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TA’IZ
City Profile
Urban Profiling Yemen

This project is part of a Profiling Project that aims to develop city profiles of 7 cities in Yemen. Cities include Aden, Sana’a, Sa’dah, Ta’iz, Al Hodeidah, Al Hawtah and Zinjibar. All profiles and data developed in this profile are accessible on the Yemen Mapping and Data Portal.

yemenportal.unhabitat.org/

Contents

Acronyms ........................................................................................................ 5
Executive Summary ....................................................................................... 6
Introduction .................................................................................................... 7
People and Conflicts in Ta’iz ........................................................................ 8
1- Conflict Dynamics .................................................................................... 10
2- Methodology ............................................................................................. 12
3- Demographics and Population Movement ............................................. 14
4- Protection ................................................................................................... 20
5- Governance ............................................................................................... 25
6- Social Cohesion .......................................................................................... 34
7- Cultural Heritage ....................................................................................... 39
8- Housing, Land, and Property (HLP) ......................................................... 44
9- Economy .................................................................................................... 51
10- Health and Emergency ............................................................................ 54
11- Education ................................................................................................. 59
12- Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) ................................................ 65
13- Energy ...................................................................................................... 72
14- Solid Waste Management (SWM) ............................................................ 81
15- Transportation and Mobility ................................................................... 89
16- Communications ................................................................................. 96

ANNEXES

A. Asset Verification ...................................................................................... 102
B. Summary Overall Situation in Each District ........................................... 105
C. List of Figures ........................................................................................... 110
D. List of Tables ............................................................................................ 114
### Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADSL</td>
<td>Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOA V</td>
<td>Action on Armed Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQAP</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>Camp Coordination and Camp Management Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Cleanliness and City Improvement Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFP</td>
<td>Community Focal Point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Central Statistics Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>Dynamic Needs Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>DTM</td>
<td>Displacement Tracking Matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emirates Red Crescent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESSSC</td>
<td>Environment Studies and Society Service Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEWS NET</td>
<td>Famine Early Warning Systems Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETC</td>
<td>Emergency Telecommunications Cluster</td>
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<tr>
<td>GBV</td>
<td>Gender-Based Violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>General Investment Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIS</td>
<td>Geographic Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOAM</td>
<td>Yemen’s General Organization of Antiquities and Museums</td>
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<td>GoY</td>
<td>Government of Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPC</td>
<td>General People’s Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSMA</td>
<td>Global System for Mobile Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>HeRAMS</td>
<td>Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH</td>
<td>Household</td>
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<tr>
<td>HF</td>
<td>Health Facility</td>
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<td>HLP</td>
<td>Housing, Land, and Property</td>
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<td>HNO</td>
<td>Humanitarian Needs Overview</td>
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<td>HRP</td>
<td>Humanitarian Response Plan</td>
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<td>IBRD</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communications Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IEDS</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Devices</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Human Rights Law</td>
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<td>International Labor Organization</td>
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<td>International Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRG</td>
<td>Internationally Recognized Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISDN</td>
<td>Integrated Services Digital Network</td>
</tr>
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<td>ISIL-YP</td>
<td>Islamic State of Iraq and Levant – Yemen Province</td>
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<td>JMP</td>
<td>Joint Meeting Parties</td>
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<td>JRC</td>
<td>Joint Research Center</td>
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<td>KI</td>
<td>Key Informant</td>
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<td>Kingdom of Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>LAE O</td>
<td>Literacy and Adult Education Organization</td>
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<td>LAL</td>
<td>Local Authority Law</td>
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<td>LC</td>
<td>Local Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCWS</td>
<td>Local Corporation of Water and Sanitation</td>
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<td>LPG</td>
<td>Liquefied Petroleum Gas</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAI</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<td>MEE</td>
<td>Ministry of Electricity and Energy</td>
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<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>MoHE SR</td>
<td>Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research</td>
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<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
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<td>MoLA</td>
<td>Ministry of Local Administration</td>
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<td>MoPHP</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Health and Population</td>
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<td>Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation</td>
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<td>MoT</td>
<td>Ministry of Transportation</td>
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<td>MoTEVT</td>
<td>Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training</td>
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<td>MPWH</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Works and Highways</td>
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<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSWM</td>
<td>Municipal Solid Waste Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTIT</td>
<td>Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>MWE</td>
<td>Ministry of Water and Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFI</td>
<td>Non-Food Item</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NNGO</td>
<td>National Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NSSWM</td>
<td>National Strategy for Solid Waste Management</td>
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<td>NWRA</td>
<td>National Water Resources Authority</td>
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<td>NWSSIP</td>
<td>National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program</td>
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<td>PIN</td>
<td>People in Need</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTC</td>
<td>Public Telecommunication Corporation</td>
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<td>PV</td>
<td>Photovoltaic</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAF</td>
<td>Small Arms Fire</td>
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<tr>
<td>SA/LW</td>
<td>Small Arms/Light Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFD</td>
<td>Social Fund for Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>State Land Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>Supreme Political Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>Supreme Revolutionary Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWM</td>
<td>Solid Waste Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNOCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Organization for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Project Services</td>
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<td>UNOSAT</td>
<td>UNITAR’s Operational Satellite Applications Program</td>
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<td>UNVIM</td>
<td>United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>UXOs</td>
<td>Unexploded Ordnances</td>
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<td>WASH</td>
<td>Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEES</td>
<td>Water Emergency and Environmental Sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMF</td>
<td>World Monument Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSLC</td>
<td>Water and Sanitation Local Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSS</td>
<td>Water Supply and Sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWTP</td>
<td>Wastewater Treatment Plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILPF</td>
<td>Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAR</td>
<td>Yemen Arab Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YEMAC</td>
<td>Yemen Executive Mine Action Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YER</td>
<td>Yemeni Rial (currency)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ta'iz city, located near the port city of Al Makhna on the Red Sea, is the Capital of Ta'iz Governorate. It is the third most populated city in Yemen after Aden and Sana’a. This City Profile (CP) examines Ta’iz city, which includes the districts of Al Mudhaffar, Al Qahirah and Salah. The CP further analyzes and describes the situation in the city of Ta’iz across a variety of sectors. It addresses key themes and findings made prominent by the impact of the ongoing conflict, its toll on the city’s population, and ability of institutions to provide basic services. Each section paints a picture of the prevailing situation and the needs of the city’s residents through triangulation of different data types and sets, including secondary data analysis which draws on available publications and media reports, remote sensing, and structured interviews with community leaders and sector experts. The aim of this profile is to provide partners with the widest possible canvas of relevant information, assisting them in their operating programming and strategic policy development. Key findings include:

- **A multitude of (armed) actors are present throughout the city, crime levels are reported as high, and social tensions result in frequent incidents of violence.** The local population resorts to informal societal mechanisms to resolve disputes, primarily turning to tribal sheikhs. Local governance mechanisms are either incapacitated or inefficient and the population continues to perceive inequality, injustice, and an evident lack of inclusion.

- **Efforts to develop mechanisms and models for local governance and social cohesion are crucial.** It is essential to liaise and coordinate with local tribesmen as they have significant influence, both in terms of the population generally as well as in terms of being able to facilitate the work of the local council. As the situation in Ta’iz has become increasingly complex and fragmented due to the diversity of (armed) actors, the local council and other parts of the local authority have been undermined in implementing their mandate. However, local councils have played an extremely important role in alleviating the impact of the conflict as they played mediating roles between armed groups (which resulted into local ceasefires), facilitated safe pathways for humanitarian aid to arrive on the frontlines, and facilitated prisoner exchanges between warring factions.

- **Ta’iz is one of Yemen’s richest cities when it comes to natural, cultural, historical and architectural heritage.** Primary data reports that about two-thirds of sites are currently partially functioning in Ta’iz city while one-third is estimated fully functioning. Although since March 2015, many sites have been damaged from conflict, a relatively small percentage of the government’s budget was allocated for renovation and restoration of cultural projects prior to the current conflict. The ability to mount reconstruction work and conservation without assistance is low, and a comprehensive management strategy, including training of staff are required.

- **Limited access to residential and non-residential land and poor infrastructure services are two particularly salient challenges in Ta’iz city.** Housing affordability rather than availability appears to be the most pertinent issue in the city; an approximate 80,000 homes are inhabited, while 7,800 housing units remain vacant in the city. Deteriorating means to monetary security and the surge of economic challenges mean that Ta’iz’s population simply cannot afford paying rent. According to primary data, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), followed by returnees, face the most frequent challenges in satisfying shelter and housing needs. In addition to conflict-related damages (78% of the housing stock), the city is subject to severe seasonal flash flooding causing significant damage to property.

- **Ta’iz city has been in a long-term state of blackout with clear evidence of a continuing lack in electricity, placing a substantial burden on various sectors and gravely undermining availability of city-wide services.** The destruction of Asifrah, Ta’iz’s primary source of electricity, along with damage to high-voltage lines connecting Ta’iz to Mocha’s and Al Hodeidah’s power plants have all contributed to diminished energy supply in the city. Additionally, a total of 313 energy facilities have broken down, rendering the public grid both undependable and ineffective.

- **Less than half of the total amount of Health Facilities (74) in the city are reported to be without damage.** Major surgery services cannot be performed in the city; neither services in terms of minor surgery and lab services nor maternal and child healthcare are available in one out of three districts. Power shortages have negatively affected health facilities as hospitals are struggling to pay for the diesel fuel needed to run their generators. Sewage and wastewater management issues, landfill sites in the proximity of the city, and a great number of polluting factories further negatively impact the health sector. Reportedly, over two-thirds of the population does not have access to water for drinking purposes; common issues reported include issues with access as well as availability as water is not frequently found in the market or is too expensive to purchase.

- **Approximately half of communication facilities in Ta’iz city are not functioning and all districts face difficulties in terms of availability of communication services.** Damage to ICT infrastructure and shortages of diesel are reported as primary reasons for internet availability in the city which has experienced ICT blackouts since the onset of the conflict. Furthermore, high tariffs are reported an issue across districts.

- **While significant investments have been made to develop the road network and transportation infrastructure in the city, Ta’iz is facing challenges associated with poor traffic management, lack of road hierarchy, inadequate design, and poor road safety.** More than half of the roads within Ta’iz city have sustained some degree of damage. Barriers faced by the population in terms of transportation services are mainly insufficient money (as well as the cost of transportation), the security situation hindering access, and logistical constraints. IDPs face the biggest challenges obtaining transportation services across districts, while returnees, the host and non-host community are also amongst the groups facing the biggest challenges.
Introduction

Ta‘iz is the capital of Ta‘iz Governorate, which is located in southwestern Yemen. The governorate borders with the Red Sea in the west, Al Hodeidah and Ibb Governorates in the north, Ad Dali’ Governorate in the east and Lahj Governorate in the south. The governorate includes mountains and highlands, as well as lush green plains stretching towards the Red Sea. Ta‘iz is the third most important city in the country (after Aden and Sana‘a), and the third most populous city. Ta‘iz is located around 265 km south of the capital Sana‘a1, picturesquely situated at an elevation of about 1,400 meters above sea level at the feet of a 3,000 meters high mountain, known as Jabal Sabir. Ta‘iz lies at the junction of two important all-weather highways, the east-west road from Al Makha on the Red Sea coast, and the north-south route to the national capital of Sana‘a, via Ibb and Dhamar. Another road, the N1, links Ta‘iz with Aden. The city covers an area of approximately 22km², was once one of Yemen’s cultural hubs and is still densely populated despite the outbreak of the conflict which included frequent heavy artillery shelling, airstrikes, and armed clashes in the city.

Historically, Ta‘iz is a young city as most of its concrete buildings were built after 1962, the year the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was established.2 Ta‘iz is famous for its old citadel sitting on a mountain spur above the city center, which hosts a National Museum and a number of old mosques of which the most famous are the Ashrafia, the Muctabiya, and the Mudhaffar.

On 30 October 1918, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Imam Yahya Mohammad Hamid Al Din declared northern Yemen an independent state and in the 1920s, the Imam had expanded power to the north into the southern Tihamah plains. Long an important administrative center, Ta‘iz city was ruled as an emirate by a member of the Al Wazir house; the province came under the personal rule of the crown prince in 1944. From 1948 to 1962, when the republic was established, Ta‘iz was the residence of the Imam and the administrative capital of the country.

Historically, the city was known for its coffee production which was considered some of the finest in the region in the early 20th century. In the 1960s, Ta‘iz was the first city in the country to have a citywide purified water system built by the United States of America (USA).3 Prior to the outbreak of the conflict, the city was long a thriving commercial hub and had been developing into a center of industry since the 1970s.

3 Ibid.
TA‘IZ

People and Conflicts in Ta‘iz

THE CITY OF TA‘IZ was Yemen’s capital from 1175, until the end of the Rasulid dynasty in 1454, and intermittently later, until falling to Ottoman armies in 1516.

1910 End of Ottoman rule. In 1949, Ta‘iz became the second capital - after Sana’a - until the fall of the Mutawakklite Imamate in 1962.

1962 A revolt erupted against the rule of the Zaydi imams. Followed by an eight-year civil war that split the country between Royalists—aiming to restore the Zaydi monarchy—and the Republicans, a force made up of a mix of Zaydi and Shafi‘i fighters. Ta‘iz fought on the side of the Republicans, which in turn split into two factions in August 1968: one faction was leftist—mostly from Ta‘iz—and the other was nationalist and conservative, from Sana’a and the north. The latter took control eventually.

1963 The General Union of Ta‘iz Workers was formed, which grew into the General Union of Yemeni Workers, recognized by the Arab Confederation of Trade Unions in 1965.

FEBRUARY 18, 2011 Anti-government demonstrations took place in several Yemeni cities- starting from Ta‘iz- and it reached a height when an eight-day protest culminated in the “Friday of Rage”.

MAY 28 - 7 JUNE, 2011 The Battle of Ta‘iz(2011) erupted during the 2011 Yemeni Revolution, which started by mostly peaceful demonstrations, then developed to an armed conflict between forces loyal to Yemeni leader Ali Abdullah Saleh and opposition forces just hours before an agreed-on truce was supposed to take effect.

JUNE 8, 2011 Opposition tribesmen took control of Ta‘iz.

JUNE 16, 2011 Demonstrators organised a large protest and demanded the formation of a transitional council without any members of the Saleh regime. The march reached Freedom Square, where the protesters set up camp and resumed their sit-in.

NOVEMBER 23, 2011 Saleh signed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) deal to step down and transfer his powers to his deputy.

MARCH 22, 2015 Houthi-Saleh troops took control over the central city and the airport of Ta‘iz.

MARCH 22, 2015 Five demonstrators were killed and 80 were injured during protests, which started peacefully, against Houthi presence in the city.

MARCH 26, 2015 The Saudi-Led Coalition (SLC) launched an intervention after the situation rapidly developed into an armed conflict and Houthis invaded the south.

APRIL 22, 2015 Saudi Arabia announced that it would end almost a month of air strikes. Hours later, Houthi fighters captured an army brigade base loyal to the government in Ta‘iz following heavy fighting, which was shortly followed by an airstrike which hit the brigade headquarters.

APRIL 26, 2015 A group of tribal and Islamist fighters (pro-Hadi forces) took control of Ta‘iz city.

APRIL 26, 2015 Pro-Hadi forces at Ta‘iz had received reinforcements from the south, allowing them to capture most of the city.

MAY 25, 2015 Houthis fighters pushed back pro-Hadi forces in heavy street clashes in Ta‘iz city.

DECEMBER 14, 2015 Fierce fighting was underway between pro-Hadi and Houthi forces just hours before an agreed-on truce was supposed to start at midnight.

DECEMBER 17, 2015 Participants at Yemeni peace talks hosted by the UN in Switzerland agreed on the full resumption of humanitarian aid to the city of Ta‘iz.

FEBRUARY 4, 2016 The Ta‘iz National Museum has been destroyed in a shelling fire, destroying the building and most of its historic content.

MARCH 12, 2016 Pro-government fighters made significant progress in Ta‘iz, by capturing several districts, and government buildings and ousted many Houthi fighters from the area.
TA’IZ

INTRODUCTION

MARCH 24, 2016
Houthis escalated their offensive by recapturing the lost part of Ta’iz and some strategical roads that lead to Aden. They built walls to prevent the Hadi loyalists’ reinforcements from arriving in the city. Meanwhile, 13 trucks carrying humanitarian aid, arrived in the part of Ta’iz recaptured by the government.

APRIL 17, 2016
A deal has been reached to reinforce the fragile ceasefire in Ta’iz city.

JUNE 3, 2016
A rocket fired on a crowded market killed at least 18 civilians and wounded 68.

JUNE 18, 2016
The warring parties exchanged 194 prisoners which included 118 Houthi fighters. The rest of the prisoners were pro-government elements.

AUGUST 16, 2016
The Houthi-Saleh forces cut off the last supply routes between Ta’iz and government-controlled Aden.

AUGUST 18, 2016
Pro-government troops launched an offensive on Houthis to break their siege around Ta’iz. Pro-government sources claimed troops had captured several areas east and west of the city.

NOVEMBER 15, 2016
Government forces announced they had liberated the western side of the city, announcing they had partially broken the Houthi siege which by then had lasted 18 months.

JANUARY 9, 2017
Operation Golden Arrow was launched which is an effort of pro-government troops to secure Yemen’s western coastline in Ta’iz including the port city of Mocha, “in the hope of blocking any further arms deliveries to Houthi-Saleh forces.

MAY 11, 2017
Republican Guard and Houthis launched a barrage of artillery shells on the gatherings of Sudanese soldiers at Nabshah mountain in northern part of Mawza’ district in Ta’iz province.

MAY 24, 2017
Pro-government forces, after fierce fighting, captured the Yemeni central bank branch in east of Ta’iz and stormed the Republican Palace the following days.

FEBRUARY 7, 2019
At Al Qahirah district, local sources said that the Public Information building office was stormed by an armed group. The building office contents were looted as a result and the perpetrators managed to flee the scene.

MARCH 23, 2019
Clashes erupted between Salafi groups and General People’s Congress (GPC) members from one side and the security apparatus campaign forces. Movement in the city is partially suspended and burning was reported in the headquarters building office of the GPC and its leaders houses; casualties were reported.

OCTOBER 19, 2019
A gunman broke into Al-Thawra Hospital in Taiz, killing a wounded and injuring one of the medical staff at the hospital, local sources reported. This was not the first incursion into the hospital which had been subjected to several incursions in the past.

SEPTEMBER 24, 2019
The Head of the Prisoners Affairs Committee in Sana’a, announced a preliminary agreement to resume the prisoner exchange deal in Ta’iz.

OCTOBER 7, 2019
Dozens of United Arab Emirates (UAE) armored vehicles arrived in the southern and western countryside of Ta’iz, as it seeks to establish its presence through forces loyal to it in Ta’iz. The UAE action comes a week after three UAE ships were seen in the port of Mocha, and the establishment of a port for warships behind al-Ton factory in Mocha.

JANUARY 27, 2020
The military police arrested a gang which was trying to smuggle manuscripts and antiquities out of the National Museum in Ta’iz.
Conflict Dynamic

Historically, Ta’iz’s active opposition against the central government has been the product of resentment towards the city’s marginalization in national politics. Even though Ta’izis have taken part in different state institutions, they held no real power to influence political decisions. Currently, military and tribal circles dominated by the northern tribal elite remain in control. 4

Ta’iz’s exclusion is not the result of current policy, but rather is rooted in Yemen’s history. Under North Yemen’s monarchy, from 1918 to 1962, the ruling Imam’s army, officers, and governors all belonged to Zaydi’s sect. However, about half of the population, including the Ta’izis, belonged to the Shafi’i Sunni school of thought, and were largely excluded from the power structure. The Yemeni monarchy was unseated in 1962 followed by an eight-year civil war that left the country split among the Royalists – aiming to restore the Zaydi monarchy – and the Republicans, a force made up of a mix of Zaydi and Shafi’i fighters.

Ta’iz fought on the side of the Republicans, which in turn split into two factions in August 1968. One faction was leftist – mostly from Ta’iz – and the other was nationalist and conservative, from San’a and the north. The conflict resulted in the dominance of the more conservative northern wing, backed by the tribal belt around San’a, and the exclusion of the leftist Ta’izi wing. 5

The city’s strong economy created a powerful mercantile class, which in turn helped establish Ta’iz as a cultured and educated metropolis. The thriving population also fostered a climate of modern liberalism in which, especially compared to other regions in Yemen, women’s rights flourished while tribal influence waned. 6

Given the context, it’s understandable that Ta’iz became a center of opposition and rebellion against marginalization represented in the northern political and tribal elite.

In November 2011, anti-government demonstrations took place in several Yemeni cities – starting from Ta’iz – which reached a peak when an eight-day protest culminated in the “Friday of Rage”, which prompted some of the government’s most brutal backlashes against participants and supporters of the movement. As government forces moved to clamp down on the incipient revolution, Ta’izi tribes stepped in to protect protesters.

In November 2011, Saleh signed the GCC deal and stepped down. However, the armed conflict has not stopped and intensified in the following years, having different factions on the ground and evolving into a proxy war. Below are the most prominent factions:

- Islah party controls most of the area in Ta’iz but is under the banner of the national army. Since its formation in 1990, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, commonly known as Islah, was made up of a broad spectrum of moderate and more extreme Islamist factions, including the Muslim Brotherhood, Wahhabi, and Salafi elements. Islah would later become the main player in a coalition of opposition parties called the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) that looked to challenge Saleh and his GPC party. Many of the opposition parties that would later make up the JMP were formed in Ta’iz in the 1960s. 7
- The Houthis mostly control the northern and northeastern parts of the city which enables them to control the food industry. In 2017, the former governor declared that they derive over 25 billion riyals per year 8 which is 8 percent of the national peacetime revenue, petroleum excluded. 9
- The Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) forces: the bulk of armed groups in Ta’iz have been subsumed and incorporated into the Yemeni military controlling southern Ta’iz via the Military Axis (most popular among them are the 4th and 22nd Mechanical brigades). However, some have remained effectively outside of its chain of command, sometimes competing amongst each other. 10
- Salafists: the three main Salafi militia clusters have established varying degrees of local recognition and legitimacy; they have integrated into society in many areas of Ta’iz city, e.g. through establishing mosques and engaging in local charitable activities, and through offering protection to the population from Houthis attacks, filling the vacuum of government institutions. 11 The three main clusters are:

1. Abu Al Abbas’s militia largely operated on Ta’iz city’s eastern front, and often worked closely with the Yemeni army’s 35th Armored Brigade; it was financially supported by the UAE. 12 By 2017, Abu Al Abbas controlled much of the Old City, as well as economic institutions which were a major source of income for the state. After fierce clashes with Islah forces, Ta’iz Military Axis ultimately sought to expel Abu Al Abbas and his forces out of Ta’iz. After rounds of mediation and talks by military committees and several orders from President Hadi, 13 Abu Al Abbas was expelled to the southwestern part of the city.

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5 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
2. Islah-affiliated Salafis, a cluster which often fights alongside the Yemeni army’s 22nd Armoured Brigade.14

3. Kataib Hasm, or ‘Hasm Battalions’ supported by the UAE. These fighters are originally from outside Ta’iz, but relocated to the central governorate, and furthermore comprise Ta’izis previously imprisoned by the Houthis.15

- Forces allied to the family of the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who are fully supported by the UAE, extended their control over the city of Al Makha and all the western districts of Ta’iz overlooking the Red Sea.16

**Figure 3: Areas of Control in Ta’iz Governorate, September 2019**

- GPC: has disappeared in all provinces since the killing of its leader Saleh, yet a few armed groups affiliated with the resistance are still present in the northeastern part of the city.17
- Militias led by Hammoud Al-Mekhlafi (funded and supported by Qatar). He mobilized fighters at an established camp in Yafrus, south of Ta’iz city in an area controlled by the Islah-affiliated 17th Brigade and is in charge of approximately 5,000 fighters. The fighters subsequently left the camp, but anecdotal evidence suggests this force was redeployed across Ta’iz city.18
- Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): increased its presence in Ta’iz as of March 2015. AQAP fighters joined the frontlines in Ta’iz and almost certainly fought alongside Salafi militias against Houthi-Saleh forces. However, since mid-2018, AQAP appears to have largely withdrawn from the city.

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17 Ibid.

2 Methodology

Data Compilation

This city profile describes and analyzes the situation in the city across a variety of sectors. Using an area-based approach, each individual section paints a separate picture through the latest available data. These are then synthesized to provide the most up-to-date holistic information backed by contextual information and analysis. The aim of the profile is twofold. First, it provides partners with the widest possible canvas to support future rehabilitation plans and prioritization of investments. Second, it assists them in their operational programming and strategic policy development. Urban profiling rests on different sets of elements and pillars, which jointly provide an integrated analysis that assess the city’s capacities as well as its population’s needs. The main elements of urban profiling – in bold – are discussed below:

1. Secondary Data Review
   Secondary data draws on available publications and media to create a context-specific background of information on pre- and post-conflict trends and baselines, against which the full array of primary data is weighed. This provides a better understanding of focal events in the city’s own history, thus allowing the triangulation of analysis with primary data results.

2. Primary Data Collection
   Background contextual evidence and area analysis are insufficient material that do not fully capture individual and community experiences. Therefore, a series of structured interviews were conducted in Ta’iz in March 2020 with different stakeholders from a variety of fields to obtain both intersectoral and people-centered data.
**TAIZ METHODOLOGY**

**Sector Experts/ Key Informants (KIs)**
50 current or retired government officials, professionals, business leaders, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) staff, economic stakeholders were identified and selected as key informants because of their practical experience and knowledge of the city. Intersectoral interviews were conducted focusing on education, healthcare, access to services, housing, the city’s infrastructure, safety and security, and the like.

**Community Focal Points (CFPs)**
76 community leaders and elders were identified and selected for interviews because of their long-standing ties to and knowledge of their community needs. Themselves residents representing a geographically distinct locality — a block, neighborhood, or a district — the CFPs are ideally suited to provide accurate, people-centered, answers about their community needs, as well as about the quality, availability, and accessibility to basic services. To ensure the widest possible city-wide coverage, the selected CFPs are those who represent the largest number of the Households (HHs) and enjoy ties to the city’s government.

**3. Remote Sensing**
Satellite imagery provides accurate assessment of the degree of physical damage inflicted on infrastructure and services, comparing pre-crisis to current imagery. Definitions of damage categories are defined by the UNOSAT. Geographic Information System (GIS) tools provided a comparative pre- and post- conflict analysis on land use classification and damage assessments per district.

**Asset Verification**
Observational Data was collected on a variety of municipal public assets, like facilities, roads, schools, hospitals and the like. The primary objective is to gather information and quantify the degree of damage that asset has suffered and assess its operational capacity. Sectors include governance; Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH); Solid Waste Management (SWM), energy, health, education, communications, cultural heritage and transportation.

During this exercise, some of the damaged buildings were photographed in order to assess the damage, this included: private, public or government buildings of a services provision nature. The rapid field asset verification did not aim to assess all or most of the damaged buildings owing to the difficulty of implementing such an assessment given the fluid situation in Yemen. Therefore, random sampling of the buildings within the predetermined areas was adopted. This approach was based on the relative distribution of the number of buildings, the level of damage shown in satellite imagery, and their approachability relative to distance from battle lines. Over 150 varying buildings were included in the assessment. These structures were evaluated based on the level of damage, ownership and nature of use while excluding all security or military buildings, as well as those that serve any other specific national security purpose.

Field images of damaged or demolished buildings were compared with satellite images by utilizing geographic coordinates taken in the field using the Global Positioning System (GPS) Explorer application installed on mobile devices. These were later office-based corrected using Google Earth. After that, buildings were assessed more accurately through field images according to below classification:

- No Visible Damage (class 1): assigned to the structures that appear to have complete structural integrity, i.e. when the walls remain standing and the roof is virtually undamaged;
- Moderate damage (class 2): visible damage level, i.e. buildings with a largely intact roof characterized by presence of partial damage (collapse of chimneys or roof tiles detach) or surrounded by large debris/rubble or sand deposit;
- Severe Damage (class 3): assigned to structures with part of the roof collapsed and serious failure of walls;
- Destroyed (class 4): assigned to structures that are total or largely collapsed (>50%). This category is also assigned when only a portion of the building has collapsed to the ground floor. In these cases, the original building structure is no longer distinguishable.

The satellite-based methodology described, has been developed based on the experience of European Commission (EC) - Joint Research Center (JRC) with assessing damages in numerous crisis areas (e.g. Georgia, Gaza strip, Lebanon).

In some cases, the interpretation is straightforward, and the risk of error is low (industrial and touristic areas), there are also borderline cases in which the assessment is difficult to discern (informal settlements and congested areas). To avoid individual bias linked to the personal judgment of a single image interpreter, collaborative work is particularly encouraged while interpreting borderline cases.

However, for this methodology to be appropriate and efficient, the quality and timing of the image acquisition are of high importance. Specifically, it should be acknowledged that the time of the year for which assessments are made is a source of important challenges with respect to monitoring damages during prolonged conflict situations - the acquisition angle and the acquisition season, both of which impede the satellite damage assessment.

The build-up pattern of Yemeni cities is also a source of important challenges. Urban density undermines the possibility of detecting damage concealing the presence of debris among other important criteria to detect affected areas. Ground truth photographs, of the satellite images, and field visits remain very important in high density areas where satellite images have limitations. For instance, building facades affected by artillery shells may never be visible in satellite imagery.

Additionally, enumerators faced difficulties on the ground due to inaccurate positioning and GPS error margins, both of which cause navigational discrepancies.

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Additionally, enumerators faced difficulties on the ground due to inaccurate positioning and GPS error margins, both of which cause navigational discrepancies.
Rapid urbanization of Ta’iz city began in the early 1970s as a result of growing inflow of workers’ remittances, stagnation of agriculture, growth of governmental services\(^\text{19}\) as well as the growth in incomes. After the 1980s, Ta’iz continued to grow rapidly with a year-on-year growth of approximately 3.9 percent between 1994 and 2005, until it reached more than 466,000 inhabitants in 2004. However, several rounds of conflict in Ta’iz have led to massive population outflows from Ta’iz city to rural areas; Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) data suggests that the city lost about 43 percent of its pre-conflict population due to these conflicts. In 2019, HNO data estimated the city’s total population at 372,845, a drop of more than 280,000 inhabitants.

On the other hand, there has been an inflow of IDPs into Ta’iz city; the International Organization for Migration (IOM)/Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) reports a presence of almost 50,300 IDPs in Ta’iz city.\(^\text{20}\)

It should be noted that the above figures are all estimates. CFP estimations suggest different figures, with the most notable difference being the distribution of people between Al Qahirah and Al Mudhaffar district. It is not clear if these figures are based on the manner of local registration, or local perceptions. Furthermore, IDP households in Ta’iz city tend to avoid registering with any authority, in fact, most of displaced households opt to either stay with host families or rent their own accommodations, given that some IDPs prefer to remain anonymous and off the radar to better outmaneuver local stigma.\(^\text{21}\)

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\(^\text{20}\) IOM, DTM Round 37, March 2019.

Following the population drop, Al Mudhaffar is still the most populated district with around 165,000 inhabitants, followed by Al Qahirah district with 120,000 inhabitants, and Salah district, where the population stands at more than 85,000 individuals, losing almost 60 percent of its population.

**Figure 8: Total Population in Ta’iz city (per district), 2019**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Mudhaffar</td>
<td>165K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qahirah</td>
<td>120K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah</td>
<td>85K</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The population of Ta’iz city is majority Shaf’i Sunni, with a handful of Ta’izi families belonging to the Zaydi sect. Ta’iz has a tribal network which is weaker than e.g. in Sana’a and its surrounding northern governorates, and tribal customs are comparatively less influential in Ta’iz. The Makhlef clan is one of the best-known tribes in Ta’iz. Because of its more socially liberal culture and its higher education levels, many Ta’izi women have been teaching in remote villages.

However, their better education, more liberal culture and their wide-spread presence throughout the country have also led to anti-Ta’izi prejudice of people from other governorates.

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25 H. Lackner, Yemen in Crisis: Road to War, Verso Books, April 30, 2019, https://books.google.jo/books?id=x4BuDwA4QBAJ&pg=PA270&lpg=PA270&dq=population+needs+taiz+education+source=bots=PqRVnerrK6a&sig=ACfU3U2wB0ummAELs0qFz5jIP5_BqD74A&hl=nl&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwijsceerdoAhXOwYeYFhe7ZC6Y06AEwG0oECA40Kg#v=onepage&q=population%20needs%20taiz%20education&f=false (accessed April 9, 2020).
1. IDP Mapping and Contextual Analysis

Figure 9: IDPs Location and Number in Ta’iz city, 2019

IOM/DTM reports a presence of almost 50,300 IDPs in Ta’iz city. According to the IOM/DTM, Salah district hosts the highest number of IDPs, with almost 20,000 individuals residing in the area. It is also the district with the highest percentage of IDPs compared to the total population present (25%). The second district in terms of number of IDPs is Al Mudhaffar, hosting almost 18,000 IDPs which constitutes more than 10 percent of the district’s total population. The third district, Al Qahirah, is reported to host approximately 12,500 IDPs, making up 10 percent of the total population in the district. Research conducted in 2018 shows that Ta’iz Governorate has received IDPs from governorates, including Al Hodeidah, Sana’a, Aden, and Lahj; however, most IDPs come from districts within Ta’iz itself.


Figure 10: Percentage of IDPs out of the Total Population in Ta’iz city (per district), 2019

CFPs, when asked about the rationale for IDPs to come to their respective current location, named the following primary reasons in order of importance: affordable accommodation costs in the district (mainly in Al Mudhaffar and Salah districts), the security situation in the area (mainly in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah districts), and family ties (mainly in Al Qahirah district). Secondary reasons mentioned include the provision of humanitarian assistance in the area (mainly in Al Mudhaffar and Salah districts). Additionally, CFPs stated the following primary causes for displacement in order of importance: lack of safety and lack of access to home/area of housing and area of livelihood. As a second reason, the following causes were stated in order of importance: lack of access to home/area of housing and area of livelihood, lack of employment opportunities, lack of access to education and health services, and other reasons such as famine, drought, or flooding.29

Following CFP data, the main primary reasons for displacement, in order of importance, for all districts include lack of safety, with 96.3 percent of CFP respondents naming this as the main primary reason in Al Mudhaffar district. As a secondary main reason, city-wide, lack of access to home/area of housing and area of livelihood were frequently named, along with lack of employment opportunities, lack of access to education and health services, and drought/famine/flood (particularly for CFP respondents in Al Mudhaffar district).30
Of all population groups, IDPs face the most challenges in satisfying their needs, in particular related to shelter and housing, followed by obtaining household commodities. People in Salah district are facing the most needs, followed by Al Mudhaffar district. Shelter and housing are the sectors where across all district needs are relatively most challenging to meet; additionally, high levels of difficulties are also felt across districts in terms of obtaining household commodities.

![Figure 13: Percentage of the IDPs Who Face Challenges in Satisfying Needs in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020](image)

2. Migrants

The majority of migrants, having arrived in Yemen (mostly Ta’iz or Al Hodeidah governorates), first move to Al Hodeidah city, a major consolidation point for migrants transiting to Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). In 2017, the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat reported that there was a decrease in the number of new arrivals, which was attributed to unfavorable weather conditions, civilian checkpoints introduced in Ethiopia (aimed at intercepting migrants and/or refugees aiming to travel to Yemen), and increased patrols at Ta’iz’ coast by Yemeni authorities, aimed at e.g. arresting smugglers. There have been reports of smuggling vessels having difficulties operating before Ta’iz coast due to these patrols, though exact data is unfortunately unavailable.

According to CFP data, migrants are most in need in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah districts; needs which are specifically mentioned in Al Mudhaffar district, in order of importance, include the need for migrants to have access to medicines and other healthcare products, solid waste disposal services (both most often mentioned as needs), followed by need to access education commodities, water for drinking purposes, communication services, energy commodities for heating and cooking (these all mentioned at similar rates of importance), followed by healthcare services, food supplies, legal and law enforcement services, and education services. In Al Qahirah district, needs for migrants are all assessed as equally required across sectors.

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Figure 14: Sectors Where Migrants Relatively Face the Biggest Challenges in Satisfying their Needs in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2020

Yemen, including Ta‘iz, is facing the world’s largest protection crisis, with potential widespread violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL), forced displacement, and weak rule of law. Ta‘iz has seen the most instances of armed conflict in comparison to all other governorates in Yemen, experiencing 22 percent of incidents of armed conflict and 28 percent of conflict-related deaths from January 2017 to March 2018. Ta‘iz city and the strategic port city of Al Makha, have both borne the brunt of the current multi-front war. Of the 9,600 reported instances of armed conflict – which include remote violence, ground battles, and targeting of civilians – between January 2017 and March 2018, 22 percent (2,075) of those instances occurred in the Ta‘iz Governorate. Ma‘rib, Ta‘iz, Hajjah and Al Hodeidah host the highest number of IDPs, hosting some 93 percent of all IDPs in Yemen. As of December 2016, 120 humanitarian groups were delivering assistance in every governorate in the country, with the highest numbers working in Aden, Ta‘iz and Hajjah.

December 2019 marked one year since the signing of the Stockholm Agreement, in addition to committing parties to halting hostilities, the deal also sought to secure prisoner exchanges and de-escalation of the conflict in the city of Ta‘iz in the south. The deal proposed the establishment of humanitarian corridors in Ta‘iz, and a handover of the three Red Sea ports (Al Hodeidah, Al-Salif, and Ras Isa) to the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM). Meanwhile, the violence continues. In April 2020, six women including a child were killed and at least 11 others injured, when shells hit the women’s section of the Central Prison in Al Mudhaffar District in Ta‘iz Governorate, but activities in non-urban areas, including rural areas of Ta‘iz and Hajjah, continue to be lower due to a lack of active partner presence and access difficulties.

Figure 15: Occurrence of Civilian Casualties in Ta‘iz Governorate, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Directly exposed to armed conflict</th>
<th>While driving</th>
<th>At the market or other civilian gatherings</th>
<th>At their own homes or farms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source: Civilian Monitoring Project, 2018.</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Throughout the conflict, Ta‘iz was among the governorates most affected in terms of casualties. In fact, casualties in Ta‘iz make up a fifth of the national death toll between 2015-2019. Based on reports from the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project, 35 percent of civilian casualties monitored had occurred when people were in their own homes or farms, 17 percent while at the market or other civilian gatherings, and 12 percent while they were driving, compared to only five percent who were directly exposed to armed conflict. Likewise, the majority of incidents resulting in civilian casualty impact in Ta‘iz were caused by airstrikes and shelling, four percent as a consequence of armed dashes, three percent due to small arms fire and two percent resulting from unexploded ordnances. In parts of the city of Ta‘iz, snipers haunt the streets and open spaces. People there say bullets come from nowhere, with no warning. The level of violence and instability in Ta‘iz city in 2011 had not been seen since the 1962 civil war, and the impact is still visible throughout the city. Security incidents in Ta‘iz governorate spiked in January 2019, with the level of civilian casualties more than doubling the monthly average in 2018, due to frontline clashes along the outskirts of the city and in southern districts. Shelling, clashes between armed groups, including sniper fire, and landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unexploded ordnances (UXOs) continue to pose major threats to the safety of civilians.
Lack of fiscal security and economic opportunities combined with a high percentage of youth in the city (about 60 percent of the population) result in livelihoods issues and consequent urgent protection needs. Reports of young men being paid to join local armed groups and increasing numbers of children dropping out of school – as well as incidents of street harassment, domestic violence, and sexual exploitation of women and children – highlight the impact that conflict and violence have had on communities. In addition, the number of child marriages appears to be rising, and emerging reports suggest that women, particularly those in IDP camps, are being sexually exploited for income.45

Mass Casualty Incidents

In 2018, Ibb Hub witnessed 186 incidents of armed violence with direct civilian impact in 2018; most of these incidents were recorded in Ta’iz, 174 (94%), with only 12 incidents reported in Ibb governorate. Shelling had most impact on civilian incidents (29%), mainly along the front lines around Ta’iz city (31 incidents), in southern Ta’iz (16 incidents), and Maqbanah in western Ta’iz (6 incidents). Airstrikes composed a second main component of incidents reported (23 percent of all incidents), which occurred in the same areas as the shelling, although no airstrike had an impact on civilians after September 2018. In 2018, 33 incidents of sniper fire were reported. Throughout Yemen in 2015, three-quarters of ground-launched incidents took place in populated areas, mostly in the southern cities of Aden and Ta’iz alone.46

In 2018, after shelling (144 incidents) and airstrikes (130 incidents), the most civilian casualties in the Ibb and Ta’iz Hubs were caused by Small Arms/Light Weapons (SA/LW) (68 incidents) and Small Arms Fire (SAF) (34 incidents). In Ta’iz, all but 4 of these were recorded in Ta’iz city, which saw deadly fighting between a variety of armed factions as the security situation in the city was reported fragile throughout 2017.47 Moreover, Ta’iz is riddled with landmines, in fact, there is not a place in Ta’iz that can be considered free from explosive remnants of war.48 Landmines are also a constant fear for the civilians trapped in Ta’iz. As the front lines shift, fighters leave them in their wake, burying them in the shallow dirt or hiding them in empty buildings.49 The Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) reported in Ta’iz province alone, landmines had killed 268 and injured 214 between April 2015 and March 2017.50

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

IDPs in Ta’iz Governorate report a fear of being targeted with the expansion of the conflict to their locations and they frequently express a concern of being targeted by coalition airstrikes, whether at schools or other public spaces they use. The severely congested and overburdened spaces at IDP shelters are also creating protection concerns for minors, women and the elderly; especially in the absence of segregated toilets and bathing facilities. Women are lacking extra sets of clothing to cover themselves according to the local customs and traditions. There are fears of increase in early child marriage, if families do not get humanitarian support.51 In 2015, almost 60 percent of interviewed IDPs indicated that they lack privacy and adequate space at designated shelters in Ta’iz.52


As is the case with the rest of Yemen, social networks tend to influence displacement patterns, as these networks are instrumental for IDPs, especially in determining where they will flee to. Individuals from rural areas moved to cities because they had family or friends there who could provide housing or might help in finding work.53

### People in Need (PiN)

**Figure 17: People in Need in Ta’iz Governorate, 2017**

- **100K Returnees**
- **430K IDPs**
- **460K Vulnerable Hosts**

**Source:** UNOCHA, HRP 2017, 2017.

Food followed by shelter are the two foremost needs in Ta’iz.54 With over 460,000 vulnerable hosts and 430,000 IDPs, the human displacement issue in Ta’iz is critical. Nearly 70 percent of returnees in Yemen are found in three main cities: Aden, Sana’a or Ta’iz. Substantial numbers of returnees are living in damaged houses, are unable to afford repairs and face serious protection risks.55

In addition to the conflict’s heightened risks of death, injury, displacement and psychological trauma, fewer than 40 percent of health facilities are fully functional in Ta’iz.56 In Ta’iz city, access to these facilities is extremely limited as people would have to cross different checkpoints manned by different warring factions—a process that only prolongs their agony and limits their access to much needed medical care. Between 2018 and 2020, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) recorded at least 40 incidents of violence perpetrated against the MSF-supported Al-Thawra General hospital in the city, its personnel and patients, including shootings inside or near hospital premises.

**Figure 18: Main Barriers Faced by Households to Meet/Secure Basic Needs in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Al Mudahfar</th>
<th>Al Qahirah</th>
<th>Salah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient money to buy goods or services</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient variety of goods</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient number of providers and shops supplying the area</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity hindering access to markets and goods</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient or unreliable quantity of goods</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrain and logistical constraints to access markets</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient skills and competencies of service providers</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient safety or reliability of provided goods</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social discrimination</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** CFP Survey, March 2020

Several types of barriers obstruct households in their efforts to secure basic food items and needs. The most notable being insecurity and unemployment. According to the CFP Survey conducted in March 2020, most respondents (96 – 100 percent) indicated that economical constraints and a continuous lack of security have severely impacted the lives of Ta’izi locals.57

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Children

Ta‘iz and Al Hodeidah are the two deadliest areas for children in Yemen. Between January and October 2019, on average 33 children have been killed or injured every month in the western port city of Al Hodeidah and Ta‘iz in the southwest, despite the signing of the Stockholm agreement on 13 December 2018 aimed at stopping the fighting in the Red Sea area. In Ta‘iz, child fatalities have more than doubled since the agreement.68 Owing to a continuous lack in food supplies and shipments, malnutrition is rampant in Ta‘iz, and children are generally not attending school because of ongoing unrest.69 While most affected households are headed by men, 17 percent of the affected households are headed by women or children.60 Among the top 10 governorates where child rights violations have been recorded, Ta‘iz ranks highest with reports indicating that warring parties recruited children as young as 10 years old in their ranks.61 In the course of the conflict, banned landmines have been used and caused numerous civilian casualties and hindered the safe return of civilians to areas affected by landmines. In 2017, Mwatana documented 25 incidents of explosions of landmines planted, which caused 14 civilian deaths and 46 injuries, with most of these incidents taking place in Ta‘iz (maiming and killing 22 women and 16 children).62 The Civilian Impact Monitoring Project found that one-quarter of civilian casualties in Yemen during 2019 concerned children, up from one-fifth in 2018.63

An investigation by Amnesty International in 2019 revealed that children as young as eight years old have been raped in the city of Ta‘iz. The suspected perpetrators are yet to be held accountable. A pattern of impunity and reprisals has thus far discouraged families from reporting these incidents.64 Amnesty International has previously also documented arbitrary restrictions on essential medical supplies and the movement of civilians and civilian goods.

Women

Often supported by International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), local committees have been formed in Ta‘iz out of a necessity to provide health services, protection services or humanitarian aid. Where they exist (especially in Aden, Abyan and Ta‘iz) some women participate, especially in the delivery of women-specific services.65 While women and female youth are actively engaging in peace building activities in Ta‘iz as humanitarian aid workers or as members of such civil society organizations, their humanitarian work as well as their economic power has allowed them to gain not only access, but also social status and standing among the main political and security actors in the governorate.66 Nonetheless, gender-based violence (GBV) incidents continue to reveal an upward trend since March 2015, and women are more acutely affected by declining living conditions and services due to the war. Both men and women are particularly vulnerable to violence and harassment in Ta‘iz governorate, given the sheer number of checkpoints manned by different armed groups and active conflict.67 Women in rural areas surrounding Ta‘iz face continuous barriers, namely from armed groups, in accessing the natural resources that they had relied on in recent years.68


There have also been reports of several women overstaying in Ta‘iz prison although they completed their sentence, due to their inability to pay blood money they have been convicted with; health service is very poor in all prisons, women are rarely provided with health care especially during pregnancy and delivery and children of imprisoned women lack social services, such as medical care, education or entertainment.  

While there are no official statistics on the number of civil society initiatives in Yemen, in the city of Ta‘iz alone, more than a hundred initiatives involve more than 1500 young people, 40 percent of whom are women, according to the estimates of the official in the local empowerment project supported by the Social Fund for Development.

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**Muhamasheen**

The absence of adequate mapping of the location of muhamasheen (marginalized groups) in the areas most affected by conflict makes it more difficult to reach them and to make accessible to them whatever protection mechanisms might otherwise be available. Lack of proper documentation and equal access to available resources makes people often more vulnerable if they are displaced to the edges of the city or towards frontlines. Pressure placed on individuals to vacate buildings and land in Ta‘iz did not only target muhamasheen IDPs, but it also targeted non-muhamasheen IDPs as well. This was due to competition over already scarce resources and a local perception that IDPs were receiving preferential treatment through humanitarian assistance over non-displaced host communities in the city.

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70 AlJazeera Net, "في غياب الحكومة المركزية.. مبادرات مجتمعية في اليمن توزع الخدمات العامة للقرى", December 2, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/miscellaneous/2019/12/2/%D8%B5%D8%B6%D9%8A%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B2-%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B1%D9%88-%D8%A7%D9%84%77D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%83%77D8%A7%77D8%A7%77D8%A8%77D8%AA%77D8%B3%77D8%A7%77D8%A8 (accessed April 8, 2020).


Legal Framework

During the interim years between 1990 (unification) and 2001, a newly united Yemen organized three national elections, two parliamentary and one presidential. Following the civil war in 1994, former president Saleh carried out a large-scale restructuring of the southern administration; he ended the central administrative role that the former capital, Aden, had played in the five outlying southern provinces: Lahj, Abyan, Shabwah, Hadramawt and Al Maharah consolidating power and resources in Yemen at a central level.\(^7\)

**Figure 19: Local governance in Yemen according to Laws 4/2000 and 18/2008**

The state had previously responded to calls for decentralization in 2000 with the Local Authority Law (LAL) where Local Councils (LCs) were introduced at governorate and district levels; there were 21 governorates and one municipality in Sana’a, the upper tier, and 333 districts, the lower tier. Two elections for LCs took place, namely in 2001 and 2006.

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After 2002, when the LAL established the LCs, the latter were intended to simplify this structure. In theory, they represented a mechanism of stability which, on the one hand would allow for a reduction in the authority of the national government by transferring some administrative and financial functions over to local administrations (i.e. LCs) and, on the other, it would enable the local population to elect their own representatives. Respondents to the KI Survey identified some activities (please see Visual “Activities of Local Authority that Need No Permission from Central Government”) that the LCs could fulfill independently without referring to the central government.

**Figure 20: Activities that Local Authority Can Do/Implement Without Permission from Central Government in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Al Mudahffar</th>
<th>Al Qahirah</th>
<th>Salah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borrow funds</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deal with international aid or stabilization programmes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Define new taxes or raise tax levels</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Define recovery/development projects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select contractors</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign agreements with private sector</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set user charges for services</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: KI Survey, 2020.*

There has been considerable confusion as to whether “decentralization” referred to the transfer of authority from central to local governing bodies, or simply the delegation of responsibilities and tasks downwards while retaining final authority in the hands of central national bodies. Consequently, there was no clear definition of hierarchical administrative powers and prerogatives.

Additionally, while elected officials were able to discuss public issues in various Governorate and District Council meetings, and discuss with district residents, Local Council members lacked the authority to fire centrally appointed local officials (e.g., directors of health, education, security). Local Council members can submit a vote of no confidence to make sure that terms of local officials are not further extended. 75

Government Structure

Although the local government structure is based on the general organizational structure of governorates, it also departs from it in several significant ways. Broadly, organizational units (offices and bureaus) are either tied directly to the Office of the Governor or managed by the Office of the Deputy Governor, also called Vice Governor or Secretary General. The Office of the Governor, who ranks as a government minister, exercises executive control over the governorate, either directly or through his deputies.76

The district local authorities have a similar structure at the governorate level except that the head of the District LC and all civil servants and public employees within the district is called Director General, who is appointed centrally, and the organization units are tied directly with the ones at the governorate level.77

But while this structure appears to preserve the relative powers of local government, thus confirming a positive political decentralization, central control over local decision-making remains strong as the president and the central government reserved the right to veto any of the local activities.

The election process divides the districts’ population into sub-districts depending on the density of the district concerned. Residents cast ballots for their representative at the LC as well as the president of the LC who, in turn, represents them at the governorate council. To serve as councilor, the elected councilor must be a natural-born Yemeni citizen, a Muslim, at least 25 years old, and be a resident of the district which they seek to represent. Upon election, their mandate is limited to four years in office. In 2006, terms were extended to six years, though representatives may run for reelection at the end of their term.

Figure 21: The System of Local Government in Yemen


78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
Pre-c
Prior to the conflict, Ta’iz’s three districts were governed by active District LCs. In fact, Al Qahirah had an electronic database and integrated archive, and Salah and Al Mudhaffar District LCs maintained a hardcopy database and relied on originals with the general departments and civil service office of the governorate. Nevertheless, all three District LCs faced issues of matching needs with skills: districts complained of capacity gaps among staff (mainly due to the practice of hiring underqualified staff) while at the same time complaining of being overstaffed (Al Mudhaffar).

At the same time, the governorate level seemed to have adjusted the district plans and budgets to calibrate them better to district-level resources while the district-level executive office/organs directly received instructions from their counterparts at the governorate level. However, District LCs complained that they were rarely informed of these changes and only learnt of them once the budget was approved. In addition, all three District LCs implemented projects outside the annual plan.

Figure 22: Main Sources of Municipal Revenue in Ta’iz city, 2020

Budget and Financing
In theory, LAL empowers governorates- and districts- councils to generate their own revenues through a series of tariffs and taxes. It specifies four main sources of revenues for the councils; firstly, district’s local revenues (illustrated in the visual “Main Sources of Revenue” as per KI Survey results in Ta’iz); secondly, joint revenues gathered by the district and the governorate; thirdly, joint public resources; and forth, financial support by the central government. The budget of LCs, however, is neither distinct nor separate from the national state budget. They are, in fact, a subset of the latter which vertically integrates and consolidates taxation and finance from district to governorate to the national budget. This setup considerably limits the authority of the municipalities to amend budgets or reallocate resources to address crises as they arise. In addition, the LCs have no discretion to set the amount of taxation and must share whatever is collected with the governorate authorities, which, in turn, must share it with the central government. Revenues from the last two sources are, in theory, redistributable downwards to the local councils based on a set of criteria ranging from priority of need, population density, poverty levels, availability of resources, etc. In practice, it is unclear to which degree these funds are sufficient to address and alleviate local issues is uncertain.

81 Ibid.
**TA‘IZ**

**GOVERNANCE**

**Figure 23:** Ta‘iz Governorate Office Expenditure, 2014

- **9.2%** Development project
- **4%** Operational cost
- **86.8%** Salaries

Total YER 291,522,963
Spend USD 1,355,920.75

Source: UNDP, Impact of the War on Local Governance, April 2016.

Although in theory the LCs are entitled to financial support from the central government for capital investments and recurring operating expenses, in practice the conflict has considerably reduced that aid. According to the 2014 national budget, an estimated 90 – 95 percent of local council income consisted of transfers from the central government.82

LC income is ordinarily generated from commercial taxes: fees on sports’ events, tourism, building permits, registrations, state-operated utilities, such as water and electricity bills, property transfers, car registrations, entertainment venues, and the like. Yet, income from these resources is meager.

The LCs have not enjoyed the authority to set a budget that would cover operations and adapt to deal with challenges as needed. They have been reliant on central government funding to cover operations and projects’ costs, wages, infrastructure maintenance, investments, development programs, and capital transfers. It is worth to mention that ordinary council members do not receive salary, they receive a small stipend to cover their expenses to attend meetings.

**Current Operations**

The situation in Ta‘iz has become increasingly fragmented and complex due to the diversity of armed actors, which destabilized the governorate’s security situation and prevented the local council or other parts of the local authority from implementing their mandate.83 The conflict has caused several internal splits among local government employees, with many having taken up arms and joining actors on opposite sides of the conflict. In these divided districts, local council performance has been notably compromised.84

After the Houthis took over Sana’a in 2014, they formed a Supreme Revolutionary Committee (SRC) and later the Supreme Political Council (SPC) to serve as Yemen’s interim authority, who were afforded the responsibility for making security appointments, among other tasks. The SPC, however, disregarded governorate-level security and public service rules and regulations in personnel appointments. Moreover, Houthis played a supervisory role at the local level through the so-called “Popular Committees” and “neighborhood watch” organizations.85

Although the Houthis have not made any substantial changes to the local governance framework, they have not facilitated performing their duties,86 and some reports suggest that the Yemeni Islah controls most state institutions in Ta‘iz.87 The above has undermined LC’s abilities to provide essential services to their communities: a survey conducted by United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 2016 suggests approximately 20 percent of Ta‘iz residents have “somewhat” to “very much” confidence in the local council and other local authorities (and their executive organs).

**Figure 24:** Ta‘iz Residents Confidence in Local Councils, 2016

- Very much confidence: 3.2%
- Somewhat confidence: 18.3%
- Somewhat no confidence: 25.4%
- No confidence at all: 38.7%
- Other: 13.5%

Source: UNDP, Impact of the War on Local Governance, April 2016.

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84 Ibid.


Nevertheless, the LCs have played an extremely important role in alleviating the impact of the war and its effects on the population; as they played mediating roles between armed groups, which resulted into local ceasefires; facilitated safe pathways for humanitarian aid on the frontlines; and facilitated prisoner exchanges between different groups, e.g. the one that took place in Ta’iz between the Houthis and Salafi militias headed by Abu Al Abbas, and settling disputes that have previously triggered revenge killings.

---

The ongoing conflict seems to have caused extensive physical damage throughout Al Qahirah and Al Mudhaffar districts. Therefore, there is a high likelihood that the District LCs offices in these districts have also suffered at least some moderate damage. Satellite imagery confirms that by April 2017, Ta’iz Governorate Council Office, located in Al Qahirah district, was partially damaged. It is possible that this facility is collocated with Al Qahirah District LC office. Even though satellite imagery does not indicate external damage to the District LC office in Salah district, the building is likely to have suffered at least some moderate damage due to proximity of clashes.89

Like Sana’a city and Aden, the capacities in terms of LCs delivering services such as electricity and water supply have been severely affected in the entire city of Ta’iz as a result of city-wide disruptions. Prior to the conflict, all three District LCs in Ta’iz depended exclusively on public supply of water and electricity. Evidence from the ground suggests that, currently, these LCs have no access to the public electricity supply and only inconsistent access to the public water supply. The visual “Status of Services Offered by Local Authorities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020” shows the status of the current activities provided by LCs according to KI Survey respondents.

Despite the reported damage to LCs offices, restricted capacities to deliver services, and access issues, media reports and social media posts indicate that these District LCs have continued to function throughout the conflict.90

Figure 27: Street Vendors’ Relationship with Local Authorities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020

Another factor to consider is the relationship of the local authority and street vendors as the informal employment sector is an integral part of urban economies, especially for those have less employment opportunities, including marginalized groups. As per the visual “Street Vendors’ Relationship with Local Authorities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020”, KI data shows there are different dynamics in each district.91

90 Ibid.
TA’IZ
RAPID CITY PROFILE

Figure 28: Public Announcements Made by the Local Council in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Al Mudahffar</th>
<th>Al Qahirah</th>
<th>Salah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contracts, procurement and tender documents</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget and spending accounts</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City urban planning, including maintenance</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notifications to building committees</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deal with international aid or stabilization programmes</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Define new taxes or raise tax levels</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Define recovery/development projects</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select contractors</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign agreements with private sector</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
<td>●</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


KI respondents furthermore described how transparent LCs are in terms of public announcements being made; KI data suggests that the satisfaction with LCs varies from district to district and between policies and services. Interestingly, KI respondents indicate that public announcements are least made in Al Mudahffar district, with announcements only being made in terms of notifications to building committees and dealing with international aid or stabilization programmes. Most public announcements seem to be made by the LC in Salah district.

Status of Governance Facilities

A KI Survey carried out in March 2020 provide a clearer picture which further captures the extent of damage inflicted upon the governance sector in Ta’iz. City-wide, a total of 137 facilities (out of 146) are currently functioning whereas only seven facilities are not functioning. It is noteworthy all governance facilities in both Al Mudhaffar as well as Al Qahirah district are reported as functioning. The lack of facility functionality is more noticeable in Salah, where heavy physical damages have been reported. With the increasing humanitarian needs in Yemen, the international support efforts focus mostly on the humanitarian response. In this context and to mitigate risks for youth and vulnerable groups, efforts to develop mechanisms and models for local governance and social cohesion are crucial. In addition, it is essential to liaise and coordinate with local tribesmen as they have significant influence, both in terms of the population as well as in terms of being able to facilitate the LCs work. It is also important that the local budget available is allocated by the local government, e.g. for rehabilitation of local offices. Last but not least, independence of the local council from the fighting factions on the ground is crucial to be able to provide services in an impartial and equal manner.

Figure 29: Total Number of Governance Facilities and Their Functionalities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility Type</th>
<th>Fully functioning</th>
<th>Partially functioning</th>
<th>Not functioning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al Mudhaffar</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadastral Affairs Department (if it exists in the city)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Registry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts (if they exist in the city)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death and Burial Office</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire stations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licenses office</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal police</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal services (building permits)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Governance Unit, please specify?</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police stations</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The slaughterhouse</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al Qahirah</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licenses office</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal police</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal services (building permits)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police stations</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The slaughterhouse</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salah</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadastral Affairs Department (if it exists in the city)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defense</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Registry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts (if they exist in the city)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death and Burial Office</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire stations</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licenses office</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal police</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal services (building permits)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police stations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The slaughterhouse</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>137</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Social Cohesion

Highlights
- Only one court remains operational in the city;
- Local population resorts to informal societal mechanisms to resolve disputes, primarily turning to tribal sheikhs;
- When Muhamasheen in Ta’iz claim their rights, stand up for themselves in a dispute or even engage in acts of social mobility, they quickly become the victims of discrimination and violence;
- While Ta’iz is a conservative society, women have played an active role in times of peace, protest and conflict;
- High incidence of fear and depression among children in Ta’iz, many have been the subject of child labor, exploitation and recruitment by armed factions.

Due to the ongoing security situation, many intellectuals and liberal local leaders have fled the city for villages outside the conflict zone, some leaving the country.93 A multitude of armed groups are present throughout the city, crime levels are reported as high, and social tensions result in frequent incidents of violence. Local governance mechanisms are either incapacitated or inefficient and the population continues to perceive inequality, injustice, favoritism, and an evident lack of inclusion by part of the authorities.94 The worsening circumstances in civil life in Ta’iz and the collapse of the salaries payment system has left citizens increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups. The police department in Ta’iz is lacking in infrastructure, equipment, vehicles and an operational budget, about 3,000 members from the resistance forces have been recruited into the security apparatus, but there are inadequate funds to train them. Local police forces are also undermined by non-state armed groups running their own makeshift police stations and prisons without the oversight of formal institutions.95

Armed groups have made a habit out of taxing and charging citizens and businesses, imposing levies and “fundraisers” to support their activities. Consequently, numerous businesses from Ta’iz have taken their operations elsewhere, seeking safer markets in which to conduct business.96 Respondents to the CFP Survey conducted in March 2020 highlighted several barriers to accessing legal and law enforcement services in Ta’iz with the foremost hurdle being an insufficient amount of money to access services.97 While urban community groups in Ta’iz have proved more resilient, mainly youth in rural areas face further challenges, such as high levels of conscription into fighting forces and high levels of displacement. Both factors have disrupted community cohesion in rural areas around the city. At the same time, Ta’iz has been absorbing high numbers of displaced people from surrounding rural areas, including those who come for treatment in the city’s struggling hospitals.98

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Figure 30: IDPs in Ta’iz Governorate by Places of Origin, 2015

- 37% Ta’iz
- 35% Lahj
- 20% Aden
- 5% Other
- 3% Sana’a


95 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Caught in the Middle: A Conflict Mapping of Taiz Governorate, (Bonn, Germany: 2018), https://ca2353e6-1waf-4e76-8b7a-930b0caab222.filesusr.com/ugd/df2b40_e6cbadad37a396b9929ac63a50b5b9aa.pdf (accessed April 7, 2020).
Out of an approximate 3,070,000 residents in 2019, about 430,000 remain in displacement as a result of the conflict in Ta’iz Governorate. Most IDPs in Ta’iz (almost 80 percent) have resorted to sheltering with host families or in rented accommodation, straining their already depleted resources. In Ta’iz Governorate, conflicts over assistance and access to local services between IDP and host communities have resulted in violence and reinforced tribal connotations as a source of conflict. Region of birth, religious beliefs, and tribal affiliation are core social identifiers which remain tied to an individual for their entire life. When these perceptions and divisions materialize into violent incidents, they entrench ingrained identity disputes at the heart of the conflict and further undermine peace and stability.

By 2017, despite an overall decline in conflict-related displacement in Yemen, the largest increases in numbers of IDPs were in Ta’iz, Amran and Al Hodeidah. In governorates such as Ta’iz, which see intermittent conflict, households experience a continuous cycle of displacement, return and secondary displacement. This repetitive cycle of displacement and return has led to an increase in informal settlements. Shanties have accumulated over time and necessitated a major resettlement program for the “akhdam”, who represent the poorest strata of Yemeni society. Parties to the conflict, in breach of international humanitarian law, have repeatedly used civilian property including homes, hospitals, communal areas, and schools for military purposes, placing civilians at greater risk of displacement.

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99 HNO data 2019.


Situation of Children

When the war broke out, many schools were quickly shut down, and some public schools were later turned into makeshift military installations. In fact, out of the 1,624 schools in the Ta’iz Governorate, 468 schools were shut down, preventing around 250,000 students from obtaining an education.106 Risks to child welfare are widespread in the capital, including risks of violence, harassment, and sexual exploitation, as well as early forced marriage, the latter becoming more common due to the increased need for supplemental income and protection by affiliation. By 2017, IDP assessments conducted in Ta’iz revealed that 8 percent of girls aged 12 to 17 were pregnant, indicating a continued prevalence of early marriage.107 In Ta’iz, many families are continuously moving towards negative coping mechanisms, such as petty crimes and child labor which also could include child recruitment into the many armed groups operating in the city and surrounding areas. In April 2020, Save the Children carried out an extensive survey, interviewing more than 1,250 children (age 13-17), parents and adult caregivers about their mental wellbeing. It concluded that children were especially fearful in Ta’iz (29 percent), where 10 percent of the children interviewed were displaced from other areas in the north of the country.108

Status of Women

The city of Ta’iz is home to a conservative society, mostly dominated by men. Women often find themselves either jobless or working low-paid jobs; families are also at high risk of exploitation and abuse.109 Because of this conservative culture, women’s participation in decision making is generally limited. However, it is important to note that the roles of women in the conflict have not been limited to victimhood; during the initial protests against the government, women were at the forefront of protest marches, protesting against stigma.110 Women in Ta’iz have also cooked and furnished shelters for soldiers, recruited fighters, and countered the traditional rules that prohibited their participation in armed conflicts by taking up arms with pro-Hadi forces against the Houthis and becoming trained police officers or snipers on the frontlines.111

Many women find themselves suddenly becoming heads of households, while lacking access to jobs and income, and vulnerable to exploitation by a variety of actors. Women in Ta’iz speak of the personal courage they have shown in approaching militia leaders to negotiate for the release of prisoners of war, including through negotiating across kinship groups they are tied to through marriage. They also worked on organizing relief convoys, smuggled medicines to hospitals in besieged areas, rescued injured citizens, and crossed during situations of fire exchange to help families which were stuck escape fire lines. They worked on improving social services, including education.112


Minority Groups

There are large concentrations of Muhamasheen in Ta’iz, most of them residing in neighborhoods in the city that were hit shortly after the conflict began. As a result, this marginalized group was among the first who were displaced. In Ta’iz, Muhamasheen began moving into parks and other communal spaces where some built shelters. Lacking tribal connections, they had no native villages to return to. Move over, they are frequently required to vacate premises they end up in since they are not seen as equal partners in terms of accessing lands. Tribal sheikhs or a local Aqel Al Harra (neighborhood chief) usually order their eviction. In 2016, Muhamasheen in Ta’iz began moving into highly volatile locations, closer to the fighting or in proximity to military zones.113

Land and Water Disputes

In Ta’iz, there are reports of communities disputing over land, allying themselves with opposing war factions as a means of taking revenge on their rivals. Militias appear to extort landowners for ‘protection’ instead of seizing the lands, and local authorities (customary and state) have expressed a sense of helplessness in terms of being able to address these kind of disputes. Overlapping claims are also emerging in the context of urban IDPs returning to their rural villages attempting to claim land from their families, or finding that parcels they thought were theirs have been occupied by neighbors, militias, sold to new owners, or had been over-divided through inheritance claims, leading to insufficient land being left. While tribal sheikhs are often relied upon to resolve such issues, there are cases where they play a direct role and profit from the creation of these overlapping claims. Where sheikhs who have been replaced by their successors do not always recognize or uphold the legitimacy of the transactions in which they were involved or the dispute resolutions that they facilitated. This lack of institutional continuity creates the opportunity for parties to reopen old disputes, or for new disputes to emerge.114

Vital resources are also causing social tensions: the citizens of Ta’iz view traditional leaders and other local authorities as neutral providers of dispute resolution services for water issues. Firewood is a commodity that instigates disputes where it is often collected or harvested from private lands or communal lands causing individuals to face challenges negotiating access to collection sites. Disputes such as these frequently lead to resentment build-up in the community where locals argue that “strangers” are over-depleting their limited supply.115

Rule of Law and Dispute Resolution

Figure 31: Population Groups Facing Biggest Challenges Satisfying/Accessing Legal Needs (Police, Courts, etc.) in Ta’iz City (per district), 2020

Vital resources are also causing social tensions: the citizens of Ta’iz view traditional leaders and other local authorities as neutral providers of dispute resolution services for water issues. Firewood is a commodity that instigates disputes where it is often collected or harvested from private lands or communal lands causing individuals to face challenges negotiating access to collection sites. Disputes such as these frequently lead to resentment build-up in the community where locals argue that “strangers” are over-depleting their limited supply.115

114 Ibid.
115 Ibid.
of trust in formal authorities. These tribal structures are still evoking their traditional position, and while tribal leaders hold authoritative roles in society, Yemenis in Ta’iz are more likely to align with a regional identity rather than their tribal affiliation. There are dispute resolution responsibilities within the Articles of Association of their sub-district cooperative council. Together through cooperation between the local community and the sub-district cooperative council, tribal leaders quickly mobilize to mediate social disputes and stop conflict escalation of disputes by using tribal and/or religious statutes. Since most of the judiciary apparatus, courts and offices have sustained damage during the conflict, rendering their premises nonfunctional, the role of tribal leaders has been brought to the forefront. Accessing legal needs is a widespread concern in Ta’iz that affects all members of society. Returnees, IDPs, host community and non-host community members alike were all found to lack the appropriate means to access any meaningful governorate legal services provider according to CFP perceptions collected in March 2020, where respondents identified these groups as the most vulnerable when it comes to accessing legal systems.

Public Discontent

Figure 32: Demonstrations in Yemen

Citizens in Ta’iz took to the street in October 2019 in a materialization of escalating popular discontent. They called for an end to the corruption that has plagued their city and demanded better benefits, including expediting treatment for casualties of war, providing salaries to employees, and improving sanitation services among a range of other issues. The demonstration’s rallying cry was: “All of you must leave, we want a state of services, not levies, we do not want you because you failed to provide water, electricity, hygiene, health and education, successful authorities in collecting taxes only”.

Media

All factions have their own media platforms that fuel the ongoing conflict, advocating their own perspectives, promoting group interests and asserting legitimacy. In addition to TV channels, radio stations, and newspapers, websites and social network pages serve the same purposes. Whereas the media is divided into two major sides, pro-Houthi and pro-Hadi, the latter is also divided between major parties that have roles in Ta’iz, such as official state authorities, Islah party, the GPC, Nasri party, and the Communist party.

Access

Parts of Ta’iz city have faced repeated siege tactics during the conflict in the past, wherein each group had prevented population movements and humanitarian access. According to the Logistics Cluster, the roads from Ibb to Ta’iz City are either open or difficult to access. However, access from Ta’iz City to lowland areas of the governorate is still severely restricted with the roads from Ta’iz city to Al Makha and along the coast remaining closed. Local partners have proved to be invaluable to international organizations in Ta’iz. The main highway linking Ta’iz with Aden, is repeatedly cut off by fighting; opening this highway would allow for huge improvements to daily life in Ta’iz, cutting a perilous six-plus hour journey to a one- or two-hour drive.


119 Ibid.

Ta’iz is one of Yemen’s richest cities when it comes to natural, cultural, historical and architectural heritage. Islamic scholar and explorer Ibn Battuta, known as the Marco Polo of the Arab world, called Ta’iz “one of the most beautiful and extensive cities of Yemen.” A lot of the historical sites are within the boundaries of the old city of Ta’iz though many are located in remote areas in the governorate such as Wadi Adh-Dhabab and Wadi Al-Barakany, two valleys on the right side of the Ta’iz-Turbat Dubhan asphalt road. Al-Musaimear valley is another tourist resort in Ta’iz. Medical tourism was also popular, as there were several natural baths of therapeutic benefit, such as Jaber Sabr Natural Therapeutic, and Al-Ajshub - known as Rasyan, and Al-Tuwair Baths. Since March 2015, more than 78 historical sites have been damaged in Yemen including 10 archaeological sites, 8 museums, 10 mosques, 2 Churches, 17 tombs, monuments and old cities, and 6 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Sites. Many of these sites have been used by a variety of actors for military purposes. However, even before the outbreak of the current conflict, a relatively small percentage of the government’s budget was allocated for cultural projects and many renovation and restoration projects were executed by inadequately trained staff. In addition to historical sites being destroyed or damaged, manuscripts and antiquities are being looted (which was already the case before the current conflict). According to open source information, since 2011 at least 100 artifacts from Yemen have been successfully sold at auctions for an estimated 1 million USD in the US, Europe and the UAE. The issues described above are confirmed and reiterated by KI Respondents, in addition to many other challenges faced in terms of needs on the ground (figure 33).


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127 The list is provided by Muhamad al-Sayani, Director of G0AM, and is continually updated once there is confirmation of site destruction or damage which is delayed sometimes due to accessibility issues. The Legal Center for Rights and Development, a CSO based in Sana’a that has been closely following SLC bombardments since 2015, shows that mosques (712) and archaeological sites (208) have mainly been targeted (though its counts are higher than GOAM’s and include modern mosques).
Figure 34: Points of Interest (POI) in Ta‘iz, UN Habitat (2020)

Source: Wikimapia, OpenStreetMap. Public Buildings, Mosques, Entertainment Facilities and Heritage Sites in Ta‘iz. See also Chapter on Culture and Heritage.
Status of Cultural and Heritage sites

KI data collected in March 2020 provides a clearer picture which further captures the extent of damage inflicted upon the culture and heritage sector in Ta’iz. City-wide, KI respondents estimate only 26 sites are currently fully functioning whereas 47 are partially functioning. Reportedly, the lack of sites functionality is most noticeable in Al Mudhaffar district, mainly due to the random demolition of cultural sites and the vandalism that befell religious ones.

The most important historical sites in Ta’iz include:

- Qahira (“Cairo”) Castle, which is located in Al Mudhaffar district, perched on the top of Mount Sabir. The castle was destroyed and rebuilt many times over the years – some say its original construction predates the arrival of Islam in Yemen between the 7th and the 10th century AC. The castle wall connects to the old wall of Ta’iz, which had multiple gates: Bab al-Kabir, Bab Musa, Bab al-Madjar and Bab al-Nasr. The first two gates still stand.

Two years before the onset of the current conflict, the Yemeni government, under the supervision of UNESCO, spent more than two billion Yemeni riyals to restore the castle. However, multiple airstrikes in May 2015 damaged about a third of the castle, which was targeted because it was used as military barracks. After the IRG retook the castle, it was reopened in 2018. It should be noted the risk of collapse is still imminent as a result of the damages.


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The National Museum, which is located in Al Qahirah district, was badly damaged when it was shelled in January 2016.132 The building sports elaborate decorations, wood and brickwork, stained glass and wonderful mashrabiya balconies.133 The museum was restored in 2019 with support of the World Monument Fund (WMF), however the museum’s interior is currently still in need of repair.134 135

The museum used to host over 45,000 artifacts, including rare manuscripts, pre-Islamic objects and more traditional artefacts;136 according to the Director General of Yemen’s General Organization of Antiquities and Museums (GOAM), approximately 60 – 70 percent are missing due to looting and trafficking.137 Reportedly, Abu Al Abbas’ group kept most of the museum’s artifacts in their own warehouses. In 2017, the group claimed they handed over all artifacts to the local authorities, but it was later uncovered that they turned over only a small portion of it.138 After the Abu Al Abbas group left Ta’iz, following armed confrontations with the army and security forces in April 2019, a storehouse of antiquities was found at the battalions’ headquarters in Arwa School in the Old City.

134 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
TA’IZ
CULTURAL HERITAGE

Figure 38: Salah Palace


The Rasulid schools and mosques of Ta’iz have been and continue to be well-known. Among those that still stand are the Al Ashrafeyah School (attributed to Rasulid King Al Ashraf 1377 – 1400 AD) with its two white minarets standing among volcanic rocks at the foothills. Al Mudhaffar Mosque and Al Mu’tabiya Dome, which is beautifully decorated in watercolors, also still stand.

Figure 39: Al Janad Mosque

Source: Flickr, Julien Harneis, 2014.

Al Janad Mosque in At Ta’iziyah district is located in Al Janad area, some 20km north of the city. Souq Al Janad was one of the Arab seasonal markets before Islam. It is the second oldest mosque in Yemen and dates to the first century of Islam during the lifetime of the prophet Mohammed. It was built by the revered companion of the Prophet, Mu’adh Bin Jabal in the 8th year AH (630 AD). Rectangular in plan, the mosque is organized around a central courtyard and features a minaret that dates to Ottoman rule in the 17th century AC.

Jebel Saber in Sabir Al Mawadim district is among the highest mountains in Yemen with an altitude of 3,070 meters. Many springs and streams run on the sides of Jebel Saber. A road from Ta’iz leads to the top of the mountain.

Youfris in Jabal Habashi district is the most prominent tourist attraction in the governorate. It is situated southwest of Ta’iz city, some 30km away, and contains several historical sites, the most important of which is the tomb of the famous Mystic (Sufi) Sheikh Ahmed Bin Alwan, who lived in the middle of the 7th AH century (13th century AD).

Additionally, there are weekly souks throughout the governorate. The most famous one is Souq Al-Bearain which is held on Wednesday in Al-Bearain region, around 35km south of Ta’iz city. Souq Al Dhabab is a market which is open on Sundays in the Wadi Al Dhabab, nearly 5 km west of the city of Ta’iz.

144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
Housing, Land, and Property (HLP)

Highlights

- Limited access to residential and non-residential land and poor infrastructure services are two particularly discouraging challenges in Ta’iz City. Over 70 percent of developed land is in one of the three boroughs that constitute Ta’iz City: Al Qahirah, Al Mudahffar and Salah;
- 80,842 homes are inhabited, 7,800 housing units remain vacant in the city. 3,247 makeshift shelters have been set up in the city, underscoring the housing needs in Ta’iz;
- Al Qahirah district contains most of the notable destruction that can be observed in Ta’iz, followed by Al Mudahffar and Salah in consecutive order;
- Deteriorating means to monetary security (i.e. a lack of having cash at hand) and the surge of economic challenges, mean that individuals in Ta’iz simply cannot afford paying rent;
- The city is subjected to severe seasonal flash flooding causing significant loss of life and damage to property;
- According to the CFP Survey perceptions, residents in Ta’iz face a variety of challenges when it comes to accessing household items. Between 87.5 — 100 percent of respondents stated that a lack of money was at the forefront of these obstacles.

Ta’iz, the third largest metropolitan area in the country, occupying 38 square kilometers of land. Battles to control the city, compounded by aerial strikes, have razed much of it to the ground. Limited access to residential and non-residential land and poor infrastructure services are two particularly salient challenges in Ta’iz city. Practically, all land available for urban expansion in the main upland cities (such as Sana’a, Ta’iz, and Ibb) are in private ownership, and there are lively informal land markets active in each city. In fact, more than half of all land converted to urban use in the last 20 years is the result of uncontrolled and unregulated informal land subdivision. The uncontrolled urban sprawl along with the absence of appropriate urban planning and regulation instruments resulted in very rapid proliferation of informal land development in Ta’iz: satellite imagery analysis shows that approximately 75 percent of the city has been developed with irregular urban patterns, suggesting that these are informal developments. Furthermore, much of the land in Ta’iz’s two adjoining municipalities, At Ta’iziyah and Sabir, is privately owned by tribal groups. A large part of the remaining land on the mountain slopes is subject to an ongoing ownership dispute between the State and private landowners owing to an ambiguous clause in the State Land and Property Law of 1995.

Land acquisition is often a risky and costly process as most buyers end up incurring additional expenses (both the leaseholder and the original owner). On its part, the State Land Authority (SLA) stopped distributing land since 2001. Access to larger parcels needed for industrial investments is even more difficult due to the prohibitive cost of land assembly. Moreover, of the seven projects that were allocated industrial land from SLA between 1997 and 2001, none have been implemented to date as all investors faced disputing claims over their sites. Finally, the central/local government often has to compensate/purchase land from private owners to provide public services (e.g. roads, schools, health centers, municipal dump, new airport runway, etc.).

Most of the housing in the city is constructed with cement (almost 65 percent), followed by wooden structures (nearly 30 percent) while the traditional clay brick is used in less than 6 percent of buildings. Marginalized individuals are often only able to collect plastic sheets and cardboard to attempt to create makeshift shelters. Shelters built with those materials represent around one percent of the housing stock. According to the CFP Survey conducted in March 2020, the majority of residents in Ta’iz are currently living in owned accommodations (52 percent), with Al Mudhaffar district accounting for most of the city’s rented accommodations. Housing affordability rather than availability appears to be the most salient issue in the city: while more than 80,000 homes are inhabited, 7,800 housing units remain vacant in the city, while at the same time more than 3,200 makeshift shelters in Ta’iz can found across the city.

Figure 40: Planned and Unplanned Urban Fabric in Ta‘iz, UN-Habitat (2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Area (ha)</th>
<th>Cover</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planned</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unplanned - compact</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unplanned - sprawl</td>
<td>2,447</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,348</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Digital Globe Satellite
### Damage to Housing

#### War Damage

The housing sector has been heavily damaged during several rounds of clashes that occurred from 2015 to 2018; the exact extent of damages however is not clear.

The office of Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) suggest that a staggering 78 percent (47,455 units) of the housing stock has been damaged. Following MoPIC figures, the worst affected district is Al Mudahffar where about 80 percent of buildings have been damaged. Generally, across the city, most damages have occurred to apartment buildings; this can complicate housing rehabilitation programs that are directed to households.

According to this report, about 11,300 units (18 percent) were destroyed and about 36,161 units partially damaged (59 percent). It should be noted that it is unclear if these figures are based on field assessments or estimations based on perceptions.

In comparison, satellite damage assessments suggest that only about 1,203 sites were damaged in the city (see Figure 39). This discrepancy can at least in part be explained by the fact that satellite damage assessments are only able to identify damages in case a roof structure is damaged as well. However, the actual figure will likely be higher than satellite damage assessments and lower than the government estimations.

#### Table 1: Estimation of damage to the housing stock by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Partially damaged</th>
<th>No damage</th>
<th>Total units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Mudhaffar</td>
<td>Apartments</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>8,100</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>13,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Detached</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>7,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>15,200</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>24,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>percent of total units</td>
<td>%17</td>
<td>%63</td>
<td>%21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qurrah</td>
<td>Apartments</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>9,100</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>14,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Detached</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,650</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>11,200</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>18,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>percent of total units</td>
<td>%15</td>
<td>%60</td>
<td>%25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saleh</td>
<td>Apartments</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>7,300</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>13,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Detached</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>4,000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,415</td>
<td>9,280</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>17,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>percent of total units</td>
<td>%25</td>
<td>%52</td>
<td>%23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Apartments</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Detached</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>percent of total units</td>
<td>%10</td>
<td>%58</td>
<td>%33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All districts</td>
<td>percent of damage category</td>
<td>%18</td>
<td>%59</td>
<td>%23</td>
<td>%100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


154 Ibid.
Damage from Natural Causes

Ta‘iz Governorate is considered a seismic area. 38 earthquake incidents occurred southwest of the city in 2001. In addition to frequent seismic activity, the city also experiences the highest and most consistent rainfall in the southern highlands. Seasonal rains occur in two periods, the first from March through May, and the second from July until September, the latter being the heaviest rainy season. As a result of the rainfall, destructive and relatively frequent flash flood events are common in the city.

Figure 41: Damage Analysis Through Satellite Imagery, UN-Habitat (2020)

approximately 1,203 damaged sites can be identified with satellite imagery analysis. Heavy damages appear to be concentrated around frontlines in the southwest of the city.

Source: Digital Globe Satellite. Approximately 1,203 damaged sites can be identified with satellite imagery analysis. Heavy damages appear to be concentrated around frontlines in the southwest of the city.


Rental Housing and Accommodation of IDPs

Deteriorating means to monetary security and the surge of economic challenges mean that many individuals in Ta’iz struggle to afford paying rent. The cycle of IDP influx has also reduced the number of units available.

In fact, rent price, security and family ties quickly emerged as the most factors in choosing one of Ta’iz’ three districts. While Salah district appeared to offer the most affordable rents, Al Mudhaffar was relatively more secure, followed by Al Qahirah. Moreover, respondents also indicated that insufficient money, along with an insufficient number of livable housing units were the most pressing barriers to securing shelter and housing.160

Most of the housing for rent is advertised by word of mouth, as opposed to advertising through a real estate agency. In addition to a range of other challenges, high rents, coupled with a lack of basic services have frequently daunted potential tenants.161

Figure 42: Population by Current Housing Tenure Types in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020


Perception data collected from the CFP Survey in March 2020 reports that IDPs, followed by returnees, face the most frequent challenges in satisfying shelter and housing needs in Ta’iz. Between 93 – 100 percent of respondents identified both these groups as the most vulnerable in the city, followed closely by the burden facing the host community.162

Assessments on how IDPs find accommodation, suggest that at the city level more than half of IDPs settle in rented dwellings.163 Those IDPs living in the rural villages around the city usually opt to stay with host families, suggesting a less active rental market.164 However, there is some variety in accommodation typologies between districts:

Available information at district level shows that accommodation of IDPs in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah districts are characterized by similar patterns, with 65 – 70 percent of IDPs renting their accommodation and around 30 percent residing with host families. The figures are different in Salah district, where rentals represent less than 40 percent of the chosen accommodation and almost 50 percent of IDPs find shelter in other private buildings.165

164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
Figure 43: IDPs Accommodation Typology, UN-Habitat (2020)

In Ta’iz Governorate, a shelter cluster study suggests that more than 60 percent of IDPs live in small housing units (consisting of one or 2 rooms). Furthermore, more than three quarters of landlords are willing to rent to IDPs, representing a positive indicator of the community’s openness to host IDPs. Landlords not willing to rent to IDPs justify their decision with the precarious financial situation of most IDPs and fear of not being paid rent regularly. The study furthermore assessed that about half (48 percent) of respondents stated they would find cheaper/more affordable rented housing in case their rented apartment would not be available anymore, while 16.6 percent stated they would live in tents, 11.7 percent stated they would likely return to their hometowns/villages. Approximately 10 percent indicated they would find accommodation with friends of family.


Figure 44: IDP Accommodations in Ta’iz city, 2019


167 Ibid.
According to CFP Survey perceptions, residents in Ta’iz face a variety of challenges when it comes to accessing household items. Between 87.5 – 100 percent of respondents stated that a lack of money was at the forefront of these obstacles. An additional 40.7 percent in Al Mudahffar district stated that households faced a daunting task attempting to secure basic household needs. Since most shoppers tend to access local district stores, security did not emerge as a pressing barrier. CFP residents, when it comes to Al Qahirah district, appear to refer to insufficient skills of service providers more than in other areas, suggesting that better service quality is available in the other adjoining districts.\(^\text{168}\)

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**Figure 45: Main Barriers to Meet/Secure Shelter and Housing (rent, purchase, construction) in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020**

- **Insufficient money**: 100% in Al Mudahffar, 96% in Al Qahirah, 91.6% in Salah
- **Insufficient number of facilities**: 44.4% in Al Mudahffar, 25% in Al Qahirah, N/A in Salah
- **Insecurity hindering access to markets**: 37% in Al Mudahffar, 20.8% in Al Qahirah, 24% in Salah
- **Terrain and logistical constraints to access markets/service providers**: 22.2% in Al Mudahffar, 33.3% in Al Qahirah, 16% in Salah
- **Insufficient or unreliable quantity**: 11.1% in Al Mudahffar, 25% in Al Qahirah, N/A in Salah
- **Insufficient variety**: 7.4% in Al Mudahffar, 16.7% in Al Qahirah, 4% in Salah
- **Insufficient skills and competencies of service providers**: 7.4% in Al Mudahffar, 41.7% in Al Qahirah, 8% in Salah
- **Social discrimination**: 3.7% in Al Mudahffar, 4.2% in Al Qahirah, 4% in Salah
- **Insufficient safety or reliability**: 3.7% in Al Mudahffar, 12.5% in Al Qahirah, N/A in Salah
- **Other**: N/A in Al Mudahffar, 4.2% in Al Qahirah, N/A in Salah

Source: CFP Survey.

1. Background

Ta’iz Governorate is one of the most important commercial areas in Yemen due to its international airport, its proximity to rich farmlands and its access to the historic Red Sea port of Al Makha. In 2009, its urban poverty rate was estimated at 23.66 percent, whereas its rural poverty rate was estimated at 41.51 percent. The employment rate in Ta’iz governorate, according to International Labor Organization (ILO) estimations in 2014, stands at 34.5 percent (below the national average of 36.5 percent). The governorate’s unemployment rate was estimated at 15.4 percent, which is not far from the national average of 13.5 percent.

The prolonged conflict has significantly affected economic activity and impacted on the livelihoods of countless families; the siege of the city (and internal fighting) has devastated the city’s industrial sector. Many factories are shuttered and many more are damaged due to fighting and reportedly 95 percent of Ta’iz’ city’s businesses are damaged. For many Ta’izi’s, armed groups present some of the only available jobs. CFP data shows that the main sources of income in (when asked over the past 30 days) Ta’iz city, in order of priority, are informal employment, formal employment, safety nets (pension, insurance). Secondary sources of income, in order of priority, are formal employment, remittances from abroad, and safety nets (pension, insurance). When asked what the main obstacles are as to finding a job, CFP data reports that the main reason mentioned is a lack of technical/vocational training. Additional main reasons mentioned include the difficulty in obtaining a business loan under favorable conditions and difficulties faced in terms of continuing or completing education.

The prolonged conflict has significantly affected economic activity and impacted on the livelihoods of countless families; the siege of the city (and internal fighting) has devastated the city’s industrial sector. Many factories are shuttered and many more are damaged due to fighting and reportedly 95 percent of Ta’iz’ city’s businesses are damaged. For many Ta’izi’s, armed groups present some of the only available jobs. CFP data shows that the main sources of income in (when asked over the past 30 days) Ta’iz city, in order of priority, are informal employment, formal employment, safety nets (pension, insurance). Secondary sources of income, in order of priority, are formal employment, remittances from abroad, and safety nets (pension, insurance). When asked what the main obstacles are as to finding a job, CFP data reports that the main reason mentioned is a lack of technical/vocational training. Additional main reasons mentioned include the difficulty in obtaining a business loan under favorable conditions and difficulties faced in terms of continuing or completing education.
Economic Activities, Including Agriculture and Fisheries

Economic activities vary widely and include large arable lands, vast agricultural terraces, medium-sized industrial plants, and a coastal line of 153km by the Red Sea. Out of the total number of employed people in Ta’iz Governorate, 24.49 percent is employed in agriculture. Ta’iz is home to several of Yemen’s most prominent businessmen and companies; in 2004, Ta’iz claimed 11 percent of all private businesses (at a national level), placing it second in rank after Sana’a city. Some of the governorate’s largest businesses are located in the Hawaban area of Salah district, east of Ta’iz city on Sana’a Road. The main manufacturing activities here regard food processing and packaging. It has been reported that factories in the Hawaban area provide an annual revenue of between 50 – 60 million USD.\(^\text{174}\) On the western side of the city, in Al Sharaab area, lies a significantly large industrial complex producing soaps. The biggest four companies in Ta’iz are reported to represent a significant investment of around 270 million USD.\(^\text{175}\) There are a number of industrial plants in the governorate, including Al-Barih Cement Factory and a range of light industries.\(^\text{176}\) There are also numerous stone, marble, sand, and salt quarries, and the area is rich in minerals, including copper, nickel, cobalt, platinum, and basalt. Ta’iz is home to traditional crafts which include metalsmithing, jewelry making, stonemasonry, and textile, and leather production. Additionally, the governorate used to offer a wide variety of touristic highlights, which includes its high mountains, natural springs and sulfurous water and ancient historic cities.\(^\text{177}\)

Ta’iz Governorate has more than 58,000 hectares of cultivable land which is mainly cultivated by cereals (59 percent), qat (14 percent), and cash crops (13 percent). However, agricultural production in this governorate is diverse; in the Tihama Plain, the coastal flatlands in the western part of the governorate, there is only irrigated agriculture which includes production of cotton, sorghum, and sesame. Inland, a much wider range of crops can be grown (depending on rainfall and through water storage) which includes production of mangoes, papayas, bananas, and coffee. In some areas, grapes are still grown to produce raisins. In 2005, fish production in Ta’iz amounted to 3,600 tons, which is 1.5 percent of the total national production.

---


Table 2: Main Industrial Investments in Ta’iz, UN-Habitat (2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Owner/Company</th>
<th>Investment (USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plant for packaging of dairy Products and Juices</td>
<td>Al-Ban Co. for Foods</td>
<td>97 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Box making and Screws Manufacturing</td>
<td>National Co. for Sponges &amp; Plastics</td>
<td>94 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant for Production &amp; Packaging of Beard Products</td>
<td>Yemeni Co. for Limited Industry &amp; Trade</td>
<td>54 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soaps &amp; Detergent Manufacturing</td>
<td>Yemen Co. for Soap Production</td>
<td>25 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: General Investment Authority.

Figure 49: Cultivation in Ta’iz Governorate, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cereals</th>
<th>59%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qat</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash crops</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfalfa</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2. Food (In)security

Out of a total population of 3,065,034, 1,337,500 people are in acute need of food security and agricultural assistance, whereas 903,500 are in moderate need, meaning that 73 percent of households are generally food insecure. In 2009, it was reported that the proportion of generally food insecure and food insecure with hunger populations in Ta’iz generally mirrored national averages.178

Figure 50: Food insecure HHs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Ta’iz Governorate</th>
<th>In Yemen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>food insecure HHs</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHs with moderate hunger</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHs with severe hunger</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHs vulnerable to food insecurity</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In terms of walking distance to obtain food items (staple food, fresh vegetables and fruit, meat, etc.), the majority of CFP respondents state that people in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah districts spend less than 20 minutes of travel time to obtain food items; however, in Salah district, most CFP respondents state people spend more than 40 minutes of travel time.179

Figure 51: Travel Time to Access Food Items in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020

In terms of walking distance to obtain food items, the majority of CFP respondents state that people in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah districts spend less than 20 minutes of travel time to obtain food items; however, in Salah district, most CFP respondents state people spend more than 40 minutes of travel time.179

Figure 52: Percentage of Food Supplies Which Are Not Readily Available in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020

According to CFP data, food supplies are mainly not readily available in Al Qahirah district; in Salah district, more than three-quarters of CFP respondents stated food supplies are not readily available whereas almost 60 percent of respondents state the same for Al Mudhaffar district. CFP data furthermore specifies that the majority of respondents stated that residents in Al Mudhaffar district purchase their food items. However, 12.5 percent of CFP respondents stated the population in Al Qahirah district obtain their food items through aid distribution and in Salah district this percentage raises up to 64 percent. Additionally, CFP data indicates that household items (such as kitchen utensils, blankets, mats, mosquito nets, etc.) are not readily available according to 62.5 percent of respondents for Al Qahirah district; 44.4 percent of respondents state the same for Al Mudhaffar district and 40 percent for Salah district.180

Figure 52: Percentage of Food Supplies Which Are Not Readily Available in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020


178 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
Health and Emergency

Highlights

- According to a 2018 MoPIC report, Ta’iz city and its vicinity host a total of 74 Health Facilities (HFs) (which include 7 Admin Offices located within Ta’iz city). Less than half of the facilities are reported to be without damage (34), while 25 sustained partial damage and 15 were completely destroyed. Salah was the most impacted district, with only 8 functioning facilities out of 26.

- According to KI data, those most in need are children (both male and female, below the ages of 18); however, KI data states that adults (18 – 64 years old) are also in need in Al Qahirah district.

- KI data specifies that major surgery cannot be performed in Al Mudhaffar, Al Qahirah, and Salah districts. Additionally, services in terms of minor surgery and lab services are not available in Salah district, and maternal and child healthcare is not available in Al Qahirah district.

- The majority of CFP respondents state that medicine and other healthcare products are mainly not readily available in Al Qahirah district followed by Al Mudhaffar district and then Salah district. In terms of healthcare services (e.g. facilities), the majority of CFP respondents stipulate that most difficulties are faced in Al Qahirah district, followed by Al Mudhaffar district and then Salah district. More specifically, CFP data stipulates that, in terms of obtaining health commodities (medicines, etc.), all respondents stated that in Al Mudhaffar and Salah districts stated that people purchased their items. However, almost 10 percent of respondents stated that residents in Al Qahirah district relied on aid distribution in terms of obtaining their health items.

- The majority of people spend between 20 – 40 minutes to access healthcare services (health centers, doctors, nurses, and services including emergency services or laboratory testing). Most individuals in Al Mudhaffar and Salah districts spend more than 40 minutes to reach healthcare services; however, in Al Qahirah district, most people spend 20 – 40 minutes of travel time.

1. Overview

Years of conflict have wrecked an already weak health system; an estimated 19.7 million people are in need of and lack access to basic healthcare in Yemen181; of these, 14 million people (more than 70%) are in acute need.182 According to Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System (HeRAMS) 2018 data (updated in October 2019), country-wide, only about half of HFs are fully functional while 36 percent are partially functional and 13 percent remain non-functional.183 Operational HFs face multiple challenges hindering the delivery of quality, effective and efficient health services, including inadequate health workers (numbers and capacity), lack of medicines, and lack of health equipment, as well as a lack of safe water, fuel, and power. Additionally, people have limited access to health services due to increased transport costs, poor infrastructure of the road network, or insecurity (including roadblocks in some conflict areas). These challenges especially impact critical services for the most vulnerable women and children. Moreover, humanitarian access is often delayed or denied; between July and September 2017, the UN verified 65 incidents of denial of humanitarian access by parties to the conflict in Ta’iz and Sa’adah governorates.184

Figure 53: Total Number of Health Facilities in Ta’iz city (per district) and its vicinity, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Al Mudhaffar</th>
<th>Al Qahirah</th>
<th>Salah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospital (Public)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital (Private)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital (Unknown)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Center</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Office</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Unit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching Hospital</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>23</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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182 HNO data 2019.
183 WHO, HeRAMS data 2018.
2. Institutional and Legal Framework

Article 55 of the Constitution of the Republic of Yemen guarantees the right of health care for all Yemeni citizens. The Ministry of Public Health and Population (MoPHP) is the main body responsible for managing the health sector at the national level. Following Parliament approving the LAL in February 2000, governorate health offices became responsible for providing healthcare at the governorate level, while district health offices manage the local level. Pre-conflict, the health sector already heavily relied on private financing, with 76 percent of the health expenditure coming from out-of-pocket sources.

3. Health Infrastructure and Operational Capacity

Ta’iz Governorate knows 383 HFs, out of which 295 are fully accessible and 88 are partially accessible; 149 of these HFs are fully functioning and 234 are partially functioning. From 2015 - 2018, Ta’iz was the governorate most affected by attacks on medical facilities, with 67 incidents documented. It should be noted that Ta’iz city, since 2015, has been engulfed in multiple frontlines which have divided the city in two. The persistent and active fighting have long impeded Ta’iz city’s residents’ access to basic services, particularly to essential healthcare. In terms of damage levels, Ta’iz city is the most affected city in the country, with roughly 70 percent of its HFs being either completely destroyed or partially damaged.

Healthcare in Ta’iz city consists of primary and secondary facilities, as well as specialized hospitals. MoPIC assessed the situation of health facilities in Ta’iz, identifying eight public hospitals and 34 private facilities. According to the same assessment Ta’iz also hosts 20 health centers and five health units. Public hospitals include a psychiatric hospital, Nur City Dermatology, the Yemeni Swedish Hospitals, all located in Ta’iz city center, as well as specialized hospitals. MoPIC identified 18 structures for healthcare services: only two were completely destroyed and five were partially damaged, resulting in 16 functioning facilities and two not functioning. Salah district accommodates the highest number of HFs (26) with 12 partially damaged and nine destroyed. Overall, in Salah district only nine health facilities are reported to be functioning while eighteen are non-functioning.

Figure 54: Physical Status of Health Facilities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2018


CFP data stipulates that city-wide, the majority respondents state that residents spend between 20 - 40 minutes to access healthcare services (health centers, doctors, nurses, and services including emergency services or laboratory testing). According to the majority of CFPS, most individuals in Al Mudhaffar and Salah districts spend more than 40 minutes to reach healthcare services; however, in Al Qahirah district, CFPS mostly state that people spend 20 – 40 minutes of travel time.

Figure 55: Operational Status of Health Facilities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2018


Figure 56: Time Traveled to Reach Healthcare Services in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020


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187 Ibid.


Figure 57: Main Health Facilities in Ta’iz and its Vicinity, UN-Habitat (2020)

Table 3: List of the Five Biggest Health Facilities in Ta’iz and Their Status, UN-Habitat (2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Area(sqm)</th>
<th>Damage</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yemen International Hospital</td>
<td>(Hospital Private)</td>
<td>159,000</td>
<td>Entire Damage</td>
<td>Not operative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Thawra Hospital</td>
<td>(Hospital Public)</td>
<td>40,209</td>
<td>Entire Damage</td>
<td>operative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Center of Public Health Laboratories Taiz</td>
<td>Health Center</td>
<td>17,396</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>operative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiz Military Hospital</td>
<td>(Hospital Public)</td>
<td>10,492</td>
<td>Entire Damage</td>
<td>operative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiz Al-Jumhuri Hospital</td>
<td>(Hospital Public)</td>
<td>9,330</td>
<td>Entire Damage</td>
<td>operative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It should be noted that none of the public hospitals are able to provide the same level of services as before the conflict. The conflict undermined the operability of private facilities too, which are now offering specialized services with limited capacity.192

Al-Thawra General Hospital

Al-Thawra General Hospital is considered the largest public hospital in Ta’iz city. The hospital was hit by missiles twice in March 2020; MSF, in March 2020, reported that between 2018 and 2020, they had recorded at least 40 incidents of violence against the MSF-supported Al-Thawra General Hospital, its personnel and patients, including shootings inside or near hospital premises. Additionally, MSF reports that hospital buildings and structures were hit more than 15 times by small arms fire and shelling and reported several incidents of medical staff being harassed and attacked. International media in August 2015 reported that the facility was targeted eight times and was hit with 22 shells in two days, damaging the hospital’s buildings and equipment and putting the facility out of service as severe damage was caused to the burn center, surgical unit, emergency room, morgue, internal medicine department, gynecology department, resuscitation department, and nephrology department, as well as the doctors’ residence.


Comparison at country level between 2018 and 2019 HNO data indicates that the caseload of people in acute need has significantly increased in the health cluster area (up by 49 percent). A crippled health system, combined with increasingly challenging living conditions, has led to a decline in people’s health, with particularly acute consequences for vulnerable groups such as pregnant women, new-born babies and young children. In Ta’iz city, before the outbreak of the conflict, there was already a significant shortage in health services, which has further deteriorated since 2011.

In Ta’iz city specifically, HNO data estimates that 233,860 people are in acute need in terms of health whereas it is estimated that 68,562 people are in moderate need, meaning that 302,422 out of its 372,845 citizens need assistance in terms of health. In Ta’iz city, women are the population group most in need (91,599), followed by men (82,625), boys (64,957), and girls (63,241). Al Qahirah district is the area where most (90 percent) of the population needs health assistance, followed by both Al Mudhaffar and Salah districts at 70 percent. According to KI data, those most in need are children (both male and female, below the ages of 18); however, KI data states that adults (18 – 64 years old) are also in need in Al Qahirah district.

![Figure 58: People in Need of Health Assistance in Ta’iz city, 2019](image)

The majority of CFP respondents state that medicine and other healthcare products are mainly not readily available in Al Qahirah district followed by Al Mudhaffar district and then Salah district. In terms of healthcare services (e.g. facilities), the majority of CFP respondents stipulate that most difficulties are faced in Al Qahirah district, followed by Al Mudhaffar district and then Salah district. More specifically, CFP data stipulates that, in terms of obtaining health commodities (medicines, etc.), all respondents stated that in Al Mudhaffar and Salah districts stated that they purchased their items on their own. However, 8.3 percent of respondents in Al Qahirah district stated that they relied on aid distribution in terms of obtaining their health items.

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5. Humanitarian Interventions

Country-wide, the health cluster reached 12 million people in 2018, compared with 8.6 million people reached in 2017, an increase of 40 percent.\(^{201}\) Humanitarian access to civilians in parts of Ta’iz city has long been difficult; in 2016, it was reported that donkeys were used to smuggle oxygen tanks into the city.\(^{202}\) According to the latest Health Cluster Yemen data, 18 Health Cluster partners (UN agencies, INGOs, and National Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) are currently working in Ta’iz Governorate.\(^{203}\) Support provided mainly included assistance in the areas of Medical Consultations, Reproductive Health, Non-Communicable Diseases, Child Health Services, Capacity Building and Operational Support.\(^{204}\) By the end of 2015, MSF started supporting Al-Thawra General Hospital in Ta’iz city center and extended its support in 2016 to Al-Joumhuri and Yemeni Swedish Hospitals to cover the health needs of the population.\(^{205}\) KI data for the health sector in terms of humanitarian assistance offered to the population was unfortunately not available.

![Figure 60: Number of Health Partners Providing Health Services in Ta’iz Governorate, 2020](source: Health Cluster Yemen, Yemen 4W: Health Cluster Partners per Governorate, DRAFT, January 2020)

Disease Outbreaks

Cases of communicable diseases, including cholera, diphtheria, measles, dengue, or chicken pox have reemerged in Yemen since 2015. Contributing factors to the spread of cholera are contaminated water sources, collapse of the public health system and limited waste, sanitation, and hygiene services. The availability and cost of specialized care alongside limited resources for the care of the noncommunicable diseases continue placing a huge burden on patients who suffer chronic illnesses such as diabetes, hypertension, renal failure and cancer. The number of cases is rising and further made worse by constrained access to much-needed specialized health care. MSF reports that the collapse of the economy and the country’s health infrastructure has meant that many people are unable to afford transportation to the few hospitals still functioning in the country, which means that people delay going to hospitals until they have gathered enough funds for traveling.\(^{199}\)

In November 2019, international media reported a new outbreak of dengue fever with thousands of cases reported and dozens of deaths. Over 3,500 cases of dengue were reported in Ta’iz alone according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In January 2020, INGOs reported that they were not only responding to dengue fever, but also to malaria outbreaks in Ta’iz. Additionally, the governorate has consistently reported high cases of cholera since 2017. In September 2019, it was reported that the Emirates Red Crescent (ERC) implemented intensified campaigns to fight cholera, including in Ta’iz; assistance included providing hospitals with successive batches of medicines.\(^{200}\)

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204 Ibid.

Education

Highlights

- Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah are the districts with the best operational capacity. In Al Mudhaffar, more than 90 percent of schools are operational while almost all schools are operational in Al Qahirah district. Salah district is characterized by a significantly different condition, as less than 15 percent of the public and private primary schools are fully functioning. In Salah almost 60 percent of schools are partially functioning and nearly 30 percent are not functioning.

- In terms of obtaining school supplies (uniforms, shoes, stationary, books, etc.), CFPs stated that 100 percent of the population in Al Mudhaffar and Salah districts that residents obtained their items through purchasing. However, in Al Qahirah district, CFPs reported that 4.2 percent of residents are reliant on aid delivery to obtain school supplies, whereas 8.3 percent relies on family and friends, and 87.5 percent purchases their items.

- In terms of travel distance to education services (including learning spaces), most CFP respondents state that it takes less than 20 minutes to reach education services. However, 52 percent of respondents in Salah district state that it takes 20 – 40 minutes to reach education services and 12 percent of respondents report that residents travel more than 40 minutes.

Overview

By 2017, Ta’iz specifically has witnessed the highest numbers of schools damaged because of the conflict, with at least 8 percent of education facilities destroyed, 68 percent reported as partially destroyed, and 24 percent of education facilities reported as functional.206 In June 2019, the UN reported verification of 28 attacks against schools with attacks mainly occurring in Ta’iz.207 As a result of the public education sector declining, informal schools are being established in areas of Ta’iz city with lower levels of conflict; however, these informal schools are reported to be overcrowded and lacking basic education materials and classroom supplies. Conflict-related damages and ongoing security concerns are reasons mentioned in terms of schools having to close; additionally, schools are being occupied by armed groups or function as shelter for the city’s IDP population.208

Organizational Structure

Key legislation includes the Education Act (1964), which establishes different levels of education, and the Education Act (1965), which sets up scholarships and fellowships.209 Prior to the conflict, the education system was highly centralized. Currently, there are several ministries that manage the education system at different levels. General education falls under the purview of the Ministry of Education (MoE). Vocational schools and community colleges are managed by the Ministry of Technical Education and Vocational Training (MoTEVT), first introduced in the 1970s under the MoE, but then established as a separate system in 2001.210 Finally, the tertiary level is managed by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research (MoHESR), first established in 1990 and, after a brief hiatus, reestablished in 2001.211 The government of Yemen subsidizes public education at all levels.212 The Literacy and Adult Education Organization (LAEO), is an autonomous technical agency within the MoE that measures and reports on national literacy rates.

Structure of the Education System

The education cycle in Yemen begins at early childhood, or preschool, which, however, is non-obligatory. Next, basic education is compulsory for all children, generally starting at the age of six or seven. Following nine years of basic education, students proceed either through a general secondary path or a vocational path (which consists of either vocational secondary or vocational training education).213 Secondary school lasts for three years. The first year is general education and consists of literary and scientific subjects.214 During the second year, students may choose to pursue either humanities or exact sciences. After the general secondary education, students may choose to pursue higher education at a university, a teachers’ institute, a community college, or receive a technical education. To be admitted to postgraduate studies, one must complete a bachelor’s degree amongst other prerequisites. Entering into the labor market is possible following any level after the completion of basic education. Following vocational secondary education, the student may opt for a technical education.215

210 Ibid.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
214 Ibid.
215 Ibid.
Admissions and Progression

The regulations governing admissions and progression are complex and can prevent students from obtaining further education. Already prior to the conflict, the number of students repeating a school year in Yemen was high. According to a 2010 World Bank report, it took 15.9 years on average to complete the compulsory nine years of education. Students who choose to proceed to vocational education upon the completion of basic education legally lose the opportunity to attend university in the future. Moreover, both the TEVT post-basic and TEVT post-secondary institutions have set age limits for admission purposes. Since most students require more time to progress out of basic education, some might not even qualify for a TEVT path solely due to age restrictions. Furthermore, there are no regulations allowing for reentry into the basic education system following a dropout. In such instances, the only possible path is Alphabetical Programs, whose mandate is only to teach reading and writing.

To be admitted to a public university, a secondary education diploma is required. However, upon finishing secondary education, graduates cannot directly apply or enroll for a tertiary education. A one-year-long hiatus is legally mandated. Although unclear, the reason is generally attributed to the obligatory performance of the national military service upon reaching the age of 18 years old. After the year has elapsed, secondary education graduates have only up to three years to apply for admittance to the university. If unable, they lose the privilege to attend a tertiary education institution for life. The complexity of the system thus prevents not only further education but also the attainment of qualifications necessary to transition into the labor market.
6. Education Infrastructure and Operational Capacity

According to the latest available Central Statistics Office (CSO) data, there were 80 kindergartens in Ta’iz Governorate in the academic year 2015 – 2016; for these 80 kindergartens, there were 41 available female teachers and no male teacher. In 2016 – 2017, there were 15 kindergartens in Ta’iz Governorate, representing a decrease of more than 80 percent.\(^{220}\) For these 15 kindergartens, there were a total of 89 teachers, 43 female and 47 male. In the 2016 – 2017 academic year, CSO reports a total of 1,380 general basic and secondary schools (public and private) for Ta’iz Governorate, out of which 1,260 were mixed, 63 for female students, and 57 for male students (it should be noted that the same numbers were reported for the 2015 – 2016 academic year).\(^{221}\)

Figure 62: Main Education Facilities in Ta’iz, UN-Habitat (2020)

Table 4: Dimensions of Ta’iz University and the Five Biggest Education Facilities in Ta’iz

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Typology</th>
<th>Area (sqm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Taiz University</td>
<td>College/University</td>
<td>59,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Fiqdi Al-Nu’man School</td>
<td>Primary/Secondary</td>
<td>18,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mohammad Ali Othman Private School</td>
<td>Primary/Secondary</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Al-Sha‘b Secondary School</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>10,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tamniyya Al-Maaqeen Harkiyya</td>
<td>Primary/Secondary</td>
<td>10,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Zyd Al Mushki School</td>
<td>Primary/Secondary</td>
<td>10,462</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{221}\) Ibid.
In Ta’iz city specifically, there are a total of 406 primary schools (public and private); most public primary schools are located in Salah district (69) whereas least public primary schools are located in Al Qahirah district (33). However, most private primary schools are located in Al Qahirah district (108) whereas 78 private primary schools are located in Salah district and 76 in Al Mudhaffar district. It should be noted that, according to KI data, there are no primary female schools in Al Qahirah district (neither public nor private), and that there are no private primary male nor female schools in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah districts.

Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah are the districts with the best operational capacity. In Al Mudhaffar, the number of functioning schools is reported more than 90 percent, while in Al Qahirah almost all the schools are operative. Salah district is characterized by a significantly different condition, as less than 15 percent of the public and private primary schools are fully functioning. In Salah almost 60 percent of schools are partially functioning and nearly 30 percent are not functioning, meaning that around 85 percent of primary schools in Salah district are either not or partially functioning.

Ta’iz University was established in 1993 and consists of 8 colleges and 5 science centers. The colleges include the faculties of Education, Science, Medicine, Arts, Administrative Sciences, Law, Engineering & Information Technology, and Education, Arts & Sciences (in Al Torba). The centers include a Language Center, Training & Consultancy Center, Center of Training & Educational Development, Center of Environmental Studies & Community Service, and a Center of Cultural Activities & Media. The University of Ta’iz reportedly reopened in June 2016 following a period of closure for approximately one year due to the security situation. Although the university has reopened, open source reporting mentions that student enrollment remains relatively low as of April 2017, a result of the current security situation and displacement within the governorate.

**Figure 63: Private and Public Primary Schools in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Private Primary Schools</th>
<th>Public Primary Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Mudhaffar</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qahirah</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Private Primary Schools</th>
<th>Public Primary Schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Mudhaffar</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qahirah</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### 7. Population Needs

Latest available HNO data estimates the current population in Ta’iz Governorate at 3,065,034 out of which 558,465 (18 percent) are in acute need in terms of education assistance.\(^{222}\) Comparison between 2018 and 2019 HNO data indicates that the caseload of people in acute need has significantly increased in the education cluster area (up by 32 percent).\(^{223}\)

CFP data shows that in terms of education commodities (uniforms, shoes, stationary, books, etc.), 87.5 percent of CFP respondents in Al Qahirah district stated these items are not readily available; in Al Mudhaffar, 44.4 percent of respondents stated the same, and 36 percent of respondents in Salah district stated education commodities were not readily available in their area. In terms of education services (transport to and from schools, availability of teachers, etc.), 40.7 percent of respondents in Al Mudhaffar district stated there were difficulties in obtaining access to services whereas 36 percent of respondents in Salah district and 25 percent of respondents in Al Qahirah districts stated the same.\(^{224}\)

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\(^{222}\) HNO data 2019.


**Figure 64: Functionality Status of Education Infrastructure in Ta’iz city (2020)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fully functioning</th>
<th>Partially functioning</th>
<th>Not functioning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al Mudhaffar</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorms/University housing (female)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary (female) school</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary (male) school</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary (mixed) school</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (female) school</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al Qahirah</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-elementary school</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary (male) school</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary (mixed) school</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (mixed) school</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salah</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorms/University housing (female)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorms/University housing (male)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-elementary school</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary (female) school</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary (male) school</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary (mixed) school</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (female) school</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>349</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Figure 65: Percentage of Education Commodities and Services Which Are Not Readily Available in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Education Commodities</th>
<th>Education Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al Mudhaffar</strong></td>
<td>64.4%</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al Qahirah</strong></td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salah</strong></td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Enrollment and Attendance**

For the 2015 – 2016 academic year, the total number of enrolled children in (public and private) kindergartens in Ta’iz Governorate comprised 833, out of which 428 were male and 405 female students. For the subsequent academic year, a total of 1,341 children were enrolled in (public and private) kindergartens, 702 male and 639 female students. For the 2015 – 2016 academic year, the total number of enrolled students for general basic and secondary schooling (public and private) for Ta’iz Governorate was 698,002; for the 2016 – 2017 academic year, CSO data reports an increase of 17.2%, with a total number of 818,251 students enrolled.\(^{225}\) United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that 87 percent of students in Ta’iz dropout from school before they reach the ninth grade, mainly due to the high costs of education.\(^{226}\)

**Figure 66: Number of Students Enrolled, 2015 – 2017, Ta’iz Governorate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2015 - 2016</th>
<th>2016 - 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kindergarten</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>1,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic and Secondary Schooling</td>
<td>698,002</td>
<td>818,251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For the 2013 – 2014 academic year, the total number of enrolled students in Ta’iz University consisted of a total of 25,715 students, of which 12,816 (49.8 percent) were female and 12,899 (50.2 percent) male. It should be noted that country-wide for the same academic year, male students made up 72 percent of the total number of students, whereas female students made up 28 percent of the total number of students. Ta’iz University had a total of 830 teaching staff, out of which 585 (70.5 percent) were male and 245 (29.5 percent) female.

Materials
Due to the ongoing conflict, Ta’iz city’s education administration has declined, resulting in schools not being equipped with the necessary study materials and classroom supplies. Additionally, the absence of sufficient government funding has led to a rise in education costs, forcing residents of Ta’iz city to purchase study materials from unofficial retailers at inflated prices. Inflation has furthermore led to rising tuition costs, reportedly reaching up to 500 riyals per student as of February 2017.

Humanitarian actors are aiming to assist in providing teaching and study materials as well as necessary classroom supplies; in September 2019, UNICEF reported they had provided 231 whiteboards to 28 schools in four districts in Ta’iz Governorate. In terms of obtaining school supplies (uniforms, shoes, stationary, books, etc.), CFPs stated that 100 percent of the population in Al Mudhaffar and Salah districts obtained their items through purchasing. However, in Al Qahirah district, CFPs reported that 4.2 percent of residents are reliant on aid delivery to obtain school supplies, whereas 8.3 percent relies on family and friends, and 87.5 percent purchases their items.

Open source information reports that numerous informal schools have been set up throughout Ta’iz city, which have reportedly provided access to education for thousands of children in Ta’iz city, though most lack sufficient space, education materials, and basic classroom supplies. It is reported that these informal facilities offer classes in morning and afternoon shifts in an effort to compensate for overcrowding and in an attempt to educate as many children as possible.

In terms of travel distance to education services (including learning spaces), most CFP respondents state that it takes less than 20 minutes to reach education services. However, 52 percent of respondents in Salah district state that it takes 20 – 40 minutes to reach education services and 12 percent travels more than 40 minutes.

Learning Spaces
According to the latest available CSO data, there were a total of 16,152 classrooms in general basic and secondary schools (public and private) in Ta’iz Governorate in the 2016 - 2017 academic year. For basic schools, a total number of 14,038 classrooms was reported while 2,114 classrooms were reported for secondary schools (it should be noted that the same numbers were reported for the 2015 – 2016 academic year).

Open source reporting states that local groups are working to improve access to education in Ta’iz. Education officials and local residents are working together to be able to provide informal education to children who do not have the opportunity to go to school throughout the city, establishing informal schools in hotels, public halls, and private homes.
The water scarcity in Ta’iz city also led to the exploration of water sources in nearby areas starting from the 1970s, hence impacting the urban-rural relationship. There were several attempts to bring water from the rural areas close to the city, most of which were unsuccessful, due to either limited compensation to the rural communities, which led to their impoverishment, or consequent halt of the projects altogether, due to conflicts with rural communities.241 More recently, a dispute was reported, when two neighboring villages on the outskirts of Ta’iz city fought over the access to a natural spring, located in between them. The violent dispute in 2013 resulted in the death of two people.242

In 2005, a workshop organized by the Environment Studies and Society Service Centre (ESSSC) at the University of Ta’iz, in collaboration with the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWEN) and the local Al-Saeed Foundation for Sciences and Culture, discussed the pressing issue of water scarcity in Ta’iz.243 The workshop concluded with recommendations, which included stopping drilling of wells, as individual drilling has been affecting aquifers, modernization of the water supply network, and setting up dams and cisterns to collect water. The collection of rainfall water should also be explored, while desalination, bears the higher cost.

238 Ibid.
239 Ibid.
WASH Management

Management of water resources and uses falls under the oversight of several government entities. First, the National Water Resources Authority (NWRA, established in 1995) is a decentralized government agency with wide ranging legal powers to implement water laws and regulations, allocate water rights, approve permits for drilling wells, and undertake various other water resource management functions. Second, the MWE, established in 2003 is the cabinet-level supervisory body that brings the water sector as a whole, and water management in particular, under the purview of the central government, thus facilitating the allocation of necessary funds. Yet, the responsibility of water uses for irrigation purposes falls under, the third, the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MAI), which shares jurisdiction over surface spate water infrastructure with the MWE. The Water Law, ratified in 2002, is one of the two main regulations that deal with the exploitation and protection of water resources and its distribution among the population. The second relevant regulation, the National Water Sector Strategy and Investment Program (NWSSIP), was the outcome of a multi-stakeholder initiative led by the MWE to prepare a consolidated strategy, an action plan, and an investment program for the sector as a whole. NWSSIP’s mandate aimed to ensure coordination among the stakeholders, unify policies regarding water supply in both urban and rural areas, ensure equitable allocation of funds, integrate sustainable policies and poverty reduction, monitor the performance of water supply utilities, and ensure effective financing.

The provision of urban water and sanitation services is the responsibility of the Local Corporations, which have a board, formed with the representatives of central and local government and community. Ta’iz Water and Sanitation Local Corporation (WSLC) was established by the Public Decree no. (20) in 2001.

2. Infrastructure and Operational Capacity

Ta’iz WSLC coverage area receives water from 86 wells, 39 of which are located within the city boundaries, 23 in Al-Haima, Habir & Shib Alrayhan areas, 9 in Al Thabab well field and 15 in Al-Hwjala - Al-Amerah. As of November 2017, 32 wells are operational and the actual water production stands at 3,000 m3 per day. The Ta’iz WSLC coverage area is divided into 12 distribution zones. Most of the water and sanitation infrastructure in Ta’iz city is publicly managed, except for the water trucks, most of which are private, and several wells.

Due to the active conflict areas within the city, the WSLC is unable to provide water supply to some areas. While each of the conflict areas has its own wells, there are significant challenges with generators and fuel supply. A number of humanitarian organizations provided support to the Ta’iz WSLC with generators and have established several water distribution points.

Ta’iz is also one of the Yemen’s main industrial hubs. To provide water to the factories, the desalination plant was built near Al Makha, with the view to also provide partial supply to the city of Ta’iz. The plant was destroyed in November 2016, which led to the factories sustaining only partial functionality.

The sanitation infrastructure consists of the sewer network, three wastewater pump stations, one Wastewater Treatment Plant (WWTP) and six sewage trucks in Ta’iz city. The WWTP (stabilization ponds) is located in the Al Burih area, and has a design capacity of the 17,000 m3 per day. The actual inflow is reported as 5,000-9,000 m3 per day, indicating that some wastewater is pumped by farmers to the surrounding areas for agriculture purposes.

246 Ibid.
The water and sanitation sector in Ta’iz WSLC area of operations sustained considerable damage. As of 2018, around 40 percent of the WASH infrastructure in Ta’iz city has reportedly sustained some degree of damage, while the city-level damage cost is estimated between 26.6 and 32.5 million USD.257 This includes either partial or total damage to the Head Office building, laboratory, several administrative buildings, iron reservoir, construction of the five pumping stations, several booster pumps, water sterilization units, several generators, three sewage pumping stations, and the walls and the security room building of the WWTP.258 In addition, parts of the water supply system, including the main pipes and parts of the distribution network, as well as some equipment have also sustained partial damage.

The operational capacity of the Ta’iz WSLC has also been affected by the wider security situation, lack of fuel and limited revenue collection. Currently, 36 percent of the water and sanitation infrastructure in Ta’iz city is partially functioning, while 4 percent is not functioning at all.259 Al Mudhaffar and Salah districts are affected the most, with critical infrastructure, such as sewage treatment plant, water pumping stations, and water intake structures, either not functioning at all or operating at a reduced capacity.260 Some employees have been displaced or are not able to come to work.261 The WSLC is unable to cover the operation and maintenance costs, and salaries have not been paid since April 2016. The WSLC therefore considerably depends on subsidies and support provided by humanitarian organizations to cover the operations and maintenance costs.262

3. Population Needs

According to the HNO 2019, 62 percent of people in Ta’iz city are in need of WASH assistance. Compared to 2018, the caseload has slightly decreased (2 percent), which, however, can be associated with the overall slight decrease in population numbers. KIs, summarizing the affected conditions of the operated population in term of WASH services reported that the number of sick people have increased in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah, while it decreased in Salah.263

The water and sanitation sector in Ta’iz WSLC area of operations sustained considerable damage. As of 2018, around 40 percent of the WASH infrastructure in Ta’iz city has reportedly sustained some degree of damage, while the city-level damage cost is estimated between 26.6 and 32.5 million USD.257 This includes either partial or total damage to the Head Office building, laboratory, several administrative buildings, iron reservoir, construction of the five pumping stations, several booster pumps, water sterilization units, several generators, three sewage pumping stations, and the walls and the security room building of the WWTP.258 In addition, parts of the water supply system, including the main pipes and parts of the distribution network, as well as some equipment have also sustained partial damage.

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260 Ibid.
262 Ibid.
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid.
Several reports indicate concerns over the water quality in Ta’iz city. In 2015, 75 percent of respondents were reporting that available water is unsafe for drinking purposes. However, no household purification methods were reportedly used. Consequently, many households have to separately buy water for drinking purposes, which is often expensive; prior to the outbreak of the conflict in 2015, households were spending between 5 percent and 20 percent of their income on purchasing water. Currently, the responses of CFPs varied across the districts. Most CFPs in Al Mudhaffar (78 percent) and Salah (76 percent) stated that the water quality is adequate, while in Salah, the majority of the CFPs (71 percent) stated that it is not. When asked about whether the population treats water to make it safer, more than half of the CFPs in Al Mudhaffar district (63 percent) and in Al Qahirah district (54 percent) stated “no”, while a quarter, 26 percent and 25 percent respectively, stated “yes”, with the remaining CFP respondents reporting that they don’t know. In Salah, similar shares of CFPs reported that the population doesn’t treat water (52 percent) while the rest (48 percent) is reported to be treating water to make it safer. Out of those who treat water, the most selected method of treating water was reporting as adding chlorine. Infrastructure-wise, there are five water sterilization facilities, one of which sustained conflict-related damage. The laboratory for testing the water quality as well as related equipment have also been destroyed.

Due to widespread water scarcity and low water supply network coverage, most of the households in Ta’iz city obtain water from private vendors, while some get it from wells. Residents also rely on water distribution points. CFPs reported that in all districts of Ta’iz city water obtained from tanker-trucks and carts is the main source of water in the neighborhood. This was reported by 93 percent of CFPs in Al Mudhaffar, 64 percent in Salah and 54 percent in Al Qahirah district. In fact, only one CFP in Al Qahirah district (and none in the other two districts) reported that water from the pipeline network is used as a primary source, with an estimated 60 percent of households having access to the piped water. The average water supply indicated by this CFP is less than 6 hours. According to KIs, however, rainwater, tanker-truck or cart and protected well or spring are used as the primary water source for drinking purposes, while piped water supply and rainwater are used as a primary source for household purposes. Reporting from 2005 also indicates that people in Ta’iz have been relying on sending children to get water from mosques, which normally have their own supply, as well as building water tanks in every new-built house, to ensure a continued supply. Fetching water requires a lot of time, which may prevent children from other activities, such as studying.

Figure 75: Main Barriers to Meet/Secure Water for Drinking Purposes Needs in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barrier</th>
<th>Al Mudhaffar</th>
<th>Al Qahirah</th>
<th>Salah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrain and logistical constraints</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity hindering access</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social discrimination hindering access</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient money</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient or unreliable quantity of goods and services</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient number of facilities, providers or shops supplying the area</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient variety of goods and services</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient skills and competencies of service providers</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient safety or reliability of provided goods or services</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Over two-thirds of CFPs in all districts in Ta’iz city reported that water for drinking purposes in not readily available, with the highest share in Al Mudhaffar district, where 78 percent stated so. Most of the common issues reported across districts relate to access and availability. In all districts, KIs reported that water is too expensive. In addition, in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah, KIs reported that fetching water is a dangerous activity, while in Al Mudhaffar and Salah it was stated that there is a lack of water points or waiting times are long. Furthermore, in Al Qahirah it was reported that waterpoints are too far, while in Salah KIs stated that water is not available in the market. CFP perceptions related to barriers to meet water for drinking purposes need is in line with the KI perspective, as the main barrier reported across all districts is insufficient money. Other barriers reported by CFPs, such as the insufficient number of providers, terrain and logistical constraints and wider insecurity, also point towards the lack of access and availability. It is important to note that while most of KIs indicated that water is too expensive and CFPs indicated insufficient money as the main barrier to obtaining water, most of CFPs (70 percent in Al Mudhaffar, 64 percent in Salah, and 63 percent in Al Qahirah) stated that the population gets potable water through purchasing it, while around a third of CFPs (30 percent in Al Mudhaffar, 38 percent in Al Qahirah, and 28 percent in Salah) reported that the population secures it though aid. Population gets it for free. As for the travel time, most CFPs in

In addition, 8 percent of CFPs in Salah district stated that the all districts (60 percent in Salah, 58 percent in Al Qahirah, and 44 percent in Al Mudhaffar) reported that it takes less than 20 minutes to acquire potable water.

When asked about which population group faces the biggest challenges meeting the water for drinking purposes need, most of CFPs in Al Mudhaffar (81 percent) indicated IDPs, followed by returnees (67 percent) and non-host community (63 percent). In Al Qahirah, however, almost 80 percent of CFPs reported that the host-community population faces the biggest challenges, followed by IDPs (71 percent), and returnees (67 percent); while in Salah, almost all CFPs (96 percent) selected IDPs, followed by the non-host community (84%), and returnees (68 percent). Therefore, it could be concluded that the severity of challenges in securing water for drinking purposes needs in Ta’iz city is similar amongst the IDPs, returnees, host- and non-host- communities. Refugees and migrants were only selected by 0 – 7 percent of CFPs, which, however, can be linked with their reported low presence within the communities.

Hygiene and Sanitation

The coverage of the sanitation services in Ta’iz is low and is expected to have deteriorated as a result of the conflict. Reports from 2015 indicate that only 50 percent of the respondents were using functioning latrines, while the other 50 percent were practicing open defecation. Currently, between 50 percent and 90 percent of households are estimated to be connected to the wastewater network. Severe issues associated with wastewater were reported by both KIs and CFPs. The situation appears to be worse in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah, as compared to Salah district. In fact, KIs reported constant sewage and wastewater management issues across all districts, with extreme issues in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah, and high severity of issues in Salah. This is in line with CFP perceptions, as the highest share of them reported constant issues associated with the sewage and wastewater management in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah, while in Salah answers varied, with around a third of CFPs stating that issues associated with sewage and wastewater management issues are observed sometimes, or frequently. Health and environmental concerns have also been expressed due to the limited coverage of the sewerage network, as in some parts to the north, east and west of the city, raw sewage is directly disposed into the wadis.

276 Ibid.
277 Ibid.
When asked about the share of households with access to safe and functioning latrines, KI answers varied a lot, stating that between 0 percent and 90 percent of the households in Al Mudhaffar, 60-80 percent in Al Qahirah and 20-80 percent in Salah had access to safe and functioning latrines. These figures suggest that while in Al Qahirah the access to functioning latrines is quite balanced among the district’s dwellings, Al Mudhaffar and in Salah are characterized by a heterogeneous condition, which could be a sign of inequality among the inhabitants. When asked about the main problems related to latrines faced by the male and female population, answers varied between districts. In Al Mudhaffar, the problems faced by the male and female population are reportedly the same, with full cesspits identified as the main issue, followed by insufficient water, and blocked pipes. In Al Qahirah, for both the male and female population lack of latrines was reported as the main issue, followed by insufficient water, while the third most important issue was reported as blocked connections to sewage for female population, and blocked pipes for male population. In Salah, more differences were observed amongst the male and female population. The main issues affecting the female population was identified as full cesspits, followed by blocked connection to sewage and insufficient water, while for the male population,
the main issue reported was insufficient water, followed by the blocked connection to sewage and full cesspits.\textsuperscript{285} CFP perceptions slightly varied, as insufficient money to buy goods was reported as the main barrier in relation to hygiene and sanitation facilities by the highest share of CFPs in all districts.\textsuperscript{286} All CFPs in Al Mudhaffar and Salah stated that hygiene and sanitation facilities and services are secured through purchasing it, while in Al Qahirah 92 percent of CFPs stated so, with 4 percent stating that the population relies on aid and another 4 percent on family and friends.

As for the travel time, in Al Mudhaffar, the relative majority of CFPs (41 percent) reported that it takes less than 20 minutes to reach hygiene and sanitation facilities and services, while in Al Qahirah most CFPs (50 percent) stated that it takes between 20 and 40 minutes, and in Salah 56 percent of CFPs reported that it takes more than 40 minutes.\textsuperscript{287}

Availability of hygiene commodities, such as clothing, washing, soap, toothbrush, pads, and diapers, appears to be better in Salah, as compared to the other two districts, as 38 percent of CFPs in Al Qahirah reported that these commodities are not readily available, followed by the 30 percent of CFPs in Al Mudhaffar and 16 percent of CFPs in Salah.\textsuperscript{288}

More specifically, between 50 percent and 80 percent of the population in Ta'iz city have access to hand-washing facilities and across all districts it was reported that most households use soap. However, CFPs also report that most households do not have soap as it is either not available (Al Mudhaffar and Salah) or too expensive (Al Qahirah).\textsuperscript{289}

This could be explained by the fact that inhabitants may use soap in mosques or other public facilities, but they don’t have it at home. The main barrier to secure hygiene commodities reported by the majority of CFPs in all districts (100 percent in Salah, 96 percent in Al Mudhaffar, and 79 percent in Al Qahirah) is insufficient money to buy goods.\textsuperscript{290} This is followed by insecurity hindering access to markets, insufficient variety of goods, and insufficient skills and competencies of service providers, which were reported by approximately a third of CFPs in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah. In Salah, other barriers apart from the insufficient money to buy goods were reported by less than 15 percent of CFPs, highlighting the dire economic situation. It is important to note that all CFPs reported that the population obtains hygiene items by purchasing them, except for 8 percent of CFPs in Al Qahirah, who stated that the items are obtained through aid. The travel time to acquire hygiene items is highest in Salah, where most CFPs stated that it takes more than 40 minutes, while in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah the highest share if the CFPs reported that it takes 20-40 minutes.\textsuperscript{291} Across all districts, IDPs were reported to face the biggest challenges in terms of securing hygiene commodities, followed by returnees in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah, and by non-host communities in Salah.\textsuperscript{292}

\textbf{4. Humanitarian Interventions}

Humanitarian organizations provide considerable support to the operation of the waste and sanitation systems in Ta'iz city. Support includes operation and maintenance of the water supply system, rehabilitation of infrastructure, payment of the incentives to staff and provision of fuel and generators. Moreover, in June 2017, a rehabilitation project, funded by UNICEF, was completed which reportedly increased the capacity of the water network from 3,000 m\textsuperscript{3} per day to 5,000 per day.\textsuperscript{293} The demand is, however, estimated to stand at 34,000 m\textsuperscript{3} per day, highlighting chronic water shortage within the city.\textsuperscript{294} Across all districts, KIs reported that the humanitarian assistance offered to the population in the WASH sector only partially meets priority needs.\textsuperscript{295}

\textsuperscript{285} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{286} CFP Survey, March 2020.
\textsuperscript{287} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{288} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{289} KI Survey, March 2020.
\textsuperscript{290} CFP Survey, March 2020.
\textsuperscript{291} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{292} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{294} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{295} KI Survey, March 2020.
13 Energy

Highlights

- The power infrastructure in Ta’iz has also fallen victim to systematic looting, particularly cables, transformers, and utility poles. As of January 2018, most of the city’s transformers and electrical wires have been looted. The destruction of Asifrah distributed generation unit, Ta’iz’s primary source of electricity, along with damage to high-voltage lines connecting Ta’iz to Al Makha’s and Al Hodeidah’s power plants have all contributed to diminished energy supply in the city;
- A total of 313 energy facilities have broken down, rendering the public grid both undependable and ineffective;
- The LC in Ta’iz owns 49 fuel generators; 32 of these are being primarily used within the water supply system. Six generators have been destroyed during the conflict and another 21 are partially damaged;
- The power sector in Ta’iz would require between 86-105 million USD in medium-term recovery and between 107-131 million USD over five years;
- The city has been in a long-term state of blackout with clear evidence of a continuing lack in electricity, placing a substantial burden on various city sectors and gravely undermining city-wide services;
- The Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) is the most popular energy source for cooking in Ta’iz;
- The population in Ta’iz primarily relies on solar energy and chargeable batteries to meet their daily electricity usage demands.

Ta’iz Governorate, the largest governorate in terms of population, has no grid electricity supply at all to cover the demand of 111 MW.296 Ta’iz still has no access to public electricity services. The primary source of power for the city, a distributed generation unit, as well as transmission infrastructure linking it to other power stations have sustained extensive conflict-related damage. Since the May 2017 Dynamic Needs Assessment (DNA) Phase II, the power infrastructure in Ta’iz has also fallen victim to systematic looting - particularly cables, transformers, and utility poles. As of January 2018, most of the city’s transformers and electrical wires have been looted.297 The destruction of Asifrah disrupted the generation unit, Ta’iz’ primary source of electricity, along with damage to high-voltage lines connecting Ta’iz to Al Makha power plant which have all contributed to diminish the energy supply in the city.298

Table 5: Electrical Powerplants Suppling Ta’iz

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power plant</th>
<th>Fuel</th>
<th>Data of commissioning</th>
<th>Installed capacity (MW)</th>
<th>Generated capacity (MW)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ras Katnib (Steam)</td>
<td>RFO/LFO</td>
<td>1,982</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AlMokha (Steam)</td>
<td>RFO/LFO</td>
<td>1,986</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osiferah</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


298 Ibid.

High diesel fuel costs, along with the high level of noise and pollution created by generators, and lack of public electricity services has led to a surge in the use of solar energy for household and commercial use. Solar Photovoltaic (PV) for household energy needs and local businesses have gained popularity over diesel generators largely due to the cost savings over diesel fuel. Solar charging services have also developed throughout the city. Many residents in Ta’iz use car batteries to power household appliances and indoor lighting. The batteries are recharged through local service providers who own private generators or solar panels. Additionally, vendors with generation capacity offer cell phone charging services for a small fee.299

Most of the water infrastructure in Ta’iz is partially functional due to a continuous lack of electricity and limited availability of diesel fuel to operate pumps. The extended lack of power has also negatively impacted the health sector in Ta’iz, as hospitals are struggling to pay for the diesel fuel needed to run their diesel generators. The price of diesel in Ta’iz has consistently remained higher than in cities of a similar size and has seen marked increases since 2015. Several hospitals can only afford enough fuel to operate their generators for a few hours per day. They have begun charging patients for their cost of fuel and, in some cases, even require patients to bring their own generator to the hospital. Patients that cannot afford these costs are often denied admission. The lack of a reliable source of power has also negatively affected certain treatments that require prolonged use of medical equipment.300

Power Supply in Ta’iz

Ta’iz is powered by three main power plants: Ras Katnib (located in Al Hodeidah Governorate), Al Makha and Asifrah. While Asifrah power plant is fueled by diesel, the other two are powered by steam. All three plants were commissioned in the 1980s. The total capacity for all three combined is 226MW. However, these power plants have not been functioning at full capacity. As such, Ta’iz continues to rely on other means of energy.


300 Ibid.
Yemen Oil Company in Ta’iz

The branch of the Yemeni Oil Company in Ta’iz was established in 1965 under the name of “The Office of the Ta’iz Petrol Company” and therefore the branch is considered one of the oldest and most distinguished branches, where it played a prominent role in providing and distributing all the oil-derivative requirements that the province needed. The governorate headquarters is located on the western end of the city of Ta’iz, and it is considered one of the prominent architectural landmarks that used to dot the city.301

Figure 80: Status of Power Sector in Ta’iz 2018

Physical Damage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damage Level</th>
<th>High Estimate</th>
<th>Low Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completely Destroyed</td>
<td>13.4 M USD</td>
<td>10.9 M USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially Damaged</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Physical Damage</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Damage to the Energy Sector in Ta’iz

Figure 81: Ta’iz Power Sector Reconstruction and Recovery Costs

Short Term Recovery (1 Year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recovery Phase</th>
<th>High Estimate</th>
<th>Low Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total (Over 5 Years)</td>
<td>105 M USD</td>
<td>86 M USD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Power Sector Reconstruction and Recovery

Figure 82: Travel Time to Secure/Acquire Energy Commodities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020

According to World Bank estimates, the power sector in Ta’iz would require between 86-105 million USD in medium term recovery and between 107-131 million USD over five years.303 It should be noted that it can be extremely difficult to narrow down reconstruction estimates in Ta’iz as there are often secondary damages from other factors, such as looting of power infrastructure and facilities to strip and sell their copper.304


**Status of Energy Facilities**

*Figure 83: Status of Energy Facilities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility Type</th>
<th>Al Mudhaftar</th>
<th>Al Qahirah</th>
<th>Salah</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Power Station</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substation (Distribution)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substation (Transmission)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformer</td>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission Line (in KM)</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities offices/admin. headquarters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Tank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil/Gas power plants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>332</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


KI data collected in March 2020 provides a picture that further captures the extent of damage inflicted upon the energy sector in Ta’iz. Between the three districts in the city, a total of nine commercial power stations and one administrative utilities office are currently functioning. Whereas over 332 facilities, including 13km of transmission line, are entirely nonfunctional. The lack of facility operability is more noticeable in Salah district, where residents cannot access any commercial power stations. One of the main obstacles to adequate electrical supply in the city is the number of damaged transformers in all three districts. A total of 313 units have broken down, rendering the public grid both undependable and ineffective.\(^{305}\)

According to the ongoing Needs Assessment conducted in 2018 by the Government of Yemen, 41.77 percent of energy facilities in the city are non-operational, while 33.29 percent are partially functioning, and 24.74 percent are operational.\(^{306}\)
Fuel Shortages

The power shortage has also negatively affected health facilities, particularly in Al Hodeidah and Ta’iz, where blockades further limit the inadequate supply of fuel. As diesel scarcity has grown rampant, fuel prices have risen sharply. An informal market for diesel has also emerged in several cities, including Ta’iz. However, the government is making efforts to provide diesel and fuel oil to operate functioning power plants. The power infrastructure has deteriorated in part due to insufficient investments in operation and maintenance. This was a problem before the conflict and has been possibly aggravated by the loss of qualified personnel, nonpayment of public sector salaries (although salary payments are being made in areas under government control), and unavailability of maintenance supplies and spare parts.307

According to the CFP Survey conducted in March 2020, when fuels are available, up to 40 percent of respondents state that the population of Ta’iz tend to travel for more than 40 minutes to secure their needed energy commodities. Indeed, the residents of Al Qahirah seem to spend less time securing their energy sources, while residents in Salah spend the most.308 Respondents to the KI Survey on the other hand identified the three top energy issues that require immediate intervention in their respective districts.309 Damage to the overall energy infrastructure, along with the lack of fuel and energy equipment, have all severely hindered access to both fuel commodities and electric supply.

Figure 84: Fuel Shortages

Source: Almashhad AlYemeni, 2020

Figure 85: Travel Time to Secure/Acquire Energy Commodities, 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Less than 20 minutes</th>
<th>20-40 minutes</th>
<th>More than 40 minutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Mudhaffar</td>
<td>37.06%</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
<td>18.52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qahirah</td>
<td>54.17%</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>12.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6: Main Energy Issues in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Mudhaffar</td>
<td>Inability to maintain and/or repair electricity infrastructure (lack of supplies, lack of qualified staff, etc)</td>
<td>Damage to electricity infrastructure</td>
<td>Unreliable or intermittent electricity supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Oahirah</td>
<td>Damage to electricity infrastructure</td>
<td>Saving energy and fuel operating equipment</td>
<td>Inability to maintain and/or repair electricity infrastructure (lack of supplies, lack of qualified staff, etc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah</td>
<td>Damage to electricity infrastructure</td>
<td>Inability to maintain and/or repair electricity infrastructure (lack of supplies, lack of qualified staff, etc)</td>
<td>Lack of skilled workers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


LC Generators

The LC in Ta’iz owns 49 fuel generators, 32 of these are being primarily used within the water supply system. Six generators have been destroyed during the conflict and another 21 are partially damaged. Owing to a lack of equipment and spare parts, these generators are unable to perform properly, and the result has been an enduring failure of generators, water wells and pumping equipment.310

5. Nightlights

Figure 86: Nightlight Change and Electricity Infrastructure in Ta’iz, UN-Habitat (2020)

Between 2014 and 2019, a remarkable nightlight change can be observed in Ta’iz. The city has been in a long-term state of blackout with clear evidence of a continuing lack in electricity, placing a substantial burden on various city sectors and gravely undermining city-wide services. The city remains without access to the public grid and lacks generators (and fuel). During the day, Ta’iz appears to be a relatively ordinary city, except that it drowns in complete darkness during nightfall. The Earth Observation Group Map clearly captures the nightlight change in Ta’iz.311 The few lights that illuminate some streets are switched off after 23:00 local time (20:00 GMT) to save fuel rations for the following day.312 Respondents who took part in the KI Survey indicated that Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah exhibited the most damage to street lights, whereas in Salah street lights have been partially damaged.313

Fuel Availability

Improper city planning has resulted in a detrimental allocation of gas station slots throughout Ta’iz; gas stations are often found in populated residential areas and thus pose a significant public health concern. During the rare times when fuel is available for purchase, gas stations are quickly overflooded with potential buyers. This disorganized retail of fuel products frequently blocks vital roads in the city and creates city-wide traffic congestion. In response to this congestion, in 2019, local authorities launched a campaign to remove 30 stations from the city – a predicament that only further reduced the availability of fuel products.314

Types of Fuel Used for Cooking

Figure 87: Type of Fuel Used for Cooking in Ta’iz, 2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LPG</td>
<td>72.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>23.59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerosene</td>
<td>1.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal Roth</td>
<td>0.25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Shadow Electricity Market

Known as as-hab mawateer (motor owners), these individuals operate with impunity in the city and sell electricity to make a living. They usually operate their own generator at home and extend electrical lines to nearby dwellings and charge a monthly fee, usually 300 YER for 1 Kilowatt. It is not uncommon for electricity sellers to agree on the set-up of monopoly zones, and prices are often ten times the public service cost.316 Many workshop and business owners have no choice but to pay these inflated prices in order to remain operational. The Electricity Corporation in Ta’iz continues to allow these individuals to operate with impunity, stipulating mutual agreements, such as relying on private generators’ owners for lighting of some city streets in the vicinity of their activities. However, reports have indicated that public employees and technicians, who are receiving salaries from the state, are being placed at the disposal of these private sellers under the justification for lighting Jamal Street, the main arterial road that crosses Ta’iz east to west.317

Access to Fuels and Challenges

Based on perceptions collected through the CFP Survey conducted in March 2020, it was reported that financial hardship posed the most significant challenge to accessibility in Ta‘iz, between 88 - 100 percent of respondents indicated that economical constraints tend to limit their ability to secure adequate amounts of fuel. Nearly 42 percent of respondents in Al Qahirah stated that terrain and logistical constraints further impeded their effort to secure fuel. Residents of Al Mudhaffar on the other hand complained of an insufficient number of fuel providers in their area which means they need to travel further to secure their needs.

Figure 88: Accessibility Challenges – Energy Commodities for Lights, Cooking and Heating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Al Mudhaffar</th>
<th>Al Qahirah</th>
<th>Salah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrain and logistical constraints to access markets/service providers</td>
<td>25.93%</td>
<td>41.67%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity hindering access to markets/service providers/goods</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>29.17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social discrimination hindering access to markets/service providers</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient money to buy goods or services</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient or unreliable quantity of goods/services available locally/produced in house</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>20.83%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient number of facilities/providers/shops supplying the area</td>
<td>44.44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient variety of goods and services</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient skills and competencies of service providers</td>
<td>18.52%</td>
<td>45.83%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient safety or reliability of provided goods or services</td>
<td>14.81%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8.33%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 89: Tenants’ Light Sources in Ta‘iz, 2018

- Solar Energy/Chargeable Batteries (82.82%)
- Public Grid (7.67%)
- Not Available (5.52%)
- Candles (2.15%)
- Kerosene (1.23%)
- Generator (0.31%)
- Domestic Gas (0.31%)

Solar Energy in Ta’iz

The population of Ta’iz primarily relies on solar energy and chargeable batteries to meet their daily electricity usage demands. Unlike other areas in Yemen that seem to have resorted to privately owned generators, a mere 0.3 percent seem to depend on them in Ta’iz. While solar energy is the primary means of electricity for households in Ta’iz, and its usage has continued to rise since 2017, affordability remains a challenge. As the costs of power sector rehabilitation are prohibitive and conflict has continued in the city, no efforts have been made to restore the public grid. However, Solar PV has become widespread and is continuing to increase. NGOs have supported its use in Ta’iz, including in several public schools and to power streetlights.319 World Food Program (WFP) conducted a phone survey in November 2017 which indicated that in 14 of 22 governorates, solar energy was the main household energy source, and solar systems were being increasingly adopted in the health and WASH sectors, often supported by NGOs or other international organizations.320

Perceptions collected from CFPs appear to show an increased tendency on part of residents in Salah district to adopt solar panels as their primary source of energy. In fact, in Salah alone there are some 11,000 solar panels while residents in Al Qahirah continue to rely on chargeable batteries or connections to local generators. It was also noted that all 28,000 panels in Al Mudhaffar are partially functional only.321

Figure 90: Status of Solar Panels in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Fully Functional</th>
<th>Partly Functional</th>
<th>Nonfunctional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Mudhaffar</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28K</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qahirah</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah</td>
<td>1K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Solid Waste Management (SWM)

Highlights
- Local authorities have seen their capacities drastically reduced to sufficiently provide and finance waste management services. Human and transportation resources to collect waste from all dump sites have also been seriously impaired. Fuel shortages have eventually led to waste buildup in the streets, waste collection frequency has been all but absent, and the use of improvised alternative disposal sites has become common (often leading to disputes);
- CFP Survey data collected in March 2020 suggests that when solid waste collection takes place, it tends to occur once a month at most. Rubbish prevalence across the city is between 63 – 100 percent and all districts in the capital have dysfunctional disposal systems;
- The existence of the dump site in its current state contradicts the definition set in the Republican Resolution No (39) in 1999 concerning public cleanliness because the area is densely populated and largely agricultural. There have been recent proposals to transfer the dump to another area located on Ta’iz-Al Hodeidah highway;
- From the operational end, the greatest problem facing the waste collection service is lack of funding and inability to expense salaries.

Figure 91: Frequency of Garbage Collection in Last 30 Days in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020

The duration and intensity of the conflict in Yemen means that there are huge volumes of debris. As early as October 2015, satellite analysis by UN agencies found that at least 3,000 structures had been destroyed. This was enough to have generated 1 million tons of debris in the cities of Aden, Hajjah, Sa’dah, Ta’iz, Abyan and Sana’a - no figures are available for the current volume of debris in each specific city. Nonetheless, solid waste generation in Ta’iz is increasing rapidly. A dumpsite was established in 1977 in Hidran, located approximately 10km north of the city center, on the road that leads to Ta’iz Airport. For the first decade waste disposal demands were very light, however, since 1990 demand has soared. The tip currently receives around 145,206 tons a year from Ta’iz, Torba, Al Makha, and Al Raheja. The existing tip has an area of 3.2 hectares – there were plans to expand this to 12 hectares to meet anticipated demand over the next decade but the ongoing conflict has halted all progress. The increasing production of solid waste in Taiz brought about the opening of a second dumpsite in 1987, located around 10km from the city center at the western tip of Ta’iz city, in Mafraq Shara’ab Junction area. Both landfill areas were once outside the built-up area of the city, while today they are surrounded by dwellings and residents report emissions of smoke and rancid odor.

Figure 92: People Living where Wastewater is Frequently Visible in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020


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In the city of Ta‘iz local authorities have seen their capacities drastically reduced to sufficiently provide and finance waste management services. Human and transportation resources to collect waste from all dump sites have also been seriously impaired. Fuel shortages have eventually led to waste buildup in the streets, there is no regularity in terms of scheduling waste collection, and the use of improvised alternative disposal sites has become common (often leading to disputes). CFP data collected in March 2020 suggests that when solid waste collection takes place, it tends to occur once a month at most. Additionally, the Urban Poverty Analysis Report (2006) shows that only 25-30 percent of the city’s population is connected to the sewage and wastewater network. Consequently, in Ta‘iz, diseases such as dengue fever, diarrhea and cholera are flourishing - for instance, an extreme spike in dengue cases was recorded in this governorate beginning in August 2015, soon after the start of the conflict. A total of 1,178 suspected dengue cases were reported during weeks 32–36 in comparison to only 54 suspected dengue cases during the same period in 2013. In 2017, Ta‘iz was identified as a high priority area by specialists from the MWE, the Local Corporation of Water and Sanitation (LCWS), and the Water Emergency and Environmental Sanitation (WEES) due to shortage of safe drinking water which result in the spread of many diseases, but despite the effort by 2018, SWM in Ta‘iz has come to a virtual standstill.

As early as May 2008, Ta‘iz’s solid waste management services were not meeting the needs of the city’s expanding population. At the time, the SWM system barely covered 60 percent of the population, according to a World Bank report. Funding shortage and a lack of equipment were the main obstacles. These issues were eventually exacerbated by the conflict, forcing residents to take matters into their own hands. In August 2016, the City Cleansing and Improvement Fund (CCIF) in Ta‘iz resumed the collection of revenues on a small scale and signed several agreements with a local NGO, which conducted two cleaning campaigns and repaired three malfunctioning equipment items. The Fund also signed an agreement with the International Federation of Red Cross to conduct two cleaning campaigns, led by humanitarian agencies like MC and UNICEF, have been launched since. However, despite all these efforts, as of 2019, waste continued to pile up on the city streets, including in the form of bottles, plastic bags, and old tires.

At the western tip of Ta‘iz city – exactly at Mafraq Shara’ab – lies the city’s main waste dump, the site in its current position contradicts the definition set in the Republican Resolution No. 39 in 1999 concerning public cleanliness because the area is densely populated and largely agricultural. There have been recent proposals to transfer the dump to another area located on Ta‘iz—Al Hodeidah highway. The place is far away from any populated villages or agricultural lands. However, an Indian company has presented a study to level a new dump some 12 km to the north of Ta‘iz city. Observers stress that the new dump could cause another disaster as it is located near the sewage pool, adding its location contradicts the Yemeni Environmental Health Law.

332 Ibid.
TA‘IZ
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT (SWM)

Damage to SWM Sector

Damages incurred by the SWM sector in Ta‘iz are estimated to be between 710,000-870,000 USD.336 Most of these damages have been secondary outcomes of the conflict, wherein operational capacity and maintenance have both been severely impacted due to a lack of security, administrative retention of employees, and an inability to pay salaries on time. Fuel shortages have also exacerbated the problem. Garbage dumps are part of an environmental-threatening triad, which includes smoke and chemicals released by factories and the festering of sanitation pools. Summed up, those three factors pose a great risk of continued damage to other sectors as well, in fact they cause soil corrosion, pollute the air and underground water sources. They are also responsible for incurred costs burdening the already strained health sector, where several diseases including asthma and cancer have notably increased - Ta‘iz city accommodates the largest number of cancer-afflicted citizens in Yemen.337

Figure 93: Solid Waste Management - City Level Damages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Estimate</th>
<th>Low Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>870K</td>
<td>710K</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Improper Solid Waste Disposal

According to the Ta‘iz Initial Rapid Needs Assessment conducted by the Humanitarian Forum in 2011, rubbish prevalence across the city is between 63-100 percent and all districts in the city have dysfunctional disposal systems.338 More recently, KI Survey data further confirmed the prevalence of garbage in all three districts.339 CFP perceptions also underscored the infrequency of garbage collection efforts with most respondents indicating that on average garbage is collected once every month or less.340 Despite a vigorous campaign to persuade people to place their domestic refuse into designated waste collection bins to be regularly emptied, some solid waste is still thrown onto open land, city streets and into the wadis (valleys) outside Ta‘iz. Bins are overfilled and garbage spills onto the street and lands that surround the containers. Floods that accompany seasonal rains eventually float much of this refuse down to the floodplains. When floodwaters sweep through the streets, they pick up much of this waste, carrying pollutants with them towards the surrounding wadis downstream to the floodplain, the resulting sight is a monumental accumulation of solid waste products from the city. Much of this waste can even be found deep within the agricultural land of the floodplain, posing a serious threat to farmers and the rural population in general. This is augmented by solid waste dumped on the rough higher ground below the Qat Market - land that is not actually swamped by the floods.341 Also present across most of the floodplain, but more prominently at the lower end, is evidence of clinical waste from the city hospitals. Among other waste, used plastic syringes, many with the needles still attached, are mixed with pharmaceutical waste and packaging. These can be seen floating in the reservoir and on the mud banks around the edges. The presence of this type of waste suggests that the water in the underlying aquifer may be contaminated with pharmaceutical chemicals, but no analyses have been performed that further research this.342

342 Ibid.
Improper Disposal of Domestic refuse

Ninety percent of people in the city of Ta’iz have access to some form of a domestic toilet, on average 10 percent resort to using open fields. In turn, this compounds the amount of solid waste and further implicates serious health concerns with solid waste issues. The use of open fields for defecation is more common in Al Qahirah district and At Ta’iziyah district. As for the treatment of waste, rubbish, and existence of stagnant water, 31 percent of the population in the city have access to appropriate means of waste disposal. However, the estimates differ for tenants when the entire governorate is taken into consideration, where 44.03 percent utilize covered sewer holes, and another 19.5 percent resort to using open fields, while only 28.62 percent rely on the public sewage system. This can be attributed to a lack of access to private toilets and a lack of running water in rented properties.

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Figure 95: Sequenced Needs and Recovery Costs in Ta’iz, 2018.

**Short Term Recovery (1 Year)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Estimate</th>
<th>Low Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (Over 5 Years)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.88M USD</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.54M USD</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Medium Term Recovery (2-5 Years)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High Estimate</th>
<th>Low Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (Over 5 Years)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.5M USD</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.23M USD</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Waste Management Facilities**

Respondents to the CFP Survey conducted in March 2020 indicated that Ta’iz currently relies on five main facilities, two of which are fully functional and three of which are only partly functional. Respondents also suggested that Al Qahirah appears to have no formal solid waste management facilities and consequently rely on the other five facilities located in Al Mudhaffar and Salah. It is easy to see how these facilities would in turn be overwhelmed with the influx of rubbish from other areas.

Figure 96: Status of Solid Waste Management Facilities by District, 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Functional</th>
<th>Partly Functional</th>
<th>Nonfunctional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Mudhaffar</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incinerator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Dumping Sites</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Grand Total: 2 Functional, 3 Partly Functional, - Nonfunctional*


The recovery and reconstruction costs of the SWM Sector in Ta’iz are estimated to cost 1.23-1.5 million USD over two to five years and between 1.54-1.88 million USD over five years.

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Recycling and Rag-Picking

The recycling industry is new to Yemen and began with recycling plastic, metals and glass. There are recycling plants scattered around the country in major cities like Sana’a, Ta’iz, Aden and Al Hodeidah. Plastic is recycled by scavengers in the streets and at the tip and sold to the local plastic industry. A price per kilogram of plastic is paid. This method is effective for relatively heavy products such as bottles, flasks and boxes. However, the major problem is the vast amount of ultra-lightweight bags, not worth the reward of collecting and submitting them for recycling. These bags tend to create obstructions to the inlets of water into the channels, but also inside the flood channels. Since the city does not have a formal waste recycling program, rag-pickers collect recyclable wastes from stationary containers placed on street corners and along roadways; waste contains all types of refuse including bio-medical leftovers. Therefore, there is a high risk of disease transmission through the current practice of recycling.

Health Issues Arising from Improper SWM Disposal

Altogether, 7.6 million people were at risk of cholera in Yemen by the end of October 2016 including 4.5 million people in six governorates (Sana’a, Ta’iz, Al Hodeidah, Aden, Lahj and Al Bayda) with confirmed or suspected cases. Moreover, domestic waste provides the ideal breeding ground and resting sites for sandflies and the incidence of Leishmaniasis has been observed in Ta’iz. Still water found in old tires, domestic water storage tanks, waste containers or even NGO water tanks for IDP camps can be an ideal breeding ground for Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus, both of which can transmit Dengue Fever.

The streets of Ta’iz are still filled with piles of garbage that not only smell foul but has directly contributed to the city becoming a breeding ground for mosquitoes and outbreaks of epidemics such as cholera among other diseases. In fact, 70 percent of respondents to the KI Survey indicated that dumped garbage was clearly visible in residential areas. With a lack in proper disposal methods, citizens in Ta’iz often resort to piling up trash and burning it, a process that produces excessive amounts of carbon monoxide and leads to air pollution in the city. Ta’iz’s environment is passively affected by burning remains on the dump site which emits toxic gases which find their way into houses, markets and shops. Landfill sites in proximity of the city, a great number of polluting factories are also responsible burdening the already strained health sector, where several diseases including asthma and cancer have notably increased - Ta’iz city accommodates the largest number of cancer-afflicted citizens in Yemen.

Challenges to SWM Collection

The current estimations put the number at 32-45 tons, while the Remains Department is just capable to dispose about 60 percent. After 22 years, the dumps are estimated to reach 1,538 tons, making it impossible for the department, in its current capacities, to handle the matter. From the operational end, the greatest problem facing the waste collection service is lack of funding. Out of 26 compactors, only four remain in action, but at least twelve are needed for current operations. Two Japanese compactors have been made available recently. None of the original 18 pickup trucks are in service, nor the two power shovels, and only one of the original two dozers is usable. The grader used to scrape up rubbish from the streets is also out of action.

Since the outbreak of the conflict in Ta‘iz in March 2015, city cleaners have not received their salaries. This has resulted in chronic failure to clean the streets and remove garbage. Local authorities have argued that the reason behind delaying the payment of salaries to workers is due to a lack of funding from the governorate, and that the revenues that are supplied have declined significantly due to the ongoing maintenance work in several directorates. This procrastination in terms of payment of salaries has led to several strikes in the city.

Oddly enough, there have also been reports that owing to financial constraints, local authorities have resorted to an unproven system of attempting to disinfect garbage dump sites. Generally, Yemen has not yet adopted a practical, economic and acceptable approach in managing and disposing of clinical waste. The present practice is co-disposal where clinical wastes are dumped at landfill sites. The solid garbage quantity generated in 2011 was estimated to be 3,682,669 tons, clinical waste represented 40 percent of the total quantity of estimated garbage in that year alone.

353 Ibid.
354 Ibid.
Barriers to Solid Waste Disposal Services

According to CFP perceptions, the primary obstacle hindering citizens’ access to appropriate solid waste disposal services is a general absence of reliable service providers and facilities coupled by an inability to pay for such services, followed by a general lack of security.\textsuperscript{359}

\textbf{Figure 98: Main Barriers to Meet/Secure Solid Waste Disposal Services (Garbage Collected, Public Streets Clean, etc.) in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2020}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barriers</th>
<th>Al Mudahffar</th>
<th>Al Qahirah</th>
<th>Salah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrain and logistical constraints</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>8.33%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td>33.33%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social discrimination</td>
<td>22.22%</td>
<td>8.33%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient money</td>
<td>40.70%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient or unreliable quantity of services available</td>
<td>14.80%</td>
<td>4.16%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient number of facilities/providers supplying the area</td>
<td>56.56%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient variety of services</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
<td>16.87%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient skills and competencies of service providers</td>
<td>16.81%</td>
<td>20.83%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transportation and Mobility

Overview

- Similar to other Yemeni cities, the transportation sector in Ta’iz lacks overall institutional oversight and strategic vision.
- Insufficient money to secure the transportation services has been identified as the key barrier to meet these needs. The cost of transportation services increased partly due to the wider insecurity situation and restricted mobility, as well as the increased cost of fuel.
- Insecurity and wider conflict are amongst the key impediments to the mobility of the civilians and goods within the city. Active frontline crossing the city effectively cuts the city, with movement from part to the other taking hours.
- Almost half of the intra-urban roads in Ta’iz sustained some degree of damage, as well as some of the inter-governorate roads. Rehabilitation is required to restore mobility, which, however, may be impeded due to the active clashes.
- The public transportation system is largely informal and lacks oversight. Poor and inconsistent service coverage especially affects women and children, as well as those with limited mobility. High prevalence of the privately-owned vehicles coupled with the low-capacity and poorly maintained public transportation contribute to traffic congestion along the main roads of the city.
- Lack of funding has been identified by the KIs as one of the most serious problems which require immediate intervention.

Ta’iz governorate is strategically located between the north and the south of Yemen, on the main road between Sana’a and Aden. It also has access to the coastline of the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandab strait, which separates Yemen and Africa, and is one of the most important maritime cargo chokepoints in the world. Several key roads lead to the city of Ta’iz: Al Hodeidah road to the west, Torba Road to the southeast, Sana’a road to the east and Salah road to the south east.360

Following the escalation of the conflict in 2015, when Houthis were pushed from the south of Yemen, Ta’iz city became a de-facto frontline between the pro-Houthi and pro-governmental forces. An active frontline, crossing the city from the west to the east, has a significant effect on the mobility of the residents. Crossing from one part of the city to another, which would normally require a few minutes, now takes between four and eight hours, travelling on a mountainous dirt road. The frontline lying within the city creates a “no-man land”, which is visible as a green and brown line crossing the city.362 Mobility within the city is further affected by the infrastructure damage and wider security situation.

Figure 99: Urban extent, primary and secondary roads in Ta’iz city.

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361 A study conducted by the Professors at Aden and Sana’a universities, as a part of “The state of Yemeni Cities Development Report”.

There are two main entrances to the city of Ta‘iz: one in east of the city, known as Al-Hawaban entrance, which connects Ta‘iz with Ibb and Lahj governorates, and serves as the primary route to Sana’a and Aden; and the second one in the west of the city through Beer Basha area, which connects it to Al Hodeidah Governorate and the road towards the Bab Al-Mandeb. In August 2015, Houthi forces took control of both of these entrances, imposing significant challenges on the movement of people and goods in and out of the city. Reporting from early 2016 indicates the degree of restrictions, as some were relying on donkeys and camels to transport goods, including food, medicine, propane, and oxygen, to the city of Ta‘iz using a mountainous road.

In March 2016, pro-Hadi forces secured the third entrance to the city, in the south, which connects it to Aden. This route, however, is composed of several secondary roads, often difficult to access due to its circuitous nature. More recently, pro-Houthi forces allowed limited movement of civilians, goods, and humanitarian aid through the main entrances, however, the overall access to Ta‘iz city remains very restricted.

Further constraints include lack of funding, underdeveloped planning process, security challenges and direct damage to the transportation infrastructure. For example, the highway connecting Aden and Ta‘iz sustained severe damage, and two bridges were destroyed.


**Table 7: Main Challenges Related to the Rehabilitation of Roads Linking the Neighboring Cities in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2020**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Mudhaffar</td>
<td>Lack of funding</td>
<td>Physical damage to the infrastructure</td>
<td>Security challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qahirah</td>
<td>Security challenges</td>
<td>Physical damage to the infrastructure</td>
<td>Lack of funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah</td>
<td>Weak or underdeveloped planning process</td>
<td>Lack of funding</td>
<td>Security challenges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Stakeholders and Legal Framework**

The two main governmental authorities responsible for managing the transportation sector are the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Ministry of Transportation (MoT). The former is responsible for inspecting and licensing vehicles and services while the latter sets policy and manages airport and port facilities. In addition, the Ministry of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) supervises the overall road infrastructure, including development and maintenance. Its role, however, is restricted to the network of rural roads. The Land Transport Law was introduced on 30 March 2003 to provide the regulatory framework for land transportation. Prior to this, land transportation services were provided through two syndicates in the governorate (passenger and freight transport), for which companies had to register through a lengthy and expensive process. The new law sets guidelines for private companies on passenger and trucking transportation services:

- **Passenger transportation services:** companies should own no less than 10 buses and have a number of passenger stations in various city points. All public bus companies in Yemen are private, apart from the state-owned Local Transport Corporation. The law has never been fully enforced, mostly because of financial and technical issues but also because of absence in human resources capacity. For instance, while in theory the law requires all transportation vehicles to be examined, in practice many vehicles are considered unfit despite being in service. Further regulations were introduced in 2004 that deal with cargo and trucks freight transport, passenger (bus) transport, and car rentals.

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371 Ibid.
While huge investments have been made to develop the road network and transportation infrastructure in Ta‘iz city, the central districts are facing several challenges associated with poor traffic management, lack of road hierarchy, inadequate design, and poor road safety. Maintenance of the infrastructure is also poor and has further deteriorated due to the damage and the ongoing conflict. As of 2018, almost half of the roads within the city sustained some degree of damage and the city-level damage cost is estimated between 37.1 and 45.3 million USD. According to KIs, roads in all three districts are partially damaged, while in Al Mudhaffar and Salah districts 37 percent of roads are estimated to be fully functioning, 62 percent partially functioning and 1 percent is not functioning at all.

The public transportation sector is largely informal, similar to other Yemeni cities, and lacks oversight and strategic vision. This leads to gaps in service coverage and congestion along the central routes. The public transportation fleet mainly consists of small capacity vehicles, such as taxis and minibuses, which further contributes to the traffic congestion and pollution. Moreover, the needs of pedestrians are poorly addressed and there is a general lack of sidewalks, secure street crossings, and street lightening.

Around a third of CFPs in all districts (37 percent in Al Mudhaffar, 38 percent in Al Qahira, and 28 percent in Salah) stated that transportation services are not readily available. The main barriers identified by CFPs in all three districts, which the population faces related to transportation services, are insufficient money, insecurity hindering access and terrain and logistical constraints.

372 A study conducted by the Professors at Aden and Sana’a universities, as a part of “The state of Yemeni Cities Development Report”.


374 KI Survey, March 2020. Please note that data on roads functionality is not available for Al Qahirah district.

375 A study conducted by the Professors at Aden and Sana’a universities, as a part of “The state of Yemeni Cities Development Report”.

376 Ibid.


378 Ibid.
The cost of intra-city transportation significantly increased due to mobility constraints. For example, prior to the escalation of the conflict, to get to Al Hawban area, in the northeast of Ta’iz from Jamal street, in the center of the city, would cost between 50 and 100 YER and take approximately 20 minutes. The same journey can currently take around five hours and costs between 3,000 and 5,000 YER.  

To cross from pro-Houthi forces-controlled territory to the pro-Hadi forces-controlled territory or vice-versa, one needs to travel along Alakroudh road, a mountainous unpaved road. The road is narrow and cars coming from opposite lanes may not have enough space and have to reverse down the mountainous road. Reporting indicates that there also are several checkpoints on this road from various parties-to-conflict. Division of the city and hindered mobility has a significant effect on families living on the opposite sides, who have been unable to see each other for months.

The mobility is further obstructed due to the increased price of fuel. The pre-conflict price stood at 158 YER per liter, while as of February 2020 the price stands at 437.5 YER per liter, marking an increase of 176%. The highest price was recorded in October 2018, and stood at 612.5 YER per liter, an increase of 188 percent as compared to pre-conflict levels.


381 Ibid.

All CFPs across districts indicated that the population purchases transportation services, except for one CFP in Salah district, who stated that transportation services are obtained with the help of family and friends.383

IDPs face the biggest challenges obtaining transportation services across districts, while returnees, host and non-host community have also been identified amongst the groups facing the biggest challenges. Since insufficient money has been identified as the main barrier to access transportation services by the CFPs, it highlights the economic obstacles the IDPs face in securing the basic services. Many IDPs in Yemen live off irregular labor and struggle to secure stable jobs, due to the overall shortage of jobs, lack of education and skills, and lack of contacts and social network in the city.384


Furthermore, active fighting remains one of the key impediments to mobility of civilians inside the city. To avoid active fighting areas, residents often have to take alternative routes, which may sometimes pose protection concerns due to the landmine’s contamination and airstrikes. High presence of snipers along the frontline are also reported, further hindering the mobility of the civilians.


According to KI data, there are a total of 187 communication facilities in Ta’iz city, with the majority of facilities located in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah districts which both host 90 communication facilities. In Salah district, there are 7 communication facilities.

In Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah districts, 55.5 percent of communication facilities are functioning whereas 44.5 percent of facilities are not functioning. In Salah district, 57.1 percent of (a very limited amount of) facilities are functioning whereas 42.8 percent of facilities are not functioning.

CFP data specifies that all districts face difficulties in terms of communication services not being readily available; however, most challenges are faced in Al Mudhaffar district where 40.7 percent of respondents stated services were not readily available, followed by 28 percent in Salah district, and 16.7 percent in Al Qahirah district.

CFP data indicates that all communication commodities are purchased by Ta’iz city’s residents themselves; they are not dependent on family and friends or aid provision to obtain their items.

Residents of Salah district have to travel longer than residents of Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah districts. It appears communication services and supplies are most easily available in terms of travel time in Al Qahirah district where 70.8 percent of respondents stated they traveled less than 20 minutes, 25 percent traveled between 20 – 40 minutes, and 4.2 percent traveled more than 40 minutes. In Salah district, 36 percent of respondents stated they traveled more than 40 minutes to reach communication services and supplies within the city.

The Ministry of Communications in Yemen was established in 1991 and later renamed to the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology.387 The telecom sector underwent considerable reform prior to the escalation of the conflict. This included new legislation, a restructuring of the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology (MTIT), and the establishment of a regulatory body monitoring the network.388

The internet services in Yemen were launched in 1996 by TeleYemen, offering services through a dial-up connection. By 2001, the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) was introduced. In mid-2006, the Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL) was launched, and by the end of the same year the Wi-Fi services were introduced with two hotspots in Sana’a and Aden.

The number of individuals using internet services was growing slowly since the introduction of services in 1996. By 2006, only 1.2 percent of the population was using internet.389 The situation has rapidly changed, however, following the introduction of ADSL and Wi-Fi connection in the same year, and by 2017 the number of individuals using internet services in Yemen reached almost 27%. However, this is still significantly lower than average in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, which currently stands at almost 65 percent.

In 2017, country-wide the total number of subscriptions to fixed telephone lines in use was estimated at 1,086,753, indicating a decrease from the 1,165,828 lines in use in 2016.390 The total number of subscriptions to mobile cellular telephone was estimated at 17,556,062, representing an increase from the 16,433,055 subscriptions in 2016.391 Additionally, in 2017, it was estimated 5,132,388 individuals within the country could access the internet at home, via any device (computer or mobile) and connection, which marks an increase compared to 2016 when the number was estimated at 4,356,959. Pre-conflict, it was reported most individuals access the internet at home, followed by their workplace, and internet cafes.392

388 Ibid.
391 Ibid.
Figure 105: Number of Subscriptions to Fixed Telephone Lines and Mobile Cellular Telephones in Yemen, 2015-2017

In 2014, the state-owned Public Telecommunication Corporation (PTC) had 13,000km of fiber optic running across Yemen which served as the country’s infrastructure backbone and connects Yemen to the international submarine fiber network at Aden, Al Mukalla, and Al Hodeidah and runs up to Sa’dah. While damages and needs are yet to be determined, fiber optic networks are usually deployed above ground in Yemen, which makes them visible and therefore vulnerable. In their May 2017 report, the World Bank recommended for deployment of fiber via linear infrastructure including electricity grids and roads and/or highways.

Figure 106: Total Amount of Communication Facilities (Public and Private) in Ta’iz City (per district), 2020

2. Infrastructure and Operational Capacity

In Ta’iz Governorate specifically, there were 103,956 fixed telephone operating lines; in 2016, this number was 104,242, and in 2015, there were 103,916 operating lines. The governorate furthermore has 130 Internet cafes (only in urban areas) and 1,705 call centers; the same numbers were reported for 2015 – 2017. However, it should be noted that since 2015, Ta’iz city has been significantly affected by the slowing down or disabling of Internet services by political actors deploying censorship tactics.


395 Ibid.

396 Ibid.
According to KI data, there are a total of 187 communication facilities in Ta’iz city, with the majority of facilities located in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah districts. There is a total of 89 public communication facilities in Al Mudhaffar district, namely 43 ICT Base Stations, 43 ICT Facilities, and 3 ICT Towers. Moreover, there is 1 privately owned ICT Shelter. In Al Qahirah district, there are 89 public communication facilities, namely 43 ICT Base Stations, 43 ICT Facilities, and 3 ICT Towers. Moreover, there is 1 privately owned ICT Shelter. In Salah district, there are 4 public communication facilities, namely 1 ICT Base Station, 1 ICT Facility, 1 ICT Shelter, and 1 ICT Tower. There are 3 privately owned communication facilities in Salah district, namely 2 ICT Base Stations and 1 ICT Tower.397

In terms of status of communication facilities, facilities are either functioning or not functioning; none of the facilities are mentioned as partially functioning. Across the three districts, between 55 and 60 percent of ICT facilities are functioning, while between 40 and 45 percent are reported to be not functioning.398

**Service Providers**

There are four mobile phone operators in Ta’iz: MTN Yemen, Sabafon, Y-Telecom (HiTS Unitel), and Yemen Mobile399; MTN appears to provide the strongest signal. Internet in Ta’iz City has only been available through 3G data service via Yemen Mobile’s network which has been severely limited as of April 2017. According to KI data, internet connection is not available and/or accessible in Salah district whereas KI data states that a mobile network connection is not available in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah districts. KIs in all districts furthermore report that network coverage is unavailable or bad and in Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah districts, high tariffs are reported as an issue in terms of accessing communication.400 Ground cable internet access is reportedly unavailable. Damage to ICT infrastructure and shortages in terms of diesel are most likely primary reasons for limited internet availability in Ta’iz City; the city has experienced ICT blackouts since the start of the conflict with lack of internet access and phone communications reported, in part due to diesel being available in a limited manner.401

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**Figure 107: Total Number of Communication Facilities and Their Functionality in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Fully Functioning</th>
<th>Partially Functioning</th>
<th>Not Functioning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al Mudhaffar</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Base Station</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Facility</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Shelter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Tower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Al Qahirah</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Base Station</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Facility</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Shelter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Tower</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Salah</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Base Station</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Facility</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Shelter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT Tower</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td>104</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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398 Ibid.
In January 2020 it was reported that more than 80 percent of internet capacities in Yemen had gone out of service due to the Falcon internet cable, an undersea fiber-optic cable in the Suez Canal, being cut402, forcing the vast majority of Yemenis offline and exposing the vulnerability of Yemen’s internet infrastructure. CFP data specifies that all districts face difficulties in terms of communication services not being readily available; however, most challenges are faced in Al Mudhaffar district where 40.7 percent of respondents stated services were not readily available, followed by 28 percent in Salah district, and 16.7 percent in Al Qahirah district.403

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3. Population Needs

The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC), a group of INGOs which provides access in terms of telecommunications from humanitarian actors, provides limited services for aid workers in the following areas as of April 2017: Aden, Sana’a, Al Hodeidah, Sa’dah, and Ibb. Plans to expand services to Ta’iz and Al Mukalla have been postponed due to the prevailing security situation. Reportedly, local humanitarian organizations have been working on improving internet connectivity in Ta’iz City since 2015, attempting to establish an internet access center in the city to connect with available services. However, the current functionality status is unknown. Following CFP data, communication commodities (such as phones, credit, etc.) are not readily available according to 24 percent of respondents in Salah district whereas 22.2 percent of respondents state the same for Al Mudhaffar district and 16.7 percent for Al Qahirah district. CFP data furthermore indicates that all communication commodities are purchased by Ta’iz city’s residents themselves; they are not dependent on family and friends or aid provision to obtain their items.

CFP data furthermore indicates that in terms of travel time to obtain communication services and supplies in Ta’iz city, residents of Salah district have to travel longer than residents of Al Mudhaffar and Al Qahirah districts. It appears communication services and supplies are most easily available in terms of travel time in Al Qahirah district where 70.8 percent of respondents stated they traveled less than 20 minutes, 25 percent traveled between 20 – 40 minutes, and 4.2 percent traveled more than 40 minutes. In Salah district, 36 percent of respondents stated they traveled more than 40 minutes to reach communication services and supplies within the city.

*Figure 110: Percentage of Communication Commodities Which Are Not Readily Available in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Less than 20 minutes</th>
<th>20-40 minutes</th>
<th>More than 40 minutes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Mudhaffar</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qahirah</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salah</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Figure 111: Travel Time to Secure Communication Services and Supplies in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020*


406 Ibid.
ANNEXES
Asset Verification

The team identified multiple areas within the city of Ta’iz based on verifying satellite imageries from UNOSAT (2019) and Digital Globe (May 2020) for 167 buildings, in addition to real pictures (March and April 2020). After that, iMMAP GIS unit triangulated data from different sources, compiled GPS coordinates and analyzed it as shown on the map below:

Since the escalation of the conflict in 2015, Ta’iz remains an active and dynamic frontline. Ta’iz recorded the highest number of shelling and armed clashes since the escalation of the conflict and received the third highest number of airstrikes nationwide. Evidence of widespread destruction in residential areas and widespread infrastructure damage is visible via Satellite imageries. The worst of the three districts covered is Salah where more than 400 buildings have been damaged.

Figure 112: Assessed Locations to Verify Damages
Figure 113: Damage Assessment for Ta’iz city, 2019

Al Mudhaffar district damage assessment (as of 2019)

Al Qahirah district damage assessment (as of 2019)

Al Qahirah district damage assessment (as of 2019)
Damaged buildings appear to be scattered throughout the city. This can be attributed to the fact that major fighting on the ground follows no clear pattern.

Although there is a clear drop in the number of events, the city is far from being secure.

The asset verification results showed that the damages on the ground are similar to evidence captured in satellite images and field images. Moreover, satellite imagery can be relied on in rapid asset verification, especially when assessing damage on a large scale as a substitute for field assessments. The latter may be difficult to conduct in all areas during periods of armed conflict and political tension. However, as Ta’iz is an active battlefield, damage is more extensive on the ground but not accurately captured due to technology limitations.

Figure 114: Photos from Field Asset Verification for some of the residential and complex area
**Summary Overall Situation in Each District**

1. **Al Mudhaffar**

**Food Security:** In Al Mudhaffar, 80-100 percent of CFPs reported that IDPs face challenges in satisfying needs in terms of food supplies (staple food, fresh vegetables and fruit, meat, etc.) whereas 60-80 percent of CFPs stated this is the case for returnees. In terms of host and non-host community, 40-60 percent of CFPs stated that both population groups face challenges in satisfying their needs for food supplies. CFPs stated that refugees do not face challenges whereas 0-20 percent of CFPs reported migrants face challenges in satisfying their needs in terms of food supplies.

**Health:** Between 80-100 percent of CFPs report that access to healthcare services (facilities, health staff, etc.) is challenging for IDPs whereas between 60-80 percent of CFPs state this is the case for returnees. In terms of the host- and non-host community, 40-60 percent of CFPs report the host community faces challenges whereas 60-80 percent report this is the case for the non-host community. Additionally, 0-20 percent of CFPs indicate migrants face challenges in accessing healthcare services. In terms of medicines and other healthcare products, 80-100 percent of CFPs reported that IDPs face challenges in satisfying their needs whereas between 60-80 percent of CFPs stated this is the case for returnees and the host community. Additionally, 40-60 percent of CFPs report that the non-host community faces challenges while 0-20 percent of CFPs report refugees and migrants face challenges.

**WASH:** Between 80-100 percent of CFPs stated that IDPs face challenges in obtaining water for drinking purposes (including treatment); 60-80 percent of CFPs stated the same for returnees and the non-host community whereas 40-60 percent reports the same issue for the host community. Additionally, 0-20 percent of CFPs report that migrants face challenges. In terms of hygiene commodities (clothing, soap, pads, diapers, etc.), 80-100 percent of CFPs state that IDPs are facing challenges in satisfying their needs whereas 60-80 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees. Additionally, 40-60 percent of CFP report challenges for the host- and non-host community. When it relates to hygiene/sanitation facilities (toilets, showers, baths, etc.), 80-100 percent of CFPs state that IDPs are facing challenges in satisfying their needs whereas 40-60 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees. Moreover, between 40-60 percent of CFP report that the host- and non-host community face challenges in accessing hygiene/sanitation facilities. Between 80-100 percent of CFPs report that IDPs are facing challenges in satisfying their needs in terms of solid waste disposal services whereas 0-20 percent of CFPs reported the same for returnees. Between 60-80 percent of CFPs report that the host- and non-host community face challenges in terms of solid waste disposal services whereas 0-20 percent of CFPs report the same for migrants in Al Mudhaffar district.

**Shelter:** When it comes to shelter/housing (rent, purchase, construction, etc.) in Al Mudhaffar district, 80-100 percent of CFPs state that IDPs face challenges whereas 40-60 percent state the same for returnees; 20-40 percent of CFPs state the same for the host- and non-host community. When it relates to access to shelter commodities (furniture, building material, etc.), 80-100 percent of CFPs state that IDPs face challenges meeting their needs whereas 40-60 percent of CFPs state that returnees face challenges and 20-40 percent of the CFPs state that host- and non-host community face the same challenges too. Between 80-100 percent of CFPs report that IDPs face challenges in meeting their needs related to energy commodities for heating, cooking, and lighting) whereas 60-80 percent state the same for the host community and 40-60 percent for returnees and the non-host community.

**Education:** When it comes to education services (transport, fees, teachers, etc.), 80-100 percent of CFPs stated IDPs face challenges; 60-80 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees and the host community and 40-60 percent of CFPs report issues for the non-host community in Al Mudhaffar district. Between 80-100 percent of CFPs report IDPs face challenges in obtaining education commodities (uniforms, shoes, stationaries, books, etc.) whereas 60-80 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees, the host community and 40-60 percent of CFP respondents report that the non-host community faces challenges in meeting their needs.

**Communication:** In terms of communication services (providers, towers, networks, etc.), 60-80 percent of CFPs report that IDPs face challenges in satisfying their needs whereas 40-60 percent of CFPs state that IDPs according to 80-100 percent of CFPs; 40-60 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees, the host- and non-host community in Al Mudhaffar district. In terms of communication commodities (phone, credit, etc.), 80-100 percent of CFPs report that IDPs face challenges in satisfying their needs; 40-60 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees, the host- and non-host community.

**Governance:** Access to legal and law enforcement services (local police, courts, municipal police) is challenging to obtain for IDPs according to 80-100 percent of CFPs; 60-80 percent of CFPs report the same for the host- and non-host community and 40-60 percent of CFPs state the same for returnees in Al Mudhaffar district.

**Transport:** Access to transport services (all except to education, work, health centers, markets, etc.) comes with challenges for IDPs according to 80-100 percent of CFPs; 40-60 percent of CFPs reported these issues for returnees, the host- and non-host community in Al Mudhaffar district.
2. Al Qahirah

**Food Security:** In Al Qahirah, 60-80 percent of CFPs reported that IDPs face challenges in satisfying needs in terms of food supplies (staple food, fresh vegetables and fruit, meat, etc.) and similarly 60-80 percent of CFPs stated this is the case for returnees.

In terms of host and non-host community, 60-80 percent of CFPs stated that the host community faces challenges whereas 40-60 percent of CFPs stated this is the case for the non-host community. Between 0-20 percent of CFPs stated that refugees and migrants face challenges in satisfying their needs in terms of food supplies.

**Health:** Between 80-100 percent of CFPs report that access to healthcare services (facilities, health staff, etc.) is challenging for IDPs whereas between 60-80 percent of CFPs state this is the case for returnees. In terms of the host- and non-host community, 60-80 percent of CFPs report the host community faces challenges whereas 40-60 percent report this is the case for the non-host community. Additionally, 0-20 percent of CFPs indicate refugees and migrants face challenges in accessing healthcare services. In terms of medicines and other healthcare products, 60-80 percent of CFPs reported that IDPs face challenges in satisfying their needs whereas between 60-80 percent of CFPs stated this is the case for returnees and the host community. Additionally, 0-20 percent of CFPs report refugees and migrants face challenges in Al Qahirah district.

**WASH:** Between 60-80 percent of CFPs stated that IDPs face challenges in obtaining water for drinking purposes (including treatment); 60-80 percent of CFPs stated the same for returnees and the host community whereas 40-60 percent reports the same issue for the non-host community. Additionally, 0-20 percent of CFPs report that refugees and migrants face challenges. In terms of hygiene commodities (clothing, soap, pads, diapers, etc.), 80-100 percent of CFPs state that IDPs are facing challenges in satisfying their needs whereas 60-80 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees. Additionally, 40-60 percent of CFP report challenges for the host- and non-host community. When it relates to hygiene/sanitation facilities (toilets, showers, baths, etc.), 60-80 percent of CFPs state that IDPs are facing challenges in satisfying their needs whereas 40-60 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees. Moreover, between 40-60 percent of CFP report that the host- and non-host community face challenges in accessing hygiene/sanitation facilities. Between 60-80 percent of CFPs report that IDPs and returnees are facing challenging tasks in accessing hygiene/sanitation facilities. Between 60-80 percent of CFPs report that IDPs and returnees face challenges in satisfying their needs in terms of solid waste disposal services (garbage collection, cleanliness of public streets, etc.). Between 60-80 percent of CFPs report that the host- and non-host community face challenges in terms of solid waste disposal services whereas 0-20 percent of CFPs report the same for refugees and migrants in Al Qahirah district.

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407 It should be noted CFP data for refugees and migrants is only available for Al Qahirah district.
**Shelter:** When it comes to shelter/housing (rent, purchase, construction, etc.) in Al Qahirah district, 80-100 percent of CFPs state that IDPs face challenges whereas 40-60 percent state the same for returnees, the host- and non-host community; 20-40 percent of CFPs state that refugees and migrants face challenges in meeting their needs. When it relates to access to shelter commodities (furniture, building material, etc.), 80-100 percent of CFPs state that IDPs face challenges meeting their needs whereas 40-60 percent state that returnees face challenges; additionally, 40-60 percent of CFP respondents report that the host- and non-host community faces challenges whereas 0-20 percent of CFPs report the same for refugees and migrants. In terms of access to household items (kitchen utensils, mats, mosquito nets, blankets, etc.), 80-100 percent of CFPs report that IDPs face challenges meeting their needs whereas 60-80 percent of CFP respondents state the same for returnees; 40-60 percent of CFPs report that the host- and non-host community faces challenges whereas 0-20 percent of CFPs report that refugees and migrants face challenges. Between 60-80 percent of CFPs report that IDPs, returnees, the host- and non-host community face challenges in meeting their needs related to energy commodities for heating, cooking, and lighting) whereas 0-20 percent of CFP respondents state the same for refugees and migrants respectively.

**Education:** When it comes to education services (transport, fees, teachers, etc.), 60-80 percent of CFPs stated IDPs and the host community face challenges; 40-60 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees and the non-host community and 0-20 percent of CFP respondents state that refugees and migrants face challenges in Al Qahirah district. Between 60-80 percent of CFPs report IDPs and the host community face challenges in obtaining education commodities (uniforms, shoes, stationaries, books, etc.) whereas 40-60 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees and the non-host community and 0-20 percent of CFP respondents state that refugees and migrants face challenges.

**Communication:** In terms of communication services (providers, towers, networks, etc.), 60-80 percent of CFPs report that IDPs and the host community face challenges in satisfying their needs whereas 40-60 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees and the non-host community in Al Qahirah district. Additionally, 0-20 percent of CFP respondents report that refugees and migrants face challenges in securing their needs related to communication services. In terms of communication commodities (phone, credit, etc.), 60-80 percent of CFPs report that IDPs and the host community face challenges in satisfying their needs; 40-60 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees and the host community. Moreover, 0-20 percent of CFP respondents report that refugees and migrants face challenges.

**Governance:** Between 40-60 percent of CFP respondents report that access to legal and law enforcement services (local police, courts, municipal police) is challenging for IDPs, the host- and non-host community. Additionally, 60-80 percent of CFPs report that returnees face challenges whereas 0-20 percent report the same for refugees and migrants in Al Qahirah district.

**Transport:** Access to transport services (all except to education, work, health centers, markets, etc.) comes with challenges for IDPs according to 60-80 percent of CFPs; 40-60 percent of CFPs reported these issues for returnees, the host- and non-host community and 0-20 percent of CFPs stated refugees and migrants faced challenges in accessing transport services in Al Qahirah district.

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**Figure 116: Population group facing biggest challenges in satisfying needs – Al Qahirah**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>0-20%</th>
<th>20-40%</th>
<th>40-60%</th>
<th>60-80%</th>
<th>80-100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food supplies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicines and healthcare products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water for drinking purposes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hygiene commodities</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hygiene and sanitation facilities</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid waste disposal services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent, purchase, construction, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household items</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter commodities</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy commodities for heating, cooking and lightning</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education commodities</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Education services</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication commodities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication services</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal and law enforcement services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport services</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Salah

Food Security: In Salah, 80-100 percent of CFPs reported that IDPs face challenges in satisfying needs in terms of food supplies (staple food, fresh vegetables and fruit, meat, etc.) whereas 60-80 percent of CFPs stated this is the case for returnees. In terms of host and non-host community, 40-60 percent of CFPs stated that the host community faces challenges whereas 60-80 percent of CFPs stated this is the case for the non-host community. CFP data for refugees and migrants in Salah district is unfortunately unavailable.

Health: Between 80-100 percent of CFPs report that access to healthcare services (facilities, health staff, etc.) is challenging for IDPs whereas between 60-80 percent of CFPs this is the case for returnees. In terms of the host- and non-host community, 40-60 percent of CFPs report the host community faces challenges whereas 60-80 percent report this is the case for the non-host community. CFP data for refugees and migrants is unfortunately unavailable. In terms of medicines and other healthcare products, 100 percent of CFPs reported that IDPs face challenges in satisfying their needs whereas between 60-80 percent of CFPs stated this is the case for returnees. Moreover, 40-60 percent of CFPs report that the host community faces challenges while 80-100 percent of CFPs report the same for the non-host community in Salah district. CFP data for refugees and migrants is unfortunately unavailable.

WASH: Between 80-100 percent of CFPs stated that IDPs and the non-host community face challenges in obtaining water for drinking purposes (including treatment); 60-80 percent of CFPs stated the same for returnees and 40-60 percent reports the same issue for the host community. In terms of hygiene commodities (clothing, soap, pads, diapers, etc.), 100 percent of CFPs state that IDPs are facing challenges in satisfying their needs whereas 60-80 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees and the non-host community. Additionally, 40-60 percent of CFP report challenges for the host community. When it relates to hygiene/sanitation facilities (toilets, showers, baths, etc.), 100 percent of CFPs state that IDPs are facing challenges in satisfying their needs whereas 60-80 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees. Moreover, between 40-60 percent of CFPs report that the host community faces challenges whereas 60-100 percent of CFPs report that the non-host community faces challenges in accessing hygiene/sanitation facilities. Between 80-100 percent of CFPs report that IDPs, returnees, and the non-host community are facing challenges in satisfying their needs in terms of solid waste disposal services (garbage collection, cleanliness of public streets, etc.) whereas 40-60 percent of CFPs stated the same for the host community in Salah district.

Shelter: When it comes to shelter/housing (rent, purchase, construction, etc.) in Salah district, 100 percent of CFPs state that IDPs face challenges whereas 40-60 percent state the same for returnees and the non-host community; 20-40 percent of CFPs state the same for the host community. When it relates to access to shelter commodities (furniture, building material, etc.), 100 percent of CFPs state that IDPs face challenges meeting their needs whereas 60-80 percent of CFPs state the same for returnees and the non-host community. Additionally, 20-40 percent of CFPs report that the host community faces challenges. In terms of access to household items (kitchen utensils, mats, mosquito nets, blankets, etc.), 100 percent of CFPs report that IDPs face challenges meeting their needs whereas 40-60 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees and the non-host community faces the same. All CFPs (100 percent) report that IDPs face challenges in meeting their needs related to energy commodities for heating, cooking, and lighting) whereas 60-80 percent report the same for returnees and the non-host community and 40-60 percent for the host community.

Education: When it comes to education services (transport, fees, teachers, etc.), 100 percent of CFPs stated IDPs face challenges whereas 80-100 of CFP respondents state the same for the non-host community, 60-80 percent for returnees, and 40-60 percent for the host community in Salah district. All CFP respondents (100 percent) report IDPs face challenges in obtaining education commodities (uniforms, shoes, stationaries, books, etc.) whereas 60-80 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees and the non-host community and 40-60 percent of CFP respondents report that the host community faces challenges in meeting their needs.

Communication: In terms of communication services (providers, towers, networks, etc.), 80-100 percent of CFPs report that IDPs and the non-host community face challenges in satisfying their needs whereas 60-80 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees and 40-60 percent for the host community in Salah district. In terms of communication commodities (phone, credit, etc.), 100 percent of CFPs report that IDPs face challenges in satisfying their needs; 80-100 percent of CFPs report that returnees and the non-host community face challenges whereas 40-60 percent of CFP respondents state the same for the host community.

Governance: Access to legal and law enforcement services (local police, courts, municipal police) is challenging to obtain for IDPs according to 100 percent of CFPs; 60-80 percent of CFPs report the same for returnees and 40-60 percent report the same for the host community in Salah district. In terms of legal and law enforcement commodities (office, credit, etc.), 100 percent of CFPs report that IDPs face challenges in satisfying their needs; 80-100 percent of CFPs report that returnees and the non-host community face challenges whereas 40-60 percent of CFP respondents state the same for the host community.

Transport: Access to transport services (all except to education, work, health centers, markets, etc.) comes with challenges for IDPs according to 100 percent of CFPs; 80-100 percent of CFPs reported these issues for the non-host community, 60-80 percent of CFPs for returnees, and 40-60 percent for the host community in Salah district.
Conclusions/highlights

- According to CFP data, in terms of population groups, IDPs are those most in need in all districts of Ta’iz city, followed by returnees, the non-host community, host community, migrants, and refugees;
- According to CFP respondents, IDPs are facing most challenges in accessing shelter/housing (rent, purchase, construction, etc.); IDPs’ second most challenging need to satisfy is related to accessing shelter commodities (furniture, building materials, etc.) whereas hygiene commodities are the third most challenging need for IDPs to meet. Needs in Salah district are especially high as 100 percent of CFP respondents indicate IDPs face challenges in accessing their needs;
- According to CFP respondents, IDPs face least challenges in satisfying their needs when it relates to accessing communication services (providers, towers, network, etc.), where needs are secondly least challenging to meet when it relates to accessing legal and law enforcement services (local police, courts, municipal police) and thirdly communication commodities (phone, credit, etc.);
Figure 1: The geographical location of Ta’iz city within the borders of the Republic of Yemen. 7
Figure 2: Conflict Timeline 8
Figure 3: Areas of Control in Ta’iz Governorate, September 2019 11
Figure 4: Analytical Framework 12
Figure 5: Primary Data Collection tools 12
Figure 6: Population Growth of Ta’iz city 14
Figure 7: Population Change Due to War in Ta’iz city 14
Figure 8: Total Population in Ta’iz city (per district), 2019 15
Figure 9: IDPs Location and Number in Ta’iz city, 2019 16
Figure 10: Percentage of IDPs out of the Total Population in Ta’iz city (per district), 2019 16
Figure 11: Primary Main Causes Named for Displacement in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 17
Figure 12: Primary Reasons Named for Coming to Current Location of Residence in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 17
Figure 13: Percentage of the IDPs Who Face Challenges in Satisfying Needs in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 18
Figure 14: Sectors Where Migrants Relatively Face the Biggest Challenges in Satisfying their Needs in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 19
Figure 15: Occurrence of Civilian Casualties in Ta’iz Governorate, 2017 20
Figure 16: Overview of Mass Civilian Casualties Incidents in Ta’iz Governorate, 2018 21
Figure 17: People in Need in Ta’iz Governorate, 2017 22
Figure 18: Main Barriers Faced by Households to Meet/Secure Basic Needs in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 22
Figure 19: Local governance in Yemen according to Laws 4/2000 and 18/2008 25
Figure 20: Activities that Local Authority Can Do/Implement Without Permission from Central Government in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 26
Figure 21: The System of Local Government in Yemen 27
Figure 22: Main Sources of Municipal Revenue in Ta’iz city, 2020 28
Figure 23: Ta’iz Governorate Office Expenditure, 2014 29
Figure 24: Ta’iz Residents Confidence in Local Councils, 2016 29
Figure 25: Ta’iz Residents Confidence in Local Authorities (Executive Organs), 2016 30
Figure 26: Status of Services Offered by Local Authorities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 30
Figure 27: Street Vendors’ Relationship with Local Authorities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 31
Figure 28: Public Announcements Made by the Local Council in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 32
Figure 29: Total Number of Governance Facilities and Their Functionalities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 33
Figure 30: IDPs in Ta’iz Governorate by Places of Origin, 2015 34
Figure 31: Population Groups Facing Biggest Challenges Satisfying/ Accessing Legal Needs (Police, Courts, etc.) in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 37
Figure 32: Demonstrations in Yemen 38
Figure 33: Situation and Status of Culture and Heritage Sites in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 39
Figure 34: Points of Interest (POI) in Ta’iz, UN Habitat (2020) 40
Figure 35: Total Number of Culture and Heritage Infrastructure and Their Functionalities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 41
Figure 36: Cairo Castle 42
TA‘IZ
SUMMARY OVERALL SITUATION IN EACH DISTRICT

Figure 37: The National Museum ................................................. 42
Figure 38: Salah Palace .............................................................. 43
Figure 39: Al Janad Mosque ......................................................... 43
Figure 40: Planned and Unplanned Urban Fabric in Ta‘iz, UN-Habitat (2020) .......................................................... 45
Figure 41: Damage Analysis Through Satellite Imagery, UN-Habitat (2020) .......................................................... 47
Figure 42: Population by Current Housing Tenure Types in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2020 ............................................. 48
Figure 43: IDPs Accommodation Typology, UN-Habitat (2020) .......................................................... 49
Figure 44: IDP Accommodations in Ta‘iz city, 2019 .......................................................... 49
Figure 45: Main Barriers to Meet/Secure Shelter and Housing (rent, purchase, construction) in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2020 .......................................................... 50
Figure 46: Labor Force Participation Rate Yemen, 2015 .......................................................... 51
Figure 47: Unemployment Rates in Yemen, 2015 .......................................................... 51
Figure 48: Agricultural Land, Industrial and Commercial Activities in Ta‘iz, UN-Habitat (2020) .......................................................... 52
Figure 49: Cultivation in Ta‘iz Governorate, 2009 .......................................................... 53
Figure 50: Food insecure HHs ......................................................... 53
Figure 51: Travel Time to Access Food Items in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2020 .......................................................... 53
Figure 52: Percentage of Food Supplies Which Are Not Readily Available in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2020 .......................................................... 53
Figure 53: Total Number of Health Facilities in Ta‘iz city (per district) and its vicinity, 2018 .......................................................... 54
Figure 54: Physical Status of Health Facilities in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2018 .......................................................... 55
Figure 55: Operational Status of Health Facilities in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2018 .......................................................... 55
Figure 56: Time Traveled to Reach Healthcare Services in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2020 .......................................................... 55
Figure 57: Main Health Facilities in Ta‘iz and its Vicinity, UN-Habitat (2020) .......................................................... 56
Figure 58: People in Need of Health Assistance in Ta‘iz city, 2019 .......................................................... 57
Figure 59: Percentage of Medicine and Other Healthcare Products Which Are Not Readily Available in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2020 .......................................................... 58
Figure 60: Number of Health Partners Providing Health Services in Ta‘iz Governorate, 2020 .......................................................... 58
Figure 61: Structure of the Educational System in Yemen. .......................................................... 60
Figure 62: Main Education Facilities in Ta‘iz, UN-Habitat (2020) .......................................................... 61
Figure 63: Private and Public Primary Schools in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2020 .......................................................... 62
Figure 64: Functionality Status of Education Infrastructure in Ta‘iz city (2020) .......................................................... 63
Figure 65: Percentage of Education Commodities and Services Which Are Not Readily Available in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2020 .......................................................... 63
Figure 66: Number of Students Enrolled, 2015 – 2017, Ta‘iz Governorate .......................................................... 63
Figure 67: Where the Majority of Households Obtain their School Supplies in Ta‘iz city (per district), 202 .......................................................... 64
Figure 68: Time Traveled to Reach Education Services in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2020 .......................................................... 64
Figure 69: Water Supply and Sanitation Coverage in Ta‘iz City (2014 and 2017) .......................................................... 65
Figure 70: Nominal Water Production (m3) .......................................................... 66
Figure 71: Damage Status of the WASH Infrastructure in Ta‘iz City (2018) .......................................................... 67
Figure 72: People in Need of WASH Services in Ta‘iz city (2019) .......................................................... 67
Figure 73: KI and CFP WASH Perceptions, 2020. .......................................................... 67
Figure 74: Main Source of Water in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020
Figure 75: Main Barriers to Meet/Secure Water for Drinking Purposes Needs in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020
Figure 76: KI and CFP Wastewater Perceptions, 2020.
Figure 77: Main Sanitation Problems in the Community
Figure 78: Frequency of Sewage and Wastewater Management Issues per District, CFP Perceptions (2020)
Figure 79: Share of Households with Access to Hand-Washing Facilities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020
Figure 80: Status of Power Sector in Ta’iz 2018
Figure 81: Ta’iz Power Sector Reconstruction and Recovery Costs
Figure 82: Travel Time to Secure/Acquire Energy Commodities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020
Figure 83: Status of Energy Facilities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020
Figure 84: Status of Solar Panels in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020
Figure 85: Fuel Shortages
Figure 86: Nightlight Change and Electricity Infrastructure in Ta’iz, UN-Habitat (2020)
Figure 87: Type of Fuel Used for Cooking in Ta’iz, 2018
Figure 88: Accessibility Challenges - Energy Commodities for Lights, Cooking and Heating
Figure 89: Tenants’ Light Sources in Ta’iz, 2018
Figure 90: Frequency of Garbage Collection in Last 30 Days in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020
Figure 91: People Living where Wastewater is Frequently Visible in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020
Figure 92: Solid Waste Management - City Level Damages
Figure 93: Solid Waste Management Issues in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020
Figure 94: Sequenced Needs and Recovery Costs in Ta’iz, 2018.
Figure 95: Status of Solid Waste Management Facilities by District, 2020
Figure 96: Photo showing public worker sanitizing a trash dump site in Ta’iz city
Figure 97: Main Barriers to Meet/Secure Solid Waste Disposal Services (Garbage Collected, Public Streets Clean, etc.) in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020
Figure 98: Urban extent, primary and secondary roads in Ta’iz city.
Figure 99: Intra-Urban Road Damage in Ta’iz City
Figure 100: Number of Vehicles by Plate Number in Ta’iz Governorate (1996-2017)
Figure 101: Main Barriers to Access/Secure Transportation Services in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020
Figure 102: Fuel Prices in Ta’iz City (2016-2020)
Figure 103: Population Group Facing the Biggest Challenges Meeting Their Transportation Needs in Ta’iz city, 2020
Figure 104: Number of Subscriptions to Fixed Telephone Lines and Mobile Cellular Telephones in Yemen, 2015-2017
Figure 105: Total Amount of Communication Facilities (Public and Private) in Ta’iz City (per district), 2020
Figure 106: Total Number of Communication Facilities and Their Functionality in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020
Figure 107: Mobile Network Coverage Ta’iz Governorate, 2019
Figure 108: Percentage of Communication Services Which Are Not Readily Available in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2020

Figure 109: Percentage of Communication Commodities Which Are Not Readily Available in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2020

Figure 110: Travel Time to Secure Communication Services and Supplies in Ta‘iz city (per district), 2020

Figure 111: Assessed Locations to Verify Damages

Figure 112: Damage Assessment for Ta‘iz city, 2019

Figure 113: Photos from Field Asset Verification for some of the residential and complex area
List of Tables

Table 1: Estimation of damage to the housing stock by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2018 .................................................. 46
Table 2: Main Industrial Investments in Ta’iz, UN-Habitat (2020) ................................................................. 53
Table 3: List of the Five Biggest Health Facilities in Ta’iz and Their Status, UN-Habitat (2020) ................. 56
Table 4: Dimensions of Ta’iz University and the Five Biggest Education Facilities in Ta’iz ......................... 61
Table 5: Electrical Powerplants Suppling Ta’iz ......................................................................................... 72
Table 6: Main Energy Issues in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 ................................................................. 76
Table 7: Main Challenges Related to the Rehabilitation of Roads Linking the Neighboring Cities in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 ........................................... 91
Table 8: Most Serious Problems Which Require Immediate Intervention in Ta’iz city (per district), 2020 ................................................................. 95